The Problem Of Evil: A Fundamentally Emotional Problem

There is pointless "distinction" that might be made between the so-called intellectual problem of evil and the emotional problem of evil in an attempt to address one of the most popular questions about theism.  The intellectual problem refers to the supposed logical difficulty of affirming God's existence in a world where whatever actions the objector considers evil are carried out.  In contrast, the emotional problem refers to emotional pain that might be felt in response to real or alleged evil.

No matter how emotionally upset the following claim may make some people, there is nothing logically contradictory about the simultaneous existence of a deity and the existence of evil, no matter how grievous that evil is.  There is no arbitrary line past which God cannot exist if humans perform an action of specific cruelty or selfishness.  Indeed, it is logically impossible for evil to exist unless a deity with a moral nature from which evil deviates also exists (not that the existence of a deity means morality must also exist, of course).  If evil does not exist, there is no intellectual problem of evil; if evil exists (and conscience does not prove that it does), there is no intellectual problem of evil.

As such, there is no genuine intellectual "problem" that requires a reconciliation of contradictory elements of theism and moral realism--reconciling two opposing concepts is an impossibility and trying to do so would be a waste of time to begin with, for no truth can contradict another!  There is only a need to discover and elaborate on the details of how the existence of God, whether that deity is benevolent or not, and the existence of human evil do not logically exclude each other.  The only problem of evil is a problem of emotional acceptance of and comfort with the concept of God and evil coexisting.

Now, some might feel as if the mere experience of emotional discomfort with the existence of perceived evil disqualifies them from appreciation of theism.  It is not as if someone morally or intellectually errs, however, by simply by struggling emotionally with certain human behaviors.  Emotional difficulties are subjective trials that do not reflect poorly on the soundness of one's worldview, nor do they reflect poorly on one's moral standing.  The very nature of emotion means that it can be unwanted, invasive, and in conflict with one's knowledge.

Although emotional dissatisfaction or difficulty with a logical fact might be a major personal struggle, it nonetheless has no place in determining one's worldview.  Emotional problems and logical problems are completely distinct, for the latter alone can disprove ideas.  If someone is deeply disturbed by the thought that an existing deity would not immediately destroy every evildoer, their inner terror has nothing to do with what is evil or with God's existence.  Only when the problem of evil is recognized as a fundamentally emotional problem can one assess it in the light of reason.