No one has ever told me that I do not take Scripture and Christianity seriously. Likewise, no one has ever told me that I am not truly devoted to rationality. I live out both rationalism and Christianity in a way that not even my enemies can legitimately criticize. Still, this does not mean that they understand the complexity of living out both of them, the nuance being of a kind that puzzles many.
A great deal of Christianity might prove false in the end, and, unlike many I know, I openly admit this and embrace this truth. I am not one of the Christians who will partner with almost anyone as long as the gospel is preached, nor am I someone who pretends like faith and logic are somehow reconcilable [1] or believes in a thing that has not been established in full. The farthest I can get to verifying Christianity is acknowledging the incontrovertible proof of an uncaused cause and then accumulating evidence that the uncaused cause has a particular nature, ultimately making a broad evidential case that Christianity seems probable [2].
Thus far I have found no conceptual disparities between Christianity and logic. That is, nothing in Christian metaphysics or doctrine is logically impossible, and here I refer to actual Christian doctrine and not the unbiblical bullshit that so many Christians believe about ethics, epistemology, or other miscellaneous subjects. I certainly do not mean that logic can prove every aspect of Christianity. Yet I do not want anyone making the mistake of believing that I would ever side with the Bible over logic, should I ever detect an actual contradiction between the two. If they are both true, neither can be "more true" than the other, since although one truth can be more important than another, both can only be equally true. But only one of them is necessarily true in its entirety. Christianity is not self-evident, but logic is.
Logic cannot be false or anything short of universal [3]; to the extent that something is not fully established by logic, it could turn out to be false in the end. No amount of faith--whether by faith one means trust in what the evidence points to or blind belief--can change this immutable reality. The minds of the unintelligent cannot grasp the nuance in a worldview like mine, with the amalgam of a pure rationalism, probabilistic commitment on the level of behaviors, and simultaneous skepticism of all that logic cannot prove in full.
I have committed to living in accordance with Christian values because the evidence supports Christianity: 1) parts of Christianity acknowledging necessary truths, the existence of a material world, the existence of an uncaused cause, and the distinction between mind and body cannot be false, 2) Christianity is internally consistent, 3) external evidence supports it, and 4) no external evidence contradicts it. But I certainly do not believe Christianity is true in full, only that it seems probable. I have also also struggled with legitimate skepticism, the doubting of anything that is not logically provable, to the point of seriously questioning the use of not killing myself. Many will not acknowledge that person can cling to perfect rationalism, skepticism of all that could be false, and Christian probabilism all at once.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/03/the-object-and-method-of-faith.html
[2]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/12/metaphysics-and-absolute-certainty.html
[3]. See here:
A. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/01/the-impossibility-of-irrationalism.html
B. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/04/the-impossibility-of-absolutely-nothing.html
Sunday, April 29, 2018
Friday, April 27, 2018
The Great Man Leadership Theory
Once used as not only a leadership theory but also a broader historical-anthropological model, the great man theory of leadership attempts to reduce all leadership talents down to one source of origin. According to this framework, some people enter the world in possession ready for leadership, having greatness already within them in the form of inborn traits. On this model these traits are viewed as the sole way that great leaders can have their talents.
This concept was initially called the great man theory because of cultural constructs viewing leadership as a male behavior, though someone could change the title to great person theory and retain the theory while extending it to both men and women. Even without the original sexist overtones, however, it remains an asinine theory. This residual stupidity of the idea, even in its non-sexist form, lies in the fact that instead of acknowledging that inborn traits do not account for all leadership ability while still focusing on them, the great person theory treats these traits as if they can never be obtained for the first time throughout one's life experiences. Focusing on something is very different than denying that anything at all besides that thing can account for some truth.
The great man/person theory is undermined by its position that leaders do not develop skills over time, but instead can only be born with the traits that enable quality leadership. While a person could certainly be born with specific traits that facilitate leadership--like intelligence, friendliness, or communicative ability--this certainly does not mean that no one can be born without them and acquire and develop them over time. Personality has two ways of coming about. The first is through natural predisposition, which the great person theory holds up as the exclusive way leadership skills appear, and the other is through the events of one's life. Either avenue can prove instrumental in the leadership talent of an individual. Some people might rely on only one for their skills, but some could also benefit from both. Only out of ignorance or stupidity would someone insist that only one or the other can be responsible for producing great leaders.
Whether in the church, the business world, politics, or society at large, people need not think that they will never be fit for leading others because they did not happen to have certain traits from birth. Human personality can be significantly shaped by experiences, and this means that even people who are in no way fit to lead can grow beyond their current states. People do not have to feel confined with whatever traits they have at the present moment. They can develop new skills, enhance existing ones, and come to a greater understanding of skills they do possess due to inborn personality characteristics. Natural talents and acquired skills can both account for the success of a leader.
This concept was initially called the great man theory because of cultural constructs viewing leadership as a male behavior, though someone could change the title to great person theory and retain the theory while extending it to both men and women. Even without the original sexist overtones, however, it remains an asinine theory. This residual stupidity of the idea, even in its non-sexist form, lies in the fact that instead of acknowledging that inborn traits do not account for all leadership ability while still focusing on them, the great person theory treats these traits as if they can never be obtained for the first time throughout one's life experiences. Focusing on something is very different than denying that anything at all besides that thing can account for some truth.
The great man/person theory is undermined by its position that leaders do not develop skills over time, but instead can only be born with the traits that enable quality leadership. While a person could certainly be born with specific traits that facilitate leadership--like intelligence, friendliness, or communicative ability--this certainly does not mean that no one can be born without them and acquire and develop them over time. Personality has two ways of coming about. The first is through natural predisposition, which the great person theory holds up as the exclusive way leadership skills appear, and the other is through the events of one's life. Either avenue can prove instrumental in the leadership talent of an individual. Some people might rely on only one for their skills, but some could also benefit from both. Only out of ignorance or stupidity would someone insist that only one or the other can be responsible for producing great leaders.
Whether in the church, the business world, politics, or society at large, people need not think that they will never be fit for leading others because they did not happen to have certain traits from birth. Human personality can be significantly shaped by experiences, and this means that even people who are in no way fit to lead can grow beyond their current states. People do not have to feel confined with whatever traits they have at the present moment. They can develop new skills, enhance existing ones, and come to a greater understanding of skills they do possess due to inborn personality characteristics. Natural talents and acquired skills can both account for the success of a leader.
Thursday, April 26, 2018
A Lie About Family
In a marriage that did not begin due to coercion or purely by the arrangements of some third party, the partners had a choice about the very existence of the relationship--the relationship literally wouldn't exist without the consent of each party. Contrary to this, a baby cannot choose what parents it is born to or what siblings it might have. I had no choice in being a member of my family, and I certainly dislike a great many of my family members. Now, some people would perhaps say that this dislike is somehow a major offense, which they might claim is the case because one owes a certain degree of special love to family members simply because they are family (I mean parents and siblings; I already addressed how choice changes the dynamics of spousal relationships).
Yes, the Bible does teach that a parent has an obligation to provide for his or her family as needed (1 Timothy 5:8), and certain offenses committed against parents by their own children are prescribed harsher penalties in Mosaic Law (compare Exodus 21:18-19 to 21:15). But it does not follow at all that a child has a moral obligation to love his or her parents more than close friends, or that a person has a moral obligation to love his or her siblings any more than he or she is obligated to love all people, even if the love of that broad obligation is only generic and impersonal. This is true even if the parents or siblings are not morally and spiritually abominable, but is especially true in cases where they are.
Even the command to honor one's parents does not require having a heightened level of personal affection for them; it only requires that one honors them, which in no way means to submit to any fallacies or sinful commands of theirs. A person's parents can be neglectful, abusive, and irrational, and they never deserve more love than a non-family member just because it came about that he or she was born to that set of parents without a choice in the matter. Children cannot come into existence without their parents, so parents do owe their children efforts to ensure their material wellbeing, as 1 Timothy 5:8 clearly describes. But no verse in the Bible comes anywhere near teaching that all immediate family members--whether they are one's siblings or parents--deserve some kind of special degree of love by nature of me happening to be born in a certain family. They don't.
Family members (again, in the non-spousal sense) are just humans one happens to share a biological connection with, and thus have no additional value whatsoever because of this connection. Morally inferior people deserve to be treated as the morally inferior beings that they are [1] whether or not they are family members, even parents. Unsound minds deserve to be treated as unsound minds whether or not those minds are those of family members. Family, unfortunately, can be one of the most draining sources of gratuitous stupidity and ideological garbage. Most of my family members, at the very least, certainly have been. I don't want other people to needlessly feel obligated to love those who do not deserve love of a deeper kind. Anyone who says otherwise is a liar and a sophist, and Christians who say otherwise after having this error exposed are inept moral theologians in addition to the other things.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/03/people-are-not-morally-equal.html
Yes, the Bible does teach that a parent has an obligation to provide for his or her family as needed (1 Timothy 5:8), and certain offenses committed against parents by their own children are prescribed harsher penalties in Mosaic Law (compare Exodus 21:18-19 to 21:15). But it does not follow at all that a child has a moral obligation to love his or her parents more than close friends, or that a person has a moral obligation to love his or her siblings any more than he or she is obligated to love all people, even if the love of that broad obligation is only generic and impersonal. This is true even if the parents or siblings are not morally and spiritually abominable, but is especially true in cases where they are.
Even the command to honor one's parents does not require having a heightened level of personal affection for them; it only requires that one honors them, which in no way means to submit to any fallacies or sinful commands of theirs. A person's parents can be neglectful, abusive, and irrational, and they never deserve more love than a non-family member just because it came about that he or she was born to that set of parents without a choice in the matter. Children cannot come into existence without their parents, so parents do owe their children efforts to ensure their material wellbeing, as 1 Timothy 5:8 clearly describes. But no verse in the Bible comes anywhere near teaching that all immediate family members--whether they are one's siblings or parents--deserve some kind of special degree of love by nature of me happening to be born in a certain family. They don't.
Family members (again, in the non-spousal sense) are just humans one happens to share a biological connection with, and thus have no additional value whatsoever because of this connection. Morally inferior people deserve to be treated as the morally inferior beings that they are [1] whether or not they are family members, even parents. Unsound minds deserve to be treated as unsound minds whether or not those minds are those of family members. Family, unfortunately, can be one of the most draining sources of gratuitous stupidity and ideological garbage. Most of my family members, at the very least, certainly have been. I don't want other people to needlessly feel obligated to love those who do not deserve love of a deeper kind. Anyone who says otherwise is a liar and a sophist, and Christians who say otherwise after having this error exposed are inept moral theologians in addition to the other things.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/03/people-are-not-morally-equal.html
On Justified True Belief
Justified true belief, a common epistemological concept, is the idea that a belief counts as knowledge if it is justified by evidence and is actually true. Depending on what is meant by justified, there might be no problem at all with this epistemology. In practice, however, this idea is sometimes heralded as confirmation that absolute certainty is not necessary for knowledge, as appropriate "justification" is sufficient. According to this inherently irrational position one does not actually have to know something in order to know it! It is amusing to me that those who subscribe to the this understanding of "justified true belief" often have quite conflicting standards for what exactly constitutes justification.
How much evidence means something is "known" (known besides the fact that there is evidence)? This is because other than absolute certainty [1] there is no such thing as a non-arbitrary, objective point past which a belief is known to be true, though there is a multitude of conflicting lines past which various people might feel subjectively persuaded. But persuasion is not proof, and belief is not knowledge. Knowledge is awareness that something is true. I cannot be aware that something is true simply because there is evidence for that thing, since mere evidence does not amount to proof of anything except that the evidence exists.
It is impossible for one to know something short of having absolute certainty about the issue in question. Although some people, including many Christian apologists--who are often just irrational sophists, whether or not they know it--will pretend like absolute certainty is not a requirement for knowledge, without absolute certainty one cannot know something, because having absolute certainty is the only way to know that something cannot possibly be false! And if a belief can be false, then the conclusion is not known to be true, meaning the belief by its very nature cannot qualify as actual knowledge. This is extremely simple.
But I cannot prove that I have existed longer than several moments at most, or that other minds exist, or that I am not a brain in a vat. What is the solution? It is devilishly simple: revise beliefs until they can be proven with perfect logicality. "That waterfall is beautiful" becomes "I think that waterfall is beautiful according to my subjective perceptions." "Jesus rose from the dead" becomes "There is significant evidence that Jesus rose from the dead, although I cannot prove this." "The sun will rise tomorrow" becomes "It seems that the sun will rise tomorrow because it has before and I have no reason to suspect it will not." I could continue to provide examples, yet I have already established my point.
One does not need absolute certainty that something is true to have absolute certainty that something is or seems to be probable, and, though anything short of absolute certainty can never justify belief in something itself, absolute certainty is not required to have a basis for committing to act as if something is true--not because it is known or because belief is justified, but because there is evidence for it. This is a key distinction that many apologists gloss over entirely, preferring to argue for the utter impossibility of faith being epistemically warranted [2].
Sometimes it is admittedly difficult to articulate the nuances of these truths to other people, yet it is something I have become fairly adept at doing (partly thanks to blogging, which necessitates that I be as clear, specific, and concise as I can be for the sake of effectiveness). Yet logic cannot be false and these truths are what logic illuminates about probability, evidence, knowledge, and belief.
[1]. See here:
A. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/12/metaphysics-and-absolute-certainty.html
B. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/02/not-everything-can-be-illusion.html
C. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-impossibility-of-total-skepticism.html
[2]. See here:
A. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/03/the-object-and-method-of-faith.html
B. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/07/the-impossibility-of-faith-in-reason.html
How much evidence means something is "known" (known besides the fact that there is evidence)? This is because other than absolute certainty [1] there is no such thing as a non-arbitrary, objective point past which a belief is known to be true, though there is a multitude of conflicting lines past which various people might feel subjectively persuaded. But persuasion is not proof, and belief is not knowledge. Knowledge is awareness that something is true. I cannot be aware that something is true simply because there is evidence for that thing, since mere evidence does not amount to proof of anything except that the evidence exists.
It is impossible for one to know something short of having absolute certainty about the issue in question. Although some people, including many Christian apologists--who are often just irrational sophists, whether or not they know it--will pretend like absolute certainty is not a requirement for knowledge, without absolute certainty one cannot know something, because having absolute certainty is the only way to know that something cannot possibly be false! And if a belief can be false, then the conclusion is not known to be true, meaning the belief by its very nature cannot qualify as actual knowledge. This is extremely simple.
But I cannot prove that I have existed longer than several moments at most, or that other minds exist, or that I am not a brain in a vat. What is the solution? It is devilishly simple: revise beliefs until they can be proven with perfect logicality. "That waterfall is beautiful" becomes "I think that waterfall is beautiful according to my subjective perceptions." "Jesus rose from the dead" becomes "There is significant evidence that Jesus rose from the dead, although I cannot prove this." "The sun will rise tomorrow" becomes "It seems that the sun will rise tomorrow because it has before and I have no reason to suspect it will not." I could continue to provide examples, yet I have already established my point.
One does not need absolute certainty that something is true to have absolute certainty that something is or seems to be probable, and, though anything short of absolute certainty can never justify belief in something itself, absolute certainty is not required to have a basis for committing to act as if something is true--not because it is known or because belief is justified, but because there is evidence for it. This is a key distinction that many apologists gloss over entirely, preferring to argue for the utter impossibility of faith being epistemically warranted [2].
Sometimes it is admittedly difficult to articulate the nuances of these truths to other people, yet it is something I have become fairly adept at doing (partly thanks to blogging, which necessitates that I be as clear, specific, and concise as I can be for the sake of effectiveness). Yet logic cannot be false and these truths are what logic illuminates about probability, evidence, knowledge, and belief.
[1]. See here:
A. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/12/metaphysics-and-absolute-certainty.html
B. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/02/not-everything-can-be-illusion.html
C. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-impossibility-of-total-skepticism.html
[2]. See here:
A. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/03/the-object-and-method-of-faith.html
B. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/07/the-impossibility-of-faith-in-reason.html
Tuesday, April 24, 2018
Philosophical Zombies
Someone recently joked with me about being a telepath. Amused, I asked what I was thinking at that time. "Something logical," I was told. Ha! She knew me at least that well! This answer was too general, and anyone who regularly spends time around me could at least guess this safely. I pressed for more detail. As all evidence available suggested would happen, she did not actually correctly describe my then-present thoughts, content with her assertion that I was thinking something "logical."
Since I am not a telepath (unless there are no other minds, of course), I have to rely on facial expressions, behaviors, and verbal communication to inform me of the mental states of others. But do any of these things actually demonstrate that there is even a single consciousness (mind) outside of my own?
Not at all. Every person and animal I see might be a philosophical zombie.
A philosophical zombie is a thing that seems to be animated by its own consciousness, when, in actuality, it has no mind, no consciousness; it is only a physical shell devoid of inner life. Philosophical zombies, of course, by their very nature could never be demonstrated to exist or not exist by a creature with my limitations, since the same limitations prevent me from establishing either possibility as true. Thus the idea of such an entity is something that is useful for epistemological and metaphysical considerations.
The notion of a philosophical zombie can be used as a hypothetical concept that establishes 1) the immateriality of consciousness (which can be proven in other ways) and 2) the inability of a person (with my limitations, at least) to prove that other minds actually exist. The former follows necessarily from the fact that a body can be imagined without consciousness, and vice versa, and the latter follows from the fact that all people and animals besides me might be philosophical zombies. Perhaps some of them are, or all of them, or none of them at all, but I am utterly unable to actually discover which of these possible options is the case.
As a mental exercise, thinking about philosophical zombies (also called p-zombies sometimes) can set our limitations before us and draw us into a rich contemplation about the nature of consciousness. Since neither of these outcomes is unprofitable, reflecting on p-zombies can be both enjoyable and educational. I cannot be a p-zombie, however--my own consciousness is infallibly certain. I can only legitimately doubt the minds of others.
Sunday, April 22, 2018
Protecting Psychology From Psychologists
Many people seem to experience the temptation to say or believe that what is true of one person must be true of another. This is indeed the case if one refers to extremely specific things about human nature. All humans, for instance, are conscious minds in mammalian bodies, or else they would not be human. Yet that all humans have minds does not mean that their mental traits (personalities) are the same, just as the fact that all humans have bodies does not mean that they all have the same physical strength or skin color, or that they all choose to partake in the same activities with their bodies. There is an enormous spectrum of human desires, motivations, and behavioral traits that are not uniform across time or geography.
Sometimes I hear psychology get criticized for the extrapolations of some psychologists, so I want to make clear what truth these criticisms might possess. Psychology itself is the study of the human mind, personalities, and behaviors, a thing quite valuable in the pursuit of knowledge. Individual psychologists, however, might make rather drastic mistakes in reasoning, especially if they belong to faulty schools of psychology (deterministic forms of behaviorism, for example). I clarify that only some psychologists are guilty of these fallacies to emphasize that I am not committing the same error of generalization in pointing to it! They might assume that what is true of one person's motivations must likewise be true in the case of another person's motivations, or that some invisible and thus unverifiable part of human consciousness (the subconscious) controls human thought and behavior, or they might embrace some other stupidity. But idiotic beliefs or erroneous conclusions of some psychologists do not make the entirety of psychology illegitimate.
No fallacy has been committed in the careful observation of a particular individual or the classification of various personalities or mental disorders. If a psychologist extrapolates from one person to another regarding personality, this is where he or she has lapsed into error (i.e. "This woman is like this, therefore women have a tendency to . . .", "Joseph likes this, therefore this study shows that men like . . ."). This indicates nothing problematic with psychology itself as a discipline, only with the conclusions held by a particular psychologist. Because of bullshit fallacies and extrapolations one might see a "new study" get replaced by a newer study, and that study contested by a newer one, with the information from one conflicting with the other(s), until only rational people can see that it is not psychology itself that is the problem, but the absurd sub-ideologies that people might bring into psychology that are the problem.
Some people I know are quick to dismiss the majority of psychology as a discipline because of the stupidity of some historical and contemporary psychologists--yet we must be careful to not indict a discipline when it is only some of the participants who are wrong. Just as an unintelligent theologian does not render all of theology false, or an assumptive physicist does not mean the entire discipline of physics is useless, the irrationality of some psychologists does not discredit the whole of psychology.
I certainly detest it when a psychologist or study extrapolates from one person to another--or contrives asinine theories of mental metaphysics (like the subconscious in the Freudian sense) or views cultural conditioning as an inescapable force. Yet, reason distinguishes between the stupidity of a person and the usefulness or legitimacy of a discipline in itself. I simply want to make it clear that psychology itself, as a mixture of general philosophy, phenomenology, and science (in some cases), is not inherently built on fabrications or assumptions. Sometimes psychology must be protected from psychologists.
Sometimes I hear psychology get criticized for the extrapolations of some psychologists, so I want to make clear what truth these criticisms might possess. Psychology itself is the study of the human mind, personalities, and behaviors, a thing quite valuable in the pursuit of knowledge. Individual psychologists, however, might make rather drastic mistakes in reasoning, especially if they belong to faulty schools of psychology (deterministic forms of behaviorism, for example). I clarify that only some psychologists are guilty of these fallacies to emphasize that I am not committing the same error of generalization in pointing to it! They might assume that what is true of one person's motivations must likewise be true in the case of another person's motivations, or that some invisible and thus unverifiable part of human consciousness (the subconscious) controls human thought and behavior, or they might embrace some other stupidity. But idiotic beliefs or erroneous conclusions of some psychologists do not make the entirety of psychology illegitimate.
No fallacy has been committed in the careful observation of a particular individual or the classification of various personalities or mental disorders. If a psychologist extrapolates from one person to another regarding personality, this is where he or she has lapsed into error (i.e. "This woman is like this, therefore women have a tendency to . . .", "Joseph likes this, therefore this study shows that men like . . ."). This indicates nothing problematic with psychology itself as a discipline, only with the conclusions held by a particular psychologist. Because of bullshit fallacies and extrapolations one might see a "new study" get replaced by a newer study, and that study contested by a newer one, with the information from one conflicting with the other(s), until only rational people can see that it is not psychology itself that is the problem, but the absurd sub-ideologies that people might bring into psychology that are the problem.
Some people I know are quick to dismiss the majority of psychology as a discipline because of the stupidity of some historical and contemporary psychologists--yet we must be careful to not indict a discipline when it is only some of the participants who are wrong. Just as an unintelligent theologian does not render all of theology false, or an assumptive physicist does not mean the entire discipline of physics is useless, the irrationality of some psychologists does not discredit the whole of psychology.
I certainly detest it when a psychologist or study extrapolates from one person to another--or contrives asinine theories of mental metaphysics (like the subconscious in the Freudian sense) or views cultural conditioning as an inescapable force. Yet, reason distinguishes between the stupidity of a person and the usefulness or legitimacy of a discipline in itself. I simply want to make it clear that psychology itself, as a mixture of general philosophy, phenomenology, and science (in some cases), is not inherently built on fabrications or assumptions. Sometimes psychology must be protected from psychologists.
Eternal Fire: A Common Assumption
Biblical descriptions of the fires of hell are often misunderstood, with the adjective attached to the fire frequently being cited as a reference to the duration of a person's punishment in hell. This is a case of an easily identifiable confusion resulting in grossly heretical claims about the nature of God, hell, and justice. How exactly does this confusion arise?
Jesus does describe hellfire as being eternal (Mathew 18:8, 25:41). This cannot be legitimately denied by exegetes. One must be careful not to draw unlinked conclusions from this fact, though. For instance, the duration of the flames themselves, which is clearly defined as perpetual, tells us nothing at all about the fate of things thrown inside them. These verses pose absolutely no threat to the doctrine of annihilationism, since it does not follow from the fire itself being eternal that anything placed in the fire will burn eternally without ceasing to exist. Just because the fire itself exists forever does not mean that unsaved humans will last forever in the fire.
The confusion of eternal conscious torment (for all unsaved humans, I must clarify [1]) comes about when people read that hellfire is called eternal and then assume that "eternal" must also refer to the suffering of any being that enters hell. This is both logically and textually an unsound conclusion, yet it is such a simple one that a person could go years without noticing it due to its commonality. That something is entrenched so deeply in Christian subcultures does not make it true.
Since these verses (and similar ones about eternal fire or eternal destruction) are basically all that supporters of eternal conscious torment for humans have to rely upon to start making a Biblical argument, the very foundations of their claims are fatally flawed at the outset, for the fire's eternality does not even come close to establishing their other ideas--like the inherent immortality of the human soul or the inherent justice of eternal conscious torment. Putting annihilationism in its rightful place as the acknowledged Biblical position on hell is the duty of any sound Christian thinker.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/03/revelation-20-and-annihilationism.html
Jesus does describe hellfire as being eternal (Mathew 18:8, 25:41). This cannot be legitimately denied by exegetes. One must be careful not to draw unlinked conclusions from this fact, though. For instance, the duration of the flames themselves, which is clearly defined as perpetual, tells us nothing at all about the fate of things thrown inside them. These verses pose absolutely no threat to the doctrine of annihilationism, since it does not follow from the fire itself being eternal that anything placed in the fire will burn eternally without ceasing to exist. Just because the fire itself exists forever does not mean that unsaved humans will last forever in the fire.
The confusion of eternal conscious torment (for all unsaved humans, I must clarify [1]) comes about when people read that hellfire is called eternal and then assume that "eternal" must also refer to the suffering of any being that enters hell. This is both logically and textually an unsound conclusion, yet it is such a simple one that a person could go years without noticing it due to its commonality. That something is entrenched so deeply in Christian subcultures does not make it true.
Since these verses (and similar ones about eternal fire or eternal destruction) are basically all that supporters of eternal conscious torment for humans have to rely upon to start making a Biblical argument, the very foundations of their claims are fatally flawed at the outset, for the fire's eternality does not even come close to establishing their other ideas--like the inherent immortality of the human soul or the inherent justice of eternal conscious torment. Putting annihilationism in its rightful place as the acknowledged Biblical position on hell is the duty of any sound Christian thinker.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/03/revelation-20-and-annihilationism.html
Uttering Names Of Other Gods
I was told several days ago that a certain verse of the Bible, Exodus 23:13, condemns the very mention of a pagan god or goddess by human beings. Here I will refute this understanding of the verse, demonstrating that it cannot mean this because of what other passages state. I will first present the verse below:
Exodus 23:13--"Be careful to do everything I have said to you. Do not invoke the names of other gods; do not let them be heard on your lips."
First of all, in context, this verse seems to be warning against uttering the names of other gods in the sense of calling upon them for aid or treating them as real entities. This is established by the use of the word "invoke" in Exodus 23:13, which means to call upon something. Certainly this would amount to a dilution of commitment to God, since, in order to seek the power of some pagan deity, one must either treat Yahweh as if he does not have the ability to act or seek another deity despite acknowledging Yahweh's sufficiency.
Secondly, and far more significantly, the Bible itself mentions the names of other deities like Baal (Numbers 25:3-5, Deuteronomy 4:3-4), Molech (Leviticus 20:1-5, 1 Kings 11:7), Ashtoreth (1 Kings 11:5)--should we not read these passages aloud? Moses, who received the Law from Yahweh, mentions the name of Baal in Numbers 25:3-5 on God's behalf. God also clearly speaks the names of other deities throughout Scripture (for instance, see Leviticus 20:2-5 again), meaning that if it truly is sinful to utter the names of other gods or goddesses, then God himself sins by doing this, and yet God cannot sin (James 1:13). So it cannot be inherently sinful to simply refer by name to false deities like Baal, Ares, Odin, Zeus, or Molech. What is certainly sinful is to call upon these deities as if they have legitimate existence or authority, as if they can come to one's aid or uproot Yahweh's power.
Also, the translation of Exodus 23:13 is questioned by some, with the claim arising that the verse does not condemn forming the sounds of names but remembering other deities with reverence. This, if true, means that these arguments of mine are not even necessary to show that it is a misinterpretation to universally condemn human reference to gods besides Yahweh. However, I do not often seek out proofs beyond purely logic-based ones whenever I do not need to, since no additional inquiry is necessary if logic alone establishes or disproves a position. Thus even if the verse has not been mistranslated, all of my previous points hold by necessity and my conclusion is still correct.
Does someone sin when he or she refers to pagan gods and goddesses? Not necessarily! The answer strictly hinges on the intent behind the words, for merely acknowledging a name does not mean that one actually believes in a deity or betrays God. Since this is the case, and since God himself mentions names of pagan deities, one can objectively refute the claim that saying a name is sinful in itself, without even consulting the original Hebrew wording.
Exodus 23:13--"Be careful to do everything I have said to you. Do not invoke the names of other gods; do not let them be heard on your lips."
First of all, in context, this verse seems to be warning against uttering the names of other gods in the sense of calling upon them for aid or treating them as real entities. This is established by the use of the word "invoke" in Exodus 23:13, which means to call upon something. Certainly this would amount to a dilution of commitment to God, since, in order to seek the power of some pagan deity, one must either treat Yahweh as if he does not have the ability to act or seek another deity despite acknowledging Yahweh's sufficiency.
| Poseidon. |
Secondly, and far more significantly, the Bible itself mentions the names of other deities like Baal (Numbers 25:3-5, Deuteronomy 4:3-4), Molech (Leviticus 20:1-5, 1 Kings 11:7), Ashtoreth (1 Kings 11:5)--should we not read these passages aloud? Moses, who received the Law from Yahweh, mentions the name of Baal in Numbers 25:3-5 on God's behalf. God also clearly speaks the names of other deities throughout Scripture (for instance, see Leviticus 20:2-5 again), meaning that if it truly is sinful to utter the names of other gods or goddesses, then God himself sins by doing this, and yet God cannot sin (James 1:13). So it cannot be inherently sinful to simply refer by name to false deities like Baal, Ares, Odin, Zeus, or Molech. What is certainly sinful is to call upon these deities as if they have legitimate existence or authority, as if they can come to one's aid or uproot Yahweh's power.
Also, the translation of Exodus 23:13 is questioned by some, with the claim arising that the verse does not condemn forming the sounds of names but remembering other deities with reverence. This, if true, means that these arguments of mine are not even necessary to show that it is a misinterpretation to universally condemn human reference to gods besides Yahweh. However, I do not often seek out proofs beyond purely logic-based ones whenever I do not need to, since no additional inquiry is necessary if logic alone establishes or disproves a position. Thus even if the verse has not been mistranslated, all of my previous points hold by necessity and my conclusion is still correct.
| Ishtar. |
Does someone sin when he or she refers to pagan gods and goddesses? Not necessarily! The answer strictly hinges on the intent behind the words, for merely acknowledging a name does not mean that one actually believes in a deity or betrays God. Since this is the case, and since God himself mentions names of pagan deities, one can objectively refute the claim that saying a name is sinful in itself, without even consulting the original Hebrew wording.
| Athena. |
Saturday, April 21, 2018
Another Error Of William Lane Craig
"I cannot think of any other belief which we have that is so fundamental and so powerfully warranted as the belief that time is real . . ."
--William Lane Craig [1]
Once again, William Lane Craig has disappointed me with his laughably inept summary of some aspect of reality. In a 2014 article that I recently found, Craig literally says that time is the most certain and foundational thing we can know of. It is astonishing to me that a professional philosopher would say that about anything other than logic and consciousness, since they alone constitute the very core of reality, as logic governs the absolute foundations of everything and there is no knowledge without a consciousness.
Truth and logic exist even in the total absence of time, matter, and conscious minds [2]--they cannot be false and cannot not exist, and nothing short of absolute certainty is what they impart. Yes, I have absolute certainty that the present moment exists and I cannot be mistaken about this, yet the existence of time is not at the foundation of necessary truths and knowledge of time is certainly not at the absolute core of epistemology and metaphysics.
There are necessary truths that are self-evident, but the existence of the past is not among them (and Craig seems to be arguing that the past, as well as the present, is obvious and at the foundation of knowledge and reality). Craig argues that because we have "temporal experience" that we are automatically justified in believing that the past exists as it appears to us, saying that "It follows from the above argument that we are prima facie justified in holding our belief in the objective reality of the distinction between past, present, and future." The existence of the present moment is self-evident in the sense that to doubt the present moment I have to exist in it, rendering any objection to the present moment self-defeating, as there cannot not be a "right now" by the nature of the way reality is [3]. But the existence of the present moment is still not as foundational as the laws of logic, the existence of truth, or the self-evidence of my own consciousness, which are all at the absolute core of my knowledge. And the past is not affirmed simply by establishing the present.
I know that the past exists because by the time I have focused on or reflected on the present moment, the present has elapsed and the moment I started focusing on has left and gone into the past. At the very least, the past has existed for a moment. This is in no way a prima facie assumed belief, as it is one that is logically demonstrable, and thus cannot be false. If I did not have this basis rooted in logic, I would have no justification for believing in the past at all, contrary to what Craig claims.
No one is prima facie justified in believing in anything, since the absence of a "defeater," as Craig sometimes calls it (meaning a refutation of something), does not establish the veracity of a claim. Prima facie means something is held to be true, i.e. believed, until disproven. However, an inability to disprove something does not prove that it is true, and there is an enormous difference between calling something seemingly probable and calling it true.
Craig has a habit of accepting certain things as true simply because he acknowledges he can't prove them false (the presence of the Holy Spirit [4], the correctness of his moral feelings, the accuracy of his sensory perceptions, etc). But I cannot prove that I should not kill every living being I come across--so should I therefore believe that I should kill every living being I can? This does not follow at all! This is one of the most asinine arguments one could ever make for anything. It is intellectually honest and rational to admit that one cannot know something if that thing truly cannot be known, and this might mean that a claim has to be rephrased so that it becomes defensible. I hope that someone does not need to even identify the stupidity of prima facie beliefs to see that knowledge and the existence of time are not at the absolute foundation of epistemology and reality--they are very foundational, but cannot be at the very foundations of them.
[1]. https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/the-reality-of-time
[2]. See here:
A. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/04/the-impossibility-of-absolutely-nothing.html
B. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/10/the-immateriality-of-logic.html
[3]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/12/metaphysics-and-absolute-certainty.html
[4]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/04/william-lane-craigs-foundational.html
--William Lane Craig [1]
Once again, William Lane Craig has disappointed me with his laughably inept summary of some aspect of reality. In a 2014 article that I recently found, Craig literally says that time is the most certain and foundational thing we can know of. It is astonishing to me that a professional philosopher would say that about anything other than logic and consciousness, since they alone constitute the very core of reality, as logic governs the absolute foundations of everything and there is no knowledge without a consciousness.
Truth and logic exist even in the total absence of time, matter, and conscious minds [2]--they cannot be false and cannot not exist, and nothing short of absolute certainty is what they impart. Yes, I have absolute certainty that the present moment exists and I cannot be mistaken about this, yet the existence of time is not at the foundation of necessary truths and knowledge of time is certainly not at the absolute core of epistemology and metaphysics.
There are necessary truths that are self-evident, but the existence of the past is not among them (and Craig seems to be arguing that the past, as well as the present, is obvious and at the foundation of knowledge and reality). Craig argues that because we have "temporal experience" that we are automatically justified in believing that the past exists as it appears to us, saying that "It follows from the above argument that we are prima facie justified in holding our belief in the objective reality of the distinction between past, present, and future." The existence of the present moment is self-evident in the sense that to doubt the present moment I have to exist in it, rendering any objection to the present moment self-defeating, as there cannot not be a "right now" by the nature of the way reality is [3]. But the existence of the present moment is still not as foundational as the laws of logic, the existence of truth, or the self-evidence of my own consciousness, which are all at the absolute core of my knowledge. And the past is not affirmed simply by establishing the present.
I know that the past exists because by the time I have focused on or reflected on the present moment, the present has elapsed and the moment I started focusing on has left and gone into the past. At the very least, the past has existed for a moment. This is in no way a prima facie assumed belief, as it is one that is logically demonstrable, and thus cannot be false. If I did not have this basis rooted in logic, I would have no justification for believing in the past at all, contrary to what Craig claims.
No one is prima facie justified in believing in anything, since the absence of a "defeater," as Craig sometimes calls it (meaning a refutation of something), does not establish the veracity of a claim. Prima facie means something is held to be true, i.e. believed, until disproven. However, an inability to disprove something does not prove that it is true, and there is an enormous difference between calling something seemingly probable and calling it true.
Craig has a habit of accepting certain things as true simply because he acknowledges he can't prove them false (the presence of the Holy Spirit [4], the correctness of his moral feelings, the accuracy of his sensory perceptions, etc). But I cannot prove that I should not kill every living being I come across--so should I therefore believe that I should kill every living being I can? This does not follow at all! This is one of the most asinine arguments one could ever make for anything. It is intellectually honest and rational to admit that one cannot know something if that thing truly cannot be known, and this might mean that a claim has to be rephrased so that it becomes defensible. I hope that someone does not need to even identify the stupidity of prima facie beliefs to see that knowledge and the existence of time are not at the absolute foundation of epistemology and reality--they are very foundational, but cannot be at the very foundations of them.
[1]. https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/the-reality-of-time
[2]. See here:
A. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/04/the-impossibility-of-absolutely-nothing.html
B. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/10/the-immateriality-of-logic.html
[3]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/12/metaphysics-and-absolute-certainty.html
[4]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/04/william-lane-craigs-foundational.html
Labels:
Absolute Certainty,
Epistemology,
Time,
William Lane Craig
Friday, April 20, 2018
Profanity And Intelligence
Have you ever heard someone say that using profanity shows a lack of intelligence? Ironically, believing that whether or not someone uses profanity has anything at all to do with his or her intelligence is actually a mark of stupidity. If someone truly holds that it follows necessarily from a person using profanity--whatever the amount of profanity or the exact words used--that the person is somehow unable to find more "sophisticated" words or that the person is unintelligent or unimaginative, then the person holding that belief relies on serious errors in reasoning.
I use profanity because I feel like using it and because it's not sinful [1], not because there are not other words I could substitute for profanity, and certainly not because I am unintelligent. I have no obligation to not do something that is not sinful (though I do abstain from using profanity in the presence of someone who asks me to do so out of love for that person), so there is no obligation for me to submit my preferences to besides not intentionally trying to offend people. But some might mistake my habit of using profanity for evidence that I do not know what else to say, when, in fact, I am well aware of multiple ways to state what is on my mind without using profanity at all. But, even if, hypothetically, someone truly does not know how to articulate something without profanity, this still says nothing about his or her intelligence, because intelligence is the extent to which someone grasps logic, not how well they communicate with others.
The other issue, which might surface in conversation with some people, is that whether or not profanity signifies unintelligence has absolutely nothing to do with any alleged moral hazards of using profanity. If someone actually uses the mythical profanity-unintelligence connection as a moral argument against use of profanity, he or she is arguing from a nonexistent connection to an ungrounded moral conclusion. It can grow quite tiring to have people make assumptions about your intelligence based upon the arbitrary linguistic terms you use, which amount to simply making sounds in a different way, but it is hilarious to me when people think that a correlation with unintelligence (in this case it might be viewed more as an act of unintelligence than a sign of low general intelligence) clearly makes something intrinsically wrong. That does not automatically follow, and is completely a separate issue (making the claim a red herring at best).
The most intelligent people I know use profanity. Some of the least intelligent people I know do not use profanity, or at least not around me. I don't even need to survey those around me to know that intelligence has nothing to do with profanity whatsoever, since logic reveals that a perfectly intelligent person could use heavy profanity frequently and that an extremely unintelligent person might not ever use profanity. Nothing about one's intelligence follows from whether or not one uses profanity, regardless of how "offensive" the words might be--and whether or not someone is offended by a word is entirely subjective.
[1]. See here:
A. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/05/the-delusion-of-inverse-morality.html
B. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/01/the-fallacies-of-anti-profanity.html
I use profanity because I feel like using it and because it's not sinful [1], not because there are not other words I could substitute for profanity, and certainly not because I am unintelligent. I have no obligation to not do something that is not sinful (though I do abstain from using profanity in the presence of someone who asks me to do so out of love for that person), so there is no obligation for me to submit my preferences to besides not intentionally trying to offend people. But some might mistake my habit of using profanity for evidence that I do not know what else to say, when, in fact, I am well aware of multiple ways to state what is on my mind without using profanity at all. But, even if, hypothetically, someone truly does not know how to articulate something without profanity, this still says nothing about his or her intelligence, because intelligence is the extent to which someone grasps logic, not how well they communicate with others.
The other issue, which might surface in conversation with some people, is that whether or not profanity signifies unintelligence has absolutely nothing to do with any alleged moral hazards of using profanity. If someone actually uses the mythical profanity-unintelligence connection as a moral argument against use of profanity, he or she is arguing from a nonexistent connection to an ungrounded moral conclusion. It can grow quite tiring to have people make assumptions about your intelligence based upon the arbitrary linguistic terms you use, which amount to simply making sounds in a different way, but it is hilarious to me when people think that a correlation with unintelligence (in this case it might be viewed more as an act of unintelligence than a sign of low general intelligence) clearly makes something intrinsically wrong. That does not automatically follow, and is completely a separate issue (making the claim a red herring at best).
The most intelligent people I know use profanity. Some of the least intelligent people I know do not use profanity, or at least not around me. I don't even need to survey those around me to know that intelligence has nothing to do with profanity whatsoever, since logic reveals that a perfectly intelligent person could use heavy profanity frequently and that an extremely unintelligent person might not ever use profanity. Nothing about one's intelligence follows from whether or not one uses profanity, regardless of how "offensive" the words might be--and whether or not someone is offended by a word is entirely subjective.
[1]. See here:
A. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/05/the-delusion-of-inverse-morality.html
B. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/01/the-fallacies-of-anti-profanity.html
Thursday, April 19, 2018
Intentional Irrationality
The vast majority of people I have met in my life are, when it comes to matters of importance, at best sheep--not only sheep, but also, in their own ways, social lemmings and intellectual insects. But a lion has no reason to care about the petty concerns of sheep. Likewise, a thorough rationalist has no reason to concern himself or herself with appeasing those who choose to remain in stupidity.
On the Christian worldview exercise of rationality is an objective moral obligation (Proverbs 19:2, 1 Thessalonians 5:21, 1 Peter 3:15), and people who intentionally refuse to do good are necessarily inferior beings to those who do intentionally do the right thing. "If people act in a morally wrong way without concern for their errors, then they choose to pursue a path that is morally inferior to the alternative pathway towards moral correctness . . . But if some courses of action and motivations are better than others, then it follows that those who actively seek the morally lesser ones are inferior to those who seek the opposite, since they intentionally choose the actions that are inferior" [1]. It follows, then, that on the Christian worldview those who refuse to exercise reason--instead clinging to errors, assumptions, and fallacies--have a lesser value than those who earnestly pursue reason and righteousness. They have chosen to align themselves with what is morally lesser and thus they themselves are lesser.
The belief of some that all ignorant people should be corrected gently is an asinine one. Some ignorance is self-imposed, and some ignorance is the result of other factors (geographical or technological limitations). There is no sin in the latter, yet the former is Biblically inexcusable, and yet so many Christians choose to live in an intellectual stupor, exchanging knowledge for assumptions, truth for error, and verification for ignorance.
A lion does not need to tread lightly lest it offend lambs, and rationalists need not worry themselves with the lesser concerns of the intellectually and morally inferior, for truth, and not other people, is the great prize of discovering reality. Though sadism and malice are inherently wrong, rational people are not Biblically obligated to treat the morally inferior as complete equals, which would be an inherently unjust thing.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/03/people-are-not-morally-equal.html
On the Christian worldview exercise of rationality is an objective moral obligation (Proverbs 19:2, 1 Thessalonians 5:21, 1 Peter 3:15), and people who intentionally refuse to do good are necessarily inferior beings to those who do intentionally do the right thing. "If people act in a morally wrong way without concern for their errors, then they choose to pursue a path that is morally inferior to the alternative pathway towards moral correctness . . . But if some courses of action and motivations are better than others, then it follows that those who actively seek the morally lesser ones are inferior to those who seek the opposite, since they intentionally choose the actions that are inferior" [1]. It follows, then, that on the Christian worldview those who refuse to exercise reason--instead clinging to errors, assumptions, and fallacies--have a lesser value than those who earnestly pursue reason and righteousness. They have chosen to align themselves with what is morally lesser and thus they themselves are lesser.
The belief of some that all ignorant people should be corrected gently is an asinine one. Some ignorance is self-imposed, and some ignorance is the result of other factors (geographical or technological limitations). There is no sin in the latter, yet the former is Biblically inexcusable, and yet so many Christians choose to live in an intellectual stupor, exchanging knowledge for assumptions, truth for error, and verification for ignorance.
A lion does not need to tread lightly lest it offend lambs, and rationalists need not worry themselves with the lesser concerns of the intellectually and morally inferior, for truth, and not other people, is the great prize of discovering reality. Though sadism and malice are inherently wrong, rational people are not Biblically obligated to treat the morally inferior as complete equals, which would be an inherently unjust thing.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/03/people-are-not-morally-equal.html
The Sins Of The Pharisees
The word Pharisee is some times thrown at someone as if it invalidates their arguments. I have been called a Pharisee several times in my life (along with several other titles intended to negatively describe me), and I scoff at the ignorance and stupidity of those who charged me with such a name, for what they meant by the term only showed that they understood neither me nor what a Pharisee is. It needs to be clarified that the Pharisees were a group of religious leaders around the time of Jesus, and thus the errors of one Pharisee does not indict the entire group. Although they are, for some reason, sometimes described as all being against Jesus' teachings, not all of them were ideological opponents of Jesus (like Nicodemus in John 3:1-21 and 19:38-39). The broad characterization of every Pharisee as an enemy of Christ is an oversimplification, a fallacious construction of shallow minds.
When "Pharisee" is used as an accusation, it usually is a charge that one has a high regard for Mosaic Law or Biblical commands in general, or perhaps that one carefully observes the exact commands of God. The modern evangelical attempt to distance themselves from Mosaic Law can sometimes motivate such accusations. Yet the problem of the Pharisees is not that they obeyed God, it is that they did not. In Matthew 15:3-9, Jesus harshly criticizes the Pharisees for not obeying God's laws and for instead honoring their own unbiblical constructs. In John 7:19 Jesus charges a crowd of Jews near the temple (meaning Pharisees were very possibly among them) with the offense of not keeping God's laws. Jesus never condemned people for actually living as God demands; he opposed doing the right thing for the sake of personal gain or public reputation. He condemned selective, insincere upholding of Mosaic Law, not the Law itself (Matthew 5:17-19).
The Pharisees Jesus rebuked may have strictly observed (at least when others were watching) their own arbitrary, non-obligatory, extra-Biblical rules, but the idea that the Pharisees Jesus sparred with obeyed Mosaic Law as a whole is untrue, and, ironically, if they did obey Mosaic Law they would not have added their subjective preferences alongside the commands of Yahweh (Deuteronomy 4:2). If a self-proclaimed Christian calls you a Pharisee for simply living as God demands, then that person is unintelligent, uneducated, or both stupid and uneducated.
When "Pharisee" is used as an accusation, it usually is a charge that one has a high regard for Mosaic Law or Biblical commands in general, or perhaps that one carefully observes the exact commands of God. The modern evangelical attempt to distance themselves from Mosaic Law can sometimes motivate such accusations. Yet the problem of the Pharisees is not that they obeyed God, it is that they did not. In Matthew 15:3-9, Jesus harshly criticizes the Pharisees for not obeying God's laws and for instead honoring their own unbiblical constructs. In John 7:19 Jesus charges a crowd of Jews near the temple (meaning Pharisees were very possibly among them) with the offense of not keeping God's laws. Jesus never condemned people for actually living as God demands; he opposed doing the right thing for the sake of personal gain or public reputation. He condemned selective, insincere upholding of Mosaic Law, not the Law itself (Matthew 5:17-19).
The Pharisees Jesus rebuked may have strictly observed (at least when others were watching) their own arbitrary, non-obligatory, extra-Biblical rules, but the idea that the Pharisees Jesus sparred with obeyed Mosaic Law as a whole is untrue, and, ironically, if they did obey Mosaic Law they would not have added their subjective preferences alongside the commands of Yahweh (Deuteronomy 4:2). If a self-proclaimed Christian calls you a Pharisee for simply living as God demands, then that person is unintelligent, uneducated, or both stupid and uneducated.
Christian Socialism
"A socialist Christian is more dangerous than a socialist atheist” (67), says a character in Brothers Karamazov. When distinguished from communism as a separate (if not related) ideology in modern times, socialism usually refers to an ideology of involuntary wealth redistribution that is not maintained with the same degree of political force as statist communism. A socialist Christian could be more dangerous than a socialist atheist because he or she might believe that God endorses some case of involuntary wealth redistribution. When a person thinks that God allows—or perhaps even demands—some abomination, misguided religious zeal can motivate great atrocities. Is there such a thing as Christian socialism/communism?
Christian socialists or communists might appeal to the behaviors of the early church in the book of Acts, claiming Biblical affirmation of wealth redistribution. The actual contents of Acts, though, neither prescribe any form of socialism/communism nor describe nonconsensual redistribution of resources. Acts 2:44-45 recounts how early Christians voluntarily shared wealth: “All the believers were together and had everything in common. Selling their possessions and goods, they gave to anyone as he had need.” This is remarkably different than more recent socialism and communism—when a faction seeks to reorganize the resources of another group by taking that group’s resources, something quite contrary to the love-based actions of the early Christians occurs.
If a socialistic idea goes beyond the version of property redistribution in Acts 2, it cannot legitimately be held up as a Christian concept. Other parts of the Bible, particularly in the Old Testament, very forcefully acknowledge a right to private property. Scripture even permits people to kill thieves who invade their homes at night, saying that in these incidents “the defender is not guilty of bloodshed” (Exodus 22:2). The early church in no way practiced a form of wealth redistribution that deprived people of private property without their consent. In Acts, the communism/socialism in the church was a voluntary system, founded on the mutual love shared by Christians who regarded each other as brothers and sisters. To isolate a communistic or socialistic atmosphere from this ideological framework can quickly prove disastrous. Divorced from uncoerced love, wealth redistribution will be fueled by egoism, covetousness, and a dehumanizing tendency to view others as means towards a self-focused (or state-focused) end.
Yes, there is such a thing as Christian socialism/communism, and it is described in Acts—but it is not obligatory for Christians and it does not deprive anyone of belongings against that person’s will. No one had to surrender personal ownership of items. Acts never prescribes this or credits God with commanding it. It was a collective decision made out of genuine affection for fellow Christians, not a forced resource pooling in the name of God. This crucial factor separates the actions of the early church from numerous other socialistic practices throughout history.
A Christian who mistakenly holds that God demands or encourages a different kind of socialism/communism, though, can be a very dangerous person indeed. When an atheist is a socialist of any sort, he or she is not misrepresenting the nature of God. Such a person does not think himself or herself theologically obligated to redistribute the property of others. A Christian, though, might stubbornly resist all correction, embracing the idea that God wants or commands this redistribution. This can prove dangerous indeed.
Dostoevsky, Fyodor. Brothers Karamazov. Trans. Pevear, Richard, and Volokhonsky, Larissa. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1990. Print.
Christian socialists or communists might appeal to the behaviors of the early church in the book of Acts, claiming Biblical affirmation of wealth redistribution. The actual contents of Acts, though, neither prescribe any form of socialism/communism nor describe nonconsensual redistribution of resources. Acts 2:44-45 recounts how early Christians voluntarily shared wealth: “All the believers were together and had everything in common. Selling their possessions and goods, they gave to anyone as he had need.” This is remarkably different than more recent socialism and communism—when a faction seeks to reorganize the resources of another group by taking that group’s resources, something quite contrary to the love-based actions of the early Christians occurs.
If a socialistic idea goes beyond the version of property redistribution in Acts 2, it cannot legitimately be held up as a Christian concept. Other parts of the Bible, particularly in the Old Testament, very forcefully acknowledge a right to private property. Scripture even permits people to kill thieves who invade their homes at night, saying that in these incidents “the defender is not guilty of bloodshed” (Exodus 22:2). The early church in no way practiced a form of wealth redistribution that deprived people of private property without their consent. In Acts, the communism/socialism in the church was a voluntary system, founded on the mutual love shared by Christians who regarded each other as brothers and sisters. To isolate a communistic or socialistic atmosphere from this ideological framework can quickly prove disastrous. Divorced from uncoerced love, wealth redistribution will be fueled by egoism, covetousness, and a dehumanizing tendency to view others as means towards a self-focused (or state-focused) end.
Yes, there is such a thing as Christian socialism/communism, and it is described in Acts—but it is not obligatory for Christians and it does not deprive anyone of belongings against that person’s will. No one had to surrender personal ownership of items. Acts never prescribes this or credits God with commanding it. It was a collective decision made out of genuine affection for fellow Christians, not a forced resource pooling in the name of God. This crucial factor separates the actions of the early church from numerous other socialistic practices throughout history.
A Christian who mistakenly holds that God demands or encourages a different kind of socialism/communism, though, can be a very dangerous person indeed. When an atheist is a socialist of any sort, he or she is not misrepresenting the nature of God. Such a person does not think himself or herself theologically obligated to redistribute the property of others. A Christian, though, might stubbornly resist all correction, embracing the idea that God wants or commands this redistribution. This can prove dangerous indeed.
Dostoevsky, Fyodor. Brothers Karamazov. Trans. Pevear, Richard, and Volokhonsky, Larissa. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1990. Print.
Monday, April 16, 2018
The Allure Of Sin
There is a reason why the book of James demands that we must obey Scripture and not merely read it (James 1:22), as if merely reading about righteousness would infuse our lifestyles with it. The unfortunate truth is that someone will not do the right thing just because he or she knows what the right thing is. Knowledge does not guarantee action, and without action knowledge has not produced change where it is needed. The point of knowledge is to learn about reality, and education can illuminate an area where a person does not live according to reality, with the realm of ethics being a crucial example.
In one sense, some people might have a far more difficult time succumbing to evil if they understood its depravity. Recognizing evil for what it is can certainly bring an attitude of revulsion towards sin. But nothing about having moral knowledge necessitates that one will act righteously--this is the nature of fallen human behavior. An evil thing is in itself objectively repulsive, damnable, and depraved, but this does not erase the allure that sin might have for a person. For some people, the evil of a thing might even be part of the allure. A thing can be harmful and vile even if one finds comfort in it.
The idea that everyone would do the right thing if they only knew what set of actions is morally obligatory reeks of errors. The assumption here is not only irrational, but it is also highly destructive--when people think that moral knowledge is all they need to be good, they can overlook or justify evils of their choice, misjudging their actions to be good because they truly (but perhaps mistakenly) believe they have right moral knowledge. But even rational metaphysics and valid epistemology alone cannot make someone do the right thing. To live rightly requires a decision of the will, not merely a recognition of the intellect.
Of course, apart from the intellect and divine revelation one cannot have moral knowledge to begin with [1], so it is untrue to pretend like one can intentionally do the right thing without the guidance of the intellect or moral revelation from God; otherwise at best one could do the right thing by accident. Yet even perfect knowledge of God's moral revelation, on its own, is insufficient for living out a righteous life, since knowledge can be compartmentalized away from actual behavior. Irrational and selfish people have the power to ignore what they do know in favor of their own delusions and preferences. The solution, alongside practice of thorough rationality, is an orienting of the will towards what is good. A person is not bound to make a choice that he or she does not want to, and thus the will might need to be redirected to desire what is right and true. It follows that people need to not merely know something is sinful, but to also to come to despise it and see through any subjective allure that it may have.
[1]. Divine revelation is inescapably necessary for moral knowledge, with conscience at best amounting to a subjective and arbitrary tool, but understanding divine revelation is utterly impossible without the light of reason:
https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/03/the-nature-of-conscience.html
In one sense, some people might have a far more difficult time succumbing to evil if they understood its depravity. Recognizing evil for what it is can certainly bring an attitude of revulsion towards sin. But nothing about having moral knowledge necessitates that one will act righteously--this is the nature of fallen human behavior. An evil thing is in itself objectively repulsive, damnable, and depraved, but this does not erase the allure that sin might have for a person. For some people, the evil of a thing might even be part of the allure. A thing can be harmful and vile even if one finds comfort in it.
The idea that everyone would do the right thing if they only knew what set of actions is morally obligatory reeks of errors. The assumption here is not only irrational, but it is also highly destructive--when people think that moral knowledge is all they need to be good, they can overlook or justify evils of their choice, misjudging their actions to be good because they truly (but perhaps mistakenly) believe they have right moral knowledge. But even rational metaphysics and valid epistemology alone cannot make someone do the right thing. To live rightly requires a decision of the will, not merely a recognition of the intellect.
Of course, apart from the intellect and divine revelation one cannot have moral knowledge to begin with [1], so it is untrue to pretend like one can intentionally do the right thing without the guidance of the intellect or moral revelation from God; otherwise at best one could do the right thing by accident. Yet even perfect knowledge of God's moral revelation, on its own, is insufficient for living out a righteous life, since knowledge can be compartmentalized away from actual behavior. Irrational and selfish people have the power to ignore what they do know in favor of their own delusions and preferences. The solution, alongside practice of thorough rationality, is an orienting of the will towards what is good. A person is not bound to make a choice that he or she does not want to, and thus the will might need to be redirected to desire what is right and true. It follows that people need to not merely know something is sinful, but to also to come to despise it and see through any subjective allure that it may have.
[1]. Divine revelation is inescapably necessary for moral knowledge, with conscience at best amounting to a subjective and arbitrary tool, but understanding divine revelation is utterly impossible without the light of reason:
https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/03/the-nature-of-conscience.html
Sunday, April 15, 2018
The Folly Of Naive Realism
Many people, it appears, are naive realists unless at some point they begin to think critically and only accept as true things which are rationally demonstrable. What is naive realism? It is the belief--by its very nature an assumed belief--that the external world [1] really is as it appears to be. For instance, a naive realist named Susan will think that because she perceives a tree in front of her the tree must exist (i.e. it is not an illusion). This is why it is called naive. It is not a rational, provable belief in any way.
A great example of someone supportive of this ideology is G.E. Moore, who mistakenly thought he could prove the external world simply by holding up his two hands. Many people, if asked, might offer similar "proofs" of the reliability of their senses. But, unfortunately, both naive realists and skeptics so often fail to understand the most basic truths about the external world and perceptions of external objects.
It is true that logic cuts deeply and fatally into naive realism, exposing the leap between perceiving an external object and the external object actually existing as perceived [2]. My senses are utterly unreliable in the sense that they cannot verify if my sensory perceptions connect with the actual material world, although there is no proof that my senses are unreliable in the sense of totally deceiving me about the appearance of the external world. Any being with my limitations that pretends to know anything about a particular external object beyond the fact that it is being immediately perceived is an irrational thinker. I despise this fact, but it remains a fact despite my discontentment. I cannot know if the iPad I am writing this post with is a part of the actual external world. And I do not pretend to know what I cannot verify.
Still, there are at least a handful of truths about the external world that I know for sure. First of all, there is some sort of external world made of physical matter, and I know this for sure [3], although whether or not it would exist apart from my mind, if my consciousness ceased to exist, is unknown [4]. I cannot experience physical sensations without actually having a physical body, so the fact that I do experience physical sensations means that I really do have a body (though I do not know its actual appearance). Likewise, I know for sure that I do encounter some sort of physical stimuli beyond my body--again, because of my sense of touch. I really am contacting something.
Secondly, I have specific perceptions of specific external objects. I cannot perceive something that I am not perceiving, so the fact that I have specific perceptions of the external world cannot be illusory (even if they do not conform to the way the external world actually is). Thirdly, logic governs the entirety of whatever external world exists. Nothing can not be what it is, and thus, even if there is an unbridgeable distance between me perceiving specific objects and knowing if those objects exist, I know that nothing in the external world is logically impossible.
Though naive realism is nonsense as an epistemological thesis, denial of the external world is also nonsense and is objectively false, meaning that total skepticism about the external world is also an incorrect position, for in proving that an external world exists I also disprove total skepticism about the external world. The stupidity of beings similar to myself who actually believe that there is no external world is incredibly thorough, but this fact does not liberate me from skepticism about the accuracy of my sense perceptions. Naive realism is a metaphysical framework held by persons who either assume in ignorance or are aware of their limitations and yet choose to believe in the unknown anyway. I have long refused to be either kind of person.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/03/defining-external-world.html
[2]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/04/the-reliability-of-senses.html
[3]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/08/the-external-world.html
[4]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/04/the-relationship-between-idealism-and.html
A great example of someone supportive of this ideology is G.E. Moore, who mistakenly thought he could prove the external world simply by holding up his two hands. Many people, if asked, might offer similar "proofs" of the reliability of their senses. But, unfortunately, both naive realists and skeptics so often fail to understand the most basic truths about the external world and perceptions of external objects.
It is true that logic cuts deeply and fatally into naive realism, exposing the leap between perceiving an external object and the external object actually existing as perceived [2]. My senses are utterly unreliable in the sense that they cannot verify if my sensory perceptions connect with the actual material world, although there is no proof that my senses are unreliable in the sense of totally deceiving me about the appearance of the external world. Any being with my limitations that pretends to know anything about a particular external object beyond the fact that it is being immediately perceived is an irrational thinker. I despise this fact, but it remains a fact despite my discontentment. I cannot know if the iPad I am writing this post with is a part of the actual external world. And I do not pretend to know what I cannot verify.
Still, there are at least a handful of truths about the external world that I know for sure. First of all, there is some sort of external world made of physical matter, and I know this for sure [3], although whether or not it would exist apart from my mind, if my consciousness ceased to exist, is unknown [4]. I cannot experience physical sensations without actually having a physical body, so the fact that I do experience physical sensations means that I really do have a body (though I do not know its actual appearance). Likewise, I know for sure that I do encounter some sort of physical stimuli beyond my body--again, because of my sense of touch. I really am contacting something.
| I cannot know if a stimuli in the external world has the exact appearance I perceive, but I know both that there is an external world and that I have specific perceptions of objects within it. |
Secondly, I have specific perceptions of specific external objects. I cannot perceive something that I am not perceiving, so the fact that I have specific perceptions of the external world cannot be illusory (even if they do not conform to the way the external world actually is). Thirdly, logic governs the entirety of whatever external world exists. Nothing can not be what it is, and thus, even if there is an unbridgeable distance between me perceiving specific objects and knowing if those objects exist, I know that nothing in the external world is logically impossible.
Though naive realism is nonsense as an epistemological thesis, denial of the external world is also nonsense and is objectively false, meaning that total skepticism about the external world is also an incorrect position, for in proving that an external world exists I also disprove total skepticism about the external world. The stupidity of beings similar to myself who actually believe that there is no external world is incredibly thorough, but this fact does not liberate me from skepticism about the accuracy of my sense perceptions. Naive realism is a metaphysical framework held by persons who either assume in ignorance or are aware of their limitations and yet choose to believe in the unknown anyway. I have long refused to be either kind of person.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/03/defining-external-world.html
[2]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/04/the-reliability-of-senses.html
[3]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/08/the-external-world.html
[4]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/04/the-relationship-between-idealism-and.html
Labels:
Epistemology,
External World,
Illusion,
Metaphysics,
Senses
Saturday, April 14, 2018
William Lane Craig's Foundational Assumption
William Lane Craig, though often held up as an undefeated Christian apologist, does not even attempt to conceal the fact that the core of his religious worldview is rooted not in logic or in evidence, but in private experiences of the heart. He appeals to the "inner witness" of the Holy Spirit, which he has called "self-authenticating." See this video here for an example: https://youtu.be/cC3q3qYIhdI. In this video, Craig answers a question about how he knows that the Holy Spirit is present with him. And his answer is thoroughly illogical. If you haven't watched the video, viewing it before reading this post further will let you see what parts of his answer I am specifically referring to in my dissection.
First of all, skepticism about the inner witness of the Holy Spirit is not refuted at all by simply asking the same questions Craig was asked about the accuracy of sense perceptions. Second, Craig's answer implies that if I am a brain in a vat then I am deceived into merely "perceiving" an external world--but an external world still exists if I am a brain in a vat, as matter would still exist. There would be a brain my consciousness resides in, and also a vat! In fact, the existence of an external world of some kind is something I know with absolute certainty [1]. I don't have to know that I am perceiving the external world as it actually appears to know that an external world exists. Third, Craig holds that "in the absence of any defeater" for the position that our immediate sensory experiences are reliable, we are somehow justified in simply assuming the reliability of our sensory perceptions. This is not true, for it does not follow from sensory skepticism.
Then there is the fact that the followers of any religion--any religion whatsoever--could claim that an inner sense of the divine validates their own religion. Craig has said at miscellaneous times, rather openly, that he would believe in Christianity even if all external evidence for Christianity did not exist or was unknown to him. At its core, his worldview rests on an assumption. He assumes that his introspective experiences confirm the existence of God in a way that actually negates the need for logical proof or evidence beyond the experiences. Likewise, when Craig talks about moral knowledge he assumes that the existence of his conscience somehow means that morality exists or that he is, at the very least, justified in believing in morality. Conscience is a purely subjective thing, and moral truths, by their very nature, cannot be self-evident. Conscience can only prove that conscience exists.
As newer videos and articles evidence, Craig has not changed these positions in recent times. There was a point in my earlier life where I deeply respected many Christian apologists. Now, I recognize the fallacies and errors that thoroughly permeate some of their epistemologies. Some of the most blatant errors on the part of contemporary apologists show themselves in the beliefs these apologists have about ethical knowledge, the veracity of logic, and their assumption that it is rational to believe in things without absolute certainty. It is rational to believe, short of absolute certainty, only that something seems probable if there is evidence for it, but this is something very different.
The difference between me and some other apologists is that I am not a Christian for reasons that do not pertain to evidence. I am only a Christian because of the evidence, and I would abandon Christianity at the first legitimate contradiction or impossibility found within it. If I was born into an era or geographical region that isolated me from the evidence I would not be a Christian (though I could still know through logic that an uncaused cause exists). People like Craig may not like or understand this, but their fallacies and assumptions do not belong to me as well. I care nothing for subjective inner comfort if it means I must sacrifice logicality and truth.
[1]. See here:
A. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/08/the-external-world.html
B. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/11/closing-my-eyes.html
First of all, skepticism about the inner witness of the Holy Spirit is not refuted at all by simply asking the same questions Craig was asked about the accuracy of sense perceptions. Second, Craig's answer implies that if I am a brain in a vat then I am deceived into merely "perceiving" an external world--but an external world still exists if I am a brain in a vat, as matter would still exist. There would be a brain my consciousness resides in, and also a vat! In fact, the existence of an external world of some kind is something I know with absolute certainty [1]. I don't have to know that I am perceiving the external world as it actually appears to know that an external world exists. Third, Craig holds that "in the absence of any defeater" for the position that our immediate sensory experiences are reliable, we are somehow justified in simply assuming the reliability of our sensory perceptions. This is not true, for it does not follow from sensory skepticism.
Then there is the fact that the followers of any religion--any religion whatsoever--could claim that an inner sense of the divine validates their own religion. Craig has said at miscellaneous times, rather openly, that he would believe in Christianity even if all external evidence for Christianity did not exist or was unknown to him. At its core, his worldview rests on an assumption. He assumes that his introspective experiences confirm the existence of God in a way that actually negates the need for logical proof or evidence beyond the experiences. Likewise, when Craig talks about moral knowledge he assumes that the existence of his conscience somehow means that morality exists or that he is, at the very least, justified in believing in morality. Conscience is a purely subjective thing, and moral truths, by their very nature, cannot be self-evident. Conscience can only prove that conscience exists.
As newer videos and articles evidence, Craig has not changed these positions in recent times. There was a point in my earlier life where I deeply respected many Christian apologists. Now, I recognize the fallacies and errors that thoroughly permeate some of their epistemologies. Some of the most blatant errors on the part of contemporary apologists show themselves in the beliefs these apologists have about ethical knowledge, the veracity of logic, and their assumption that it is rational to believe in things without absolute certainty. It is rational to believe, short of absolute certainty, only that something seems probable if there is evidence for it, but this is something very different.
The difference between me and some other apologists is that I am not a Christian for reasons that do not pertain to evidence. I am only a Christian because of the evidence, and I would abandon Christianity at the first legitimate contradiction or impossibility found within it. If I was born into an era or geographical region that isolated me from the evidence I would not be a Christian (though I could still know through logic that an uncaused cause exists). People like Craig may not like or understand this, but their fallacies and assumptions do not belong to me as well. I care nothing for subjective inner comfort if it means I must sacrifice logicality and truth.
[1]. See here:
A. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/08/the-external-world.html
B. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/11/closing-my-eyes.html
Labels:
Apologetics,
Epistemology,
Fallacies,
Skepticism,
William Lane Craig
Thursday, April 12, 2018
Specificity In Language
Over time careless use of language can reinforce belief in false ideas. When numerous people in a society use language inconsistently, or without conceptual accuracy, the quality of public intellectual discourse will suffer. In particular, the uneducated and shallow thinkers might be easily disoriented. It is unfortunate that many people, in my experience, are often not very careful in the selection of their words, and thus may not even know what themselves mean by certain words that they are using. What are some examples of the confusion that can result? Two specific examples come to my mind.
Since I recently wrote on how several things (logic, truth, and space) exist in the absence of any matter and minds, I will use a related example. Say I were to show someone a picture that is entirely black, and he or she tells me that there is "nothing" in the picture. Is this accurate? Not at all, since there is still space, logic, etc. No objects is not the same as nothing. Misunderstanding of this matter can lead to false statements about reality prior to the Big Bang irrespective of whether or not God exists.
Another example is the way that people sometimes speak as if the brain is somehow separate from the body. So many times I have heard people distinguish brains from bodies, as if brains were not merely parts of bodies [1]! One is just a component of the other. This kind of imprecise or inaccurate language can lead to entirely gratuitous confusion about the distinction between consciousness, the brain, and other body parts. The confusion could be avoided if people merely used language precisely and consistently.
At this point in my life, I find it easy to speak concisely and specifically the vast majority of the time. This is because I've practiced doing so for a long time. Even if clarity of speech is not a normal part of someone's lifestyle, it is not as if it is impossible to include it. When most people do not include it in their lives the public sphere becomes contaminated with ideological murkiness--or at least murkiness of communication when it comes to ideas, even if not concerning the ideas themselves.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/01/the-language-of-substance-dualism.html
Since I recently wrote on how several things (logic, truth, and space) exist in the absence of any matter and minds, I will use a related example. Say I were to show someone a picture that is entirely black, and he or she tells me that there is "nothing" in the picture. Is this accurate? Not at all, since there is still space, logic, etc. No objects is not the same as nothing. Misunderstanding of this matter can lead to false statements about reality prior to the Big Bang irrespective of whether or not God exists.
Another example is the way that people sometimes speak as if the brain is somehow separate from the body. So many times I have heard people distinguish brains from bodies, as if brains were not merely parts of bodies [1]! One is just a component of the other. This kind of imprecise or inaccurate language can lead to entirely gratuitous confusion about the distinction between consciousness, the brain, and other body parts. The confusion could be avoided if people merely used language precisely and consistently.
At this point in my life, I find it easy to speak concisely and specifically the vast majority of the time. This is because I've practiced doing so for a long time. Even if clarity of speech is not a normal part of someone's lifestyle, it is not as if it is impossible to include it. When most people do not include it in their lives the public sphere becomes contaminated with ideological murkiness--or at least murkiness of communication when it comes to ideas, even if not concerning the ideas themselves.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/01/the-language-of-substance-dualism.html
Bikinis Are Not Sexual
Brace yourselves; summer is coming! Pardon my double misquotation of Game of Thrones' Ned Stark. Because it's almost summer yet again, I want to emphasize yet again that there is nothing morally problematic about bikinis [1]. Each summer gives legalists new opportunities to heighten their efforts in condemning people for innocent things--things like wearing bikinis, because they can allegedly "make" people sexually lust--and I am going to refute them every summer as long as I need to.
I can easily run through, yet again, a concise summary of why evangelical modesty teachings are entirely nonsense. There is no standard of modesty revealed by logic or Scripture (with modesty here meaning a certain amount of clothing one must wear). In fact, on the Biblical worldview there is no such thing as any standard of modesty and there is no general obligation to cover one's body at all (Deuteronomy 4:2). There is nothing sinful about the human body, even when it is unclothed in its entirety (Genesis 1:31; see James 1:13, Isaiah 20:1-6, and Exodus 22:26-27). Then there's the fact that sexual attraction is entirely nonsinful in itself, and the Bible only condemns coveting someone else's spouse, wanting to commit a sexual sin, or mentally reducing a person to just one component of his or her being (objectification). Besides, no person can make another being with free will sin. And bikinis are not sexual whatsoever in themselves. There is also the idiotic tendency for evangelicals to treat women as asexual or demisexual beings and men as hypersexual beings, when gender has absolutely nothing to do with whether or not one is asexual, demisexual, and so on. For lengthier elaborations on these things, see earlier posts.
An error that needs to be extinguished for good, the one I want to magnify and dissect here, is the idea that bikinis are somehow sexual, when they are objectively nonsexual. Why does this myth persist in some evangelical minds? It only persists because of stubbornness on the part of its adherents. Nothing at all about the human body, physical beauty, and aesthetic attraction themselves is sexual. Unsurprisingly, misunderstanding these facts can lead to many manifestations of legalism, asceticism, and pointless guilt.
If I was to walk around without a shirt on, or even without any clothing, the exposure of my body does not mean that I am trying to attract female attention or that I am intending to show off my body (though absolutely nothing is wrong with either on their own). It is also true that a woman wearing a bikini is not necessarily doing so in an effort to attract male attention. Even if I and the hypothetical aforementioned woman did intentionally show our bodies hoping to attract the attention of the respective opposite gender, this is not necessarily sexual in nature. A desire to simply be thought of as beautiful, apart from sexual feelings, can motivate a person to show his or her body. Someone might feel confident at being admired independent of a relationship or of sexual fulfillment.
Just as nothing about a male going shirtless is sexual, though the context or intentions behind the exposure might be, nothing at all about a bikini is sexual, and only the context or intentions in wearing it might be sexual. It is asinine to think that bikinis are sexual in nature or that every time a woman wears one she has sexual motivations, just as it is asinine to think that the exposed male form is inherently sexual or that a shirtless man must have sexual motivations for forgoing certain clothing.
I hope that this summer Christian legalists cease their stupidity, confront any heretical asceticism they might cling to about the alleged sinfulness of the human body, and come to both accept their own bodies as very good and have peace about seeing, and perhaps even admiring, the bodies of others.
[1]. See here:
A. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/05/bikinis-are-not-sinful.html
B. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2016/07/the-folly-of-modesty-part-1.html
I can easily run through, yet again, a concise summary of why evangelical modesty teachings are entirely nonsense. There is no standard of modesty revealed by logic or Scripture (with modesty here meaning a certain amount of clothing one must wear). In fact, on the Biblical worldview there is no such thing as any standard of modesty and there is no general obligation to cover one's body at all (Deuteronomy 4:2). There is nothing sinful about the human body, even when it is unclothed in its entirety (Genesis 1:31; see James 1:13, Isaiah 20:1-6, and Exodus 22:26-27). Then there's the fact that sexual attraction is entirely nonsinful in itself, and the Bible only condemns coveting someone else's spouse, wanting to commit a sexual sin, or mentally reducing a person to just one component of his or her being (objectification). Besides, no person can make another being with free will sin. And bikinis are not sexual whatsoever in themselves. There is also the idiotic tendency for evangelicals to treat women as asexual or demisexual beings and men as hypersexual beings, when gender has absolutely nothing to do with whether or not one is asexual, demisexual, and so on. For lengthier elaborations on these things, see earlier posts.
An error that needs to be extinguished for good, the one I want to magnify and dissect here, is the idea that bikinis are somehow sexual, when they are objectively nonsexual. Why does this myth persist in some evangelical minds? It only persists because of stubbornness on the part of its adherents. Nothing at all about the human body, physical beauty, and aesthetic attraction themselves is sexual. Unsurprisingly, misunderstanding these facts can lead to many manifestations of legalism, asceticism, and pointless guilt.
If I was to walk around without a shirt on, or even without any clothing, the exposure of my body does not mean that I am trying to attract female attention or that I am intending to show off my body (though absolutely nothing is wrong with either on their own). It is also true that a woman wearing a bikini is not necessarily doing so in an effort to attract male attention. Even if I and the hypothetical aforementioned woman did intentionally show our bodies hoping to attract the attention of the respective opposite gender, this is not necessarily sexual in nature. A desire to simply be thought of as beautiful, apart from sexual feelings, can motivate a person to show his or her body. Someone might feel confident at being admired independent of a relationship or of sexual fulfillment.
| Nothing at all about bikinis themselves is sexual. |
Just as nothing about a male going shirtless is sexual, though the context or intentions behind the exposure might be, nothing at all about a bikini is sexual, and only the context or intentions in wearing it might be sexual. It is asinine to think that bikinis are sexual in nature or that every time a woman wears one she has sexual motivations, just as it is asinine to think that the exposed male form is inherently sexual or that a shirtless man must have sexual motivations for forgoing certain clothing.
I hope that this summer Christian legalists cease their stupidity, confront any heretical asceticism they might cling to about the alleged sinfulness of the human body, and come to both accept their own bodies as very good and have peace about seeing, and perhaps even admiring, the bodies of others.
[1]. See here:
A. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/05/bikinis-are-not-sinful.html
B. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2016/07/the-folly-of-modesty-part-1.html
Two Schools Of Psychology
Psychology, like all other disciplines, is inherently held up by philosophy. Psychology is the study of the human mind and/or human behaviors, and thus it can overlap with phenomenology, the study of consciousness, in many ways (at least certain modes of psychology). Behavioral analysis in psychology could assess how personality, background, and features of human consciousness impact outward actions. There are two particular schools of psychology that I want to describe and analyze here: structuralism and behaviorism. Each is extremely contrary to the other! One can easily see how philosophy is inseparably intertwined with various approaches to psychology and with the ramifications of each.
Structuralism
Structuralism is about identifying and classifying aspects of consciousness, primarily relying on logic and introspection (in this sense, a good deal of what I have written about consciousness and phenomenology is already highly structuralist). The aim is to explore and chart out the "structure" of the human mind. Units of experience, called qualia in modern phenomenology, are divided down into their basic components and analyzed by oneself. A criticism of structuralism that I have seen is that it it is limited and does not assess behaviors. This is not a reflection of any error within structuralism, as this observation only highlights the fact that structuralism does not address the totality of the human person.
Structuralism by no means contains false ideas in itself, and it safely relies on the only tools that can grant absolute certainty (logic and introspection)--but, as far as holistic psychology goes, it is incomplete given its lack of focus on outward human behavior. It deals with the metaphysics of the human mind, not with how the contents of the mind are expressed in bodily actions. However, structuralism does not pursue unobservable phenomena; it emphasizes mental activities that a conscious subject can observe within itself using the inward gaze of introspection [1].
Behaviorism
Whereas structuralism dissects the internal content of consciousness, behaviorism dismisses introspection altogether in favor of focusing on external behavior, holding in its most pure forms that all behaviors and mental events are in some way mandatorily caused by external stimuli. Behaviorism quickly becomes very, if not purely, deterministic. If all of my behaviors and thoughts are merely reactions to external stimuli (and this also errs in ignoring the prominence of internal thoughts and desires that underlay behaviors), then it is impossible for me to have free will, as my stream of consciousness and bodily actions are dictated by outside stimuli. This would leave me with no ultimate control over any reaction of mine. I would be reacting, not deliberating and choosing behaviors from a series of alternatives.
Logic proves to me that it follows from the fact that I have knowledge that I do possess free will [2], however, so behaviorism as a system must be rejected by rational people due to the way that it attacks the concept of human free will. Behaviorism is a deeply flawed response to structuralism, and, although structuralism in no way accounts for the full extent of human nature, since I am a creature with a body and not just a consciousness, there is no methodological error embedded in the very nature of structuralism.
It is important to remember that just because something is incomplete in a certain way does not mean that it can be legitimately tossed aside. When an idea is incomplete, it is not to be rejected, but united with the missing components it needs to accurately reflect reality. Even if an idea is erroneous, responding to one error by embracing another is an irrational course of action.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/02/introspection-inward-gaze.html
[2]. See here:
A. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/09/explaining-free-will.html
B. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/11/refuting-arguments-against-free-will.html
Structuralism
Structuralism is about identifying and classifying aspects of consciousness, primarily relying on logic and introspection (in this sense, a good deal of what I have written about consciousness and phenomenology is already highly structuralist). The aim is to explore and chart out the "structure" of the human mind. Units of experience, called qualia in modern phenomenology, are divided down into their basic components and analyzed by oneself. A criticism of structuralism that I have seen is that it it is limited and does not assess behaviors. This is not a reflection of any error within structuralism, as this observation only highlights the fact that structuralism does not address the totality of the human person.
Structuralism by no means contains false ideas in itself, and it safely relies on the only tools that can grant absolute certainty (logic and introspection)--but, as far as holistic psychology goes, it is incomplete given its lack of focus on outward human behavior. It deals with the metaphysics of the human mind, not with how the contents of the mind are expressed in bodily actions. However, structuralism does not pursue unobservable phenomena; it emphasizes mental activities that a conscious subject can observe within itself using the inward gaze of introspection [1].
Behaviorism
Whereas structuralism dissects the internal content of consciousness, behaviorism dismisses introspection altogether in favor of focusing on external behavior, holding in its most pure forms that all behaviors and mental events are in some way mandatorily caused by external stimuli. Behaviorism quickly becomes very, if not purely, deterministic. If all of my behaviors and thoughts are merely reactions to external stimuli (and this also errs in ignoring the prominence of internal thoughts and desires that underlay behaviors), then it is impossible for me to have free will, as my stream of consciousness and bodily actions are dictated by outside stimuli. This would leave me with no ultimate control over any reaction of mine. I would be reacting, not deliberating and choosing behaviors from a series of alternatives.
Logic proves to me that it follows from the fact that I have knowledge that I do possess free will [2], however, so behaviorism as a system must be rejected by rational people due to the way that it attacks the concept of human free will. Behaviorism is a deeply flawed response to structuralism, and, although structuralism in no way accounts for the full extent of human nature, since I am a creature with a body and not just a consciousness, there is no methodological error embedded in the very nature of structuralism.
It is important to remember that just because something is incomplete in a certain way does not mean that it can be legitimately tossed aside. When an idea is incomplete, it is not to be rejected, but united with the missing components it needs to accurately reflect reality. Even if an idea is erroneous, responding to one error by embracing another is an irrational course of action.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/02/introspection-inward-gaze.html
[2]. See here:
A. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/09/explaining-free-will.html
B. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/11/refuting-arguments-against-free-will.html
Labels:
Determinism,
Introspection,
Phenomenology,
Psychology
Wednesday, April 11, 2018
The Impossibility Of "Absolutely Nothing"
It is objectively impossible for absolutely nothing at all to exist. There are two main groups of people who resort to impossible claims about nothingness, the two groups being atheists and theists (especially Christian theists in my experience), though I certainly do not mean that all atheists or Christians have uniform beliefs. There are several things that exist even in the complete absence of both physical matter and conscious minds, even if those minds are not animating a body (like the description of Yahweh in John 4).
No, I will not primarily address how the uncaused cause must exist [1], though that is erroneously how many other apologists might handle the issue of absolutely nothing. It is impossible for absolutely nothing to exist even if there is not a single atom and not a single conscious mind in existence, not even the mind of God. Logic, truth, and space are not nothing, but they neither are made of matter nor are they minds/consciousnesses. They are immaterial things that simply exist by necessity regardless of what else does. Logic is the set of laws that govern all of reality and describe what does and does not follow from certain concepts; truth is the way reality is; space is simply an area where matter could be placed (and thus is itself immaterial).
Logic and space cannot create anything, though, since the laws of logic merely describe reality or govern concepts and since space is only a place where matter could reside, even if there is no matter inhabiting that space at all. Thus logic and space are distinct from the uncaused cause. But, on one hand, to say that "nothing" at all existed before the Big Bang is asinine even on an atheistic worldview, since truth, reality, logic, and space would still exist; on the other hand, it is equally asinine to say that God created logic, space, truth, or reality, since these things cannot not exist, with or without God. If God, other minds besides that of God, and matter did not exist, there is still such a thing as truth and reality, because there is still a way reality is. The laws of logic would still exist, because reality is still what it is and certain conclusions still follow from certain premises. Space would still exist, because there cannot not be an area where matter could exist. It is not possible for any of these three things to not exist.
Even the uncaused cause only exists by necessity because contingent things do--things that exist only because of some prior cause. I can certainly imagine a reality (the word "world" will be avoided here, since a world is a physical plane and no matter exists in this hypothetical realm) where there is neither a creation nor a creator. It is logically possible for there to be a reality where there is no God, and thus no creation, although this is not how reality actually is in actuality. In a reality without either a deity or creation, the only things that could exist would be things that do not depend on any minds or matter for their own existence. And the only things in this category are logic, truth, and space.
All created things (the physical cosmos and contingent minds) could not exist without an uncaused cause. But when people, theists or atheists, describe or attempt to describe "absolutely nothing" in reference to reality pre-Big Bang, l usually find myself inwardly cringing at how both sides often overlook the most basic necessary facts about reality before the Big Bang--with or without a deity. Even without a god there is not nothing prior to the Big Bang, and God did not create everything besides himself [3].
It is entirely correct to say that God exists necessarily because the natural world exists, for it is logically and mathematically impossible for the natural world to not have a beginning and it is impossible for something to create itself or come into existence without a cause. But it is a mark of either unintelligence, a lack of thoroughness in not making assumptions, of reflection of a lack of education by rationalists (not that social prompting is necessary to realize these things) to believe that it is even possible for nothing to exist at all.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/04/the-uncaused-cause.html
[2]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/10/the-immateriality-of-logic.html
[3]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/06/god-did-not-create-everything.html
No, I will not primarily address how the uncaused cause must exist [1], though that is erroneously how many other apologists might handle the issue of absolutely nothing. It is impossible for absolutely nothing to exist even if there is not a single atom and not a single conscious mind in existence, not even the mind of God. Logic, truth, and space are not nothing, but they neither are made of matter nor are they minds/consciousnesses. They are immaterial things that simply exist by necessity regardless of what else does. Logic is the set of laws that govern all of reality and describe what does and does not follow from certain concepts; truth is the way reality is; space is simply an area where matter could be placed (and thus is itself immaterial).
Even the uncaused cause only exists by necessity because contingent things do--things that exist only because of some prior cause. I can certainly imagine a reality (the word "world" will be avoided here, since a world is a physical plane and no matter exists in this hypothetical realm) where there is neither a creation nor a creator. It is logically possible for there to be a reality where there is no God, and thus no creation, although this is not how reality actually is in actuality. In a reality without either a deity or creation, the only things that could exist would be things that do not depend on any minds or matter for their own existence. And the only things in this category are logic, truth, and space.
All created things (the physical cosmos and contingent minds) could not exist without an uncaused cause. But when people, theists or atheists, describe or attempt to describe "absolutely nothing" in reference to reality pre-Big Bang, l usually find myself inwardly cringing at how both sides often overlook the most basic necessary facts about reality before the Big Bang--with or without a deity. Even without a god there is not nothing prior to the Big Bang, and God did not create everything besides himself [3].
It is entirely correct to say that God exists necessarily because the natural world exists, for it is logically and mathematically impossible for the natural world to not have a beginning and it is impossible for something to create itself or come into existence without a cause. But it is a mark of either unintelligence, a lack of thoroughness in not making assumptions, of reflection of a lack of education by rationalists (not that social prompting is necessary to realize these things) to believe that it is even possible for nothing to exist at all.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/04/the-uncaused-cause.html
[2]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/10/the-immateriality-of-logic.html
[3]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/06/god-did-not-create-everything.html
Labels:
Big Bang,
Causality,
Creation,
Metaphysics,
Necessary Existents,
Reason,
Space,
Truth,
Uncaused Cause
Tuesday, April 10, 2018
The Liberating Nature Of Individualism
Although, in my experience, this is seldom acknowledged, Christianity is a highly individualistic religion [1]. This fact is not the birthplace of selfishness when rightly understood; selfishness is a focus on the self that hinders the right love of others [2], and individualism is the recognition that people have their own unique individuality and that they are valuable as individuals. The two are nowhere near identical.
Individualism is not only a fact of reality and something Christianity embraces--different people really do have their own respective personalities and God is not displeased by this--but it can also be deeply liberating for people to realize that they can be themselves. There is no need or obligation to sacrifice our personalities on the altars of social expectations. Reason and reality can give individuals the strength, as well as the desire, to both know and accept themselves even if others are confused and ensnared by herd behavior. It is only out of ignorance or irrational fear that some people might fear individualism as a destructive, sinful, or dangerous. The truth is that individualism is both true and liberating. It liberates from non-obligatory social pressures and the misunderstanding of one's own nature.
Other than abstaining from sin, there are no restrictions that God places on how someone can express his or her personality (Deuteronomy 4:2). Jesus never demands that we give up our unique personalities in order to follow him. What his teachings do demand of us is that we use our personalities in service of righteousness in a way that glorifies God. Consider the Apostle Paul--his strong personality existed both before and after his dramatic conversion. Conversion, time, and his experiences with suffering did not extinguish his fierce passion. Even when Paul persecuted Christians out of intense but misplaced theological zeal, it was not the forcefulness of his personality that was sinful, but the end to which he directed that forcefulness. Once he became a Christian himself he was free to channel his intensity and ferocity into a new pursuit.
I am who I am, and I not only am intimately familiar with my own personality but I also have accepted it. I do not pretend to have a personality that I do not actually possess. And I am morally free to be myself and to express my personality however I wish as long as I do not engage in any defined sin. Because I know myself, I am able to avoid a great deal of personal confusion; because I have accepted my personality, I have a vast confidence that energizes me. Self-knowledge and self-acceptance, when oriented towards truth and righteousness, are powerful things indeed.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/12/individualism-in-christianity.html
[2]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/03/the-biblical-command-of-self-love.html
Individualism is not only a fact of reality and something Christianity embraces--different people really do have their own respective personalities and God is not displeased by this--but it can also be deeply liberating for people to realize that they can be themselves. There is no need or obligation to sacrifice our personalities on the altars of social expectations. Reason and reality can give individuals the strength, as well as the desire, to both know and accept themselves even if others are confused and ensnared by herd behavior. It is only out of ignorance or irrational fear that some people might fear individualism as a destructive, sinful, or dangerous. The truth is that individualism is both true and liberating. It liberates from non-obligatory social pressures and the misunderstanding of one's own nature.
Other than abstaining from sin, there are no restrictions that God places on how someone can express his or her personality (Deuteronomy 4:2). Jesus never demands that we give up our unique personalities in order to follow him. What his teachings do demand of us is that we use our personalities in service of righteousness in a way that glorifies God. Consider the Apostle Paul--his strong personality existed both before and after his dramatic conversion. Conversion, time, and his experiences with suffering did not extinguish his fierce passion. Even when Paul persecuted Christians out of intense but misplaced theological zeal, it was not the forcefulness of his personality that was sinful, but the end to which he directed that forcefulness. Once he became a Christian himself he was free to channel his intensity and ferocity into a new pursuit.
I am who I am, and I not only am intimately familiar with my own personality but I also have accepted it. I do not pretend to have a personality that I do not actually possess. And I am morally free to be myself and to express my personality however I wish as long as I do not engage in any defined sin. Because I know myself, I am able to avoid a great deal of personal confusion; because I have accepted my personality, I have a vast confidence that energizes me. Self-knowledge and self-acceptance, when oriented towards truth and righteousness, are powerful things indeed.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/12/individualism-in-christianity.html
[2]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/03/the-biblical-command-of-self-love.html
Monday, April 9, 2018
Refuting Objections To Bribery
Bribery is a controversial but ultimately illicitly demonized practice. I've explained why bribery itself, as a method, is not sinful unless one uses it to bring about an immoral outcome [1]. There are specific business-based objections to bribery that I want to dismantle (one of which I addressed in the footnoted post, but I included it anyway).
The first objection is based upon the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy: it is the charge that bribery causes poverty and/or is correlated with corruption in developing countries. One must first of all remember that a correlation between two or more things in no way necessitates a causal connection between them. One can use logic to discover, even prior to examination of business history or contemporary politics, that there is no necessary connection between bribery and poverty or corruption. Bribery and material flourishing can coexist, and since a corrupt thing is something that is evil, bribery cannot by necessity lead to corruption, since one can make a bribe to bring about something that is not unethical.
To argue otherwise a person must merely assume that bribery is itself an evil, yet there is no way to do so apart from logical fallacies and mere assertions. Preferences, social norms, emotions, and consensus do not demonstrate that something is wrong, and no one can argue that bribery is intrinsically immoral apart from these fallacious grounds. It is also worth noting that poverty can be a result of other factors besides just political/social corruption, like scarcity of resources or mishandling of money. The position I am articulating certainly does not, for instance, deny the evils of withholding basic necessities until bribes are given, to be sure. It is just that bribery does not inherently lead to either poverty or corruption.
There is also the claim that bribery advantages some firms over others and thus is unethical for this reason. Yes, a bribe could enable a larger, more established company to secure work that a smaller organization will be excluded from. However, all business decisions exclude some party by the very nature of what business decisions are, and it does not follow just from a bribe disadvantaging a firm without plentiful resources that it is intrinsically evil.
If a company used bribes (either the giving or receiving of them) in order to maliciously destroy another corporation, the company would, in operating out of malice, be using bribery with morally illicit motives. But simply using a submission of money to guarantee a contract, or a job, or a partnership of some sort is not a malicious activity and does not violate any actual moral obligation.
Yet another possible objection to bribery is that viewing bribes as legitimate might diminish the drive to make quality products, since a firm could simply rely on monetary persuasion instead of product quality to determine contracts. This objection could be paired with the previously addressed one about bribery giving more power to larger organizations that can expend resources more easily, since, if a firm has a vast amount of monetary resources to use in its business endeavors, it is possible that it might sacrifice the quality or safety of its products.
First of all, bribery not being inherently wrong does not mean that a company will use the amorality of bribery as a method as an excuse to create products that are unsafe, easily breakable, or otherwise of a poor quality. Second of all, bribery being morally neutral on its own does not mean that those who use bribery to conceal dangerous products or product misinformation should not be held accountable. Unjust harm and intentional marketing deception are wrong, but this does not mean that bribery causes these things or that companies that use legitimate bribery will at some point engage in them.
There are no logically or Biblically sound objections to bribery in itself. Unfortunately, bribery is just one of several things that might be demonized without basis by Christians and even non-Christians who don't know how to correctly reason.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/02/understanding-bribery.html
The first objection is based upon the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy: it is the charge that bribery causes poverty and/or is correlated with corruption in developing countries. One must first of all remember that a correlation between two or more things in no way necessitates a causal connection between them. One can use logic to discover, even prior to examination of business history or contemporary politics, that there is no necessary connection between bribery and poverty or corruption. Bribery and material flourishing can coexist, and since a corrupt thing is something that is evil, bribery cannot by necessity lead to corruption, since one can make a bribe to bring about something that is not unethical.
To argue otherwise a person must merely assume that bribery is itself an evil, yet there is no way to do so apart from logical fallacies and mere assertions. Preferences, social norms, emotions, and consensus do not demonstrate that something is wrong, and no one can argue that bribery is intrinsically immoral apart from these fallacious grounds. It is also worth noting that poverty can be a result of other factors besides just political/social corruption, like scarcity of resources or mishandling of money. The position I am articulating certainly does not, for instance, deny the evils of withholding basic necessities until bribes are given, to be sure. It is just that bribery does not inherently lead to either poverty or corruption.
There is also the claim that bribery advantages some firms over others and thus is unethical for this reason. Yes, a bribe could enable a larger, more established company to secure work that a smaller organization will be excluded from. However, all business decisions exclude some party by the very nature of what business decisions are, and it does not follow just from a bribe disadvantaging a firm without plentiful resources that it is intrinsically evil.
If a company used bribes (either the giving or receiving of them) in order to maliciously destroy another corporation, the company would, in operating out of malice, be using bribery with morally illicit motives. But simply using a submission of money to guarantee a contract, or a job, or a partnership of some sort is not a malicious activity and does not violate any actual moral obligation.
Yet another possible objection to bribery is that viewing bribes as legitimate might diminish the drive to make quality products, since a firm could simply rely on monetary persuasion instead of product quality to determine contracts. This objection could be paired with the previously addressed one about bribery giving more power to larger organizations that can expend resources more easily, since, if a firm has a vast amount of monetary resources to use in its business endeavors, it is possible that it might sacrifice the quality or safety of its products.
First of all, bribery not being inherently wrong does not mean that a company will use the amorality of bribery as a method as an excuse to create products that are unsafe, easily breakable, or otherwise of a poor quality. Second of all, bribery being morally neutral on its own does not mean that those who use bribery to conceal dangerous products or product misinformation should not be held accountable. Unjust harm and intentional marketing deception are wrong, but this does not mean that bribery causes these things or that companies that use legitimate bribery will at some point engage in them.
There are no logically or Biblically sound objections to bribery in itself. Unfortunately, bribery is just one of several things that might be demonized without basis by Christians and even non-Christians who don't know how to correctly reason.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/02/understanding-bribery.html
Sunday, April 8, 2018
What Is The Supernatural?
I have found that the concept of the supernatural is something perhaps misunderstood by a greater number of people than those who rightly understand it. First I must define the supernatural in order to elaborate more on the subject. The supernatural is that beyond or above nature (the material world). The cosmos encompasses all of nature--all atoms and their configurations, all actual universes in any hypothetical multiverse. So the supernatural, to be beyond the cosmos, must in some way involve something immaterial.
Logic is immaterial [1] and thus is not a part of nature, though it universally governs the totality of the material world. Consciousness, being immaterial [2], is not a part of nature, although my consciousness is intimately intertwined with my material body. It is often overlooked how neither is a part of nature itself. On the strictest possible meaning of the word supernatural, logic and human consciousness do qualify as supernatural things, as they are not a part of nature itself despite their close relationship to it.
However, logic and consciousness, although they are purely immaterial, are not what most people mean by the word "supernatural." Similarly, although morality can only be a supernatural thing, since a moral obligation is not a tangible thing comprised of matter, many people do not seem to think of morality as a supernatural concept. Often the word is reserved for some extra-natural energy or unembodied spirit, a consciousness without a body, as opposed to consciousness that is trapped within a body. Most people do not seem to view their own minds as supernatural, but seem quite willing to use the word in reference to the concept of a ghost, a demon, or a purely immaterial deity. In such cases it seems that people really view something that deviates from the familiarity of their regular experiences as supernatural, not just something that is metaphysically above or separate from nature.
There is another thing that is by definition supernatural on either the strictest or casual meaning of the word. The uncaused cause [3], being responsible for creating nature, must by necessity be beyond it. What preceded nature cannot not be supernatural. It cannot be a part of the natural world. The uncaused cause, like logic and my own consciousness, must exist necessarily in order for the physical world to come into existence at all; it is possible, however seemingly unlikely, though, that my consciousness is the uncaused cause. I cannot disprove this possibility and can only bring up evidences that make it seem highly improbable. But the fact remains true that there is a deity: there is an uncaused cause.
It is only out of stupidity that some might dismiss the very idea of the supernatural as something impossible. There is nothing logically impossible about the existence of an unembodied consciousness, an afterlife, or mystical energy. In fallacious stupor, some might be quick to mock the concept of the supernatural, but rational reflection shows that those with a bias against the supernatural are just as guilty of idiocy as those who believe in the supernatural (in the casual sense) without proof--aka on faith.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/10/the-immateriality-of-logic.html
[2]. See here:
A. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/08/the-immateriality-of-consciousness.html
B. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/03/the-mind-body-problem.html
[3]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/04/the-uncaused-cause.html
Logic is immaterial [1] and thus is not a part of nature, though it universally governs the totality of the material world. Consciousness, being immaterial [2], is not a part of nature, although my consciousness is intimately intertwined with my material body. It is often overlooked how neither is a part of nature itself. On the strictest possible meaning of the word supernatural, logic and human consciousness do qualify as supernatural things, as they are not a part of nature itself despite their close relationship to it.
However, logic and consciousness, although they are purely immaterial, are not what most people mean by the word "supernatural." Similarly, although morality can only be a supernatural thing, since a moral obligation is not a tangible thing comprised of matter, many people do not seem to think of morality as a supernatural concept. Often the word is reserved for some extra-natural energy or unembodied spirit, a consciousness without a body, as opposed to consciousness that is trapped within a body. Most people do not seem to view their own minds as supernatural, but seem quite willing to use the word in reference to the concept of a ghost, a demon, or a purely immaterial deity. In such cases it seems that people really view something that deviates from the familiarity of their regular experiences as supernatural, not just something that is metaphysically above or separate from nature.
There is another thing that is by definition supernatural on either the strictest or casual meaning of the word. The uncaused cause [3], being responsible for creating nature, must by necessity be beyond it. What preceded nature cannot not be supernatural. It cannot be a part of the natural world. The uncaused cause, like logic and my own consciousness, must exist necessarily in order for the physical world to come into existence at all; it is possible, however seemingly unlikely, though, that my consciousness is the uncaused cause. I cannot disprove this possibility and can only bring up evidences that make it seem highly improbable. But the fact remains true that there is a deity: there is an uncaused cause.
It is only out of stupidity that some might dismiss the very idea of the supernatural as something impossible. There is nothing logically impossible about the existence of an unembodied consciousness, an afterlife, or mystical energy. In fallacious stupor, some might be quick to mock the concept of the supernatural, but rational reflection shows that those with a bias against the supernatural are just as guilty of idiocy as those who believe in the supernatural (in the casual sense) without proof--aka on faith.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/10/the-immateriality-of-logic.html
[2]. See here:
A. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/08/the-immateriality-of-consciousness.html
B. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/03/the-mind-body-problem.html
[3]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/04/the-uncaused-cause.html
Saved For Righteousness
Sometimes Christians need to be reminded periodically of just why they were saved by God. Christians aren't saved just for the hell of it; they are saved so that they can have a restored relationship with God and so that they can act like it. Paul states in Ephesians 2:10 that Christians are "created in Christ Jesus to do good works," a verse which conveys a message similar to that of Romans 6, where Paul affirms that redemption does not exempt the saved of their moral obligations--and in fact gives them a new ability to uphold those obligations since they have now "died to sin" (Romans 6:2).
This does not mean that someone ceases to sin entirely just by becoming a Christian. Instead it means that he or she has been liberated from the ultimate cosmic consequences of sin and has a new identity rooted in a relationship with God. It is this dying to sin that leads Paul to ask in Romans 6:2 "How can we live in it any longer?" Sin no longer has the metaphysical power over the saved that it did prior to salvation, and the saved are free to aggressively purge sin from their lives.
Justification, becoming right with God, is the start of the journey of sanctification, the process of becoming more like God in terms of moral character. Sanctification is obligatory for all Christians--it is one of the things they are saved for. Abandoning sin and turning to righteousness is not a morally optional thing, as if someone's unwillingness to do so makes obligations vanish! Moral obligations remain, in full force, once a person becomes saved, but they can then be pursued with renewed energy.
Indeed, the demands of morality do not disappear just because someone is now a Christian. Some may not appreciate being reminded of this, but truth is unaffected by preferences, and it is not altered by a desire for ease. But living righteously is possible. It is not a logical impossibility that only unrealistic Christians aim for. It is something demanded of all Christians.
This does not mean that someone ceases to sin entirely just by becoming a Christian. Instead it means that he or she has been liberated from the ultimate cosmic consequences of sin and has a new identity rooted in a relationship with God. It is this dying to sin that leads Paul to ask in Romans 6:2 "How can we live in it any longer?" Sin no longer has the metaphysical power over the saved that it did prior to salvation, and the saved are free to aggressively purge sin from their lives.
Justification, becoming right with God, is the start of the journey of sanctification, the process of becoming more like God in terms of moral character. Sanctification is obligatory for all Christians--it is one of the things they are saved for. Abandoning sin and turning to righteousness is not a morally optional thing, as if someone's unwillingness to do so makes obligations vanish! Moral obligations remain, in full force, once a person becomes saved, but they can then be pursued with renewed energy.
Indeed, the demands of morality do not disappear just because someone is now a Christian. Some may not appreciate being reminded of this, but truth is unaffected by preferences, and it is not altered by a desire for ease. But living righteously is possible. It is not a logical impossibility that only unrealistic Christians aim for. It is something demanded of all Christians.
Friday, April 6, 2018
A Marital Benefit Of Erotic Media
In a different post I mentioned that erotic media could be useful for getting spouses sexually aroused and excited before or during their own sexual activities with each other [1]. Indeed, erotic media could be used to arouse a spouse whose mind or body is slow to become ready for sexual activity, and in this way could be a great aid to marital sexuality. Likewise, erotic media can help spouses handle sexual feelings that reside after their husbands or wives are sexually satisfied or while they are away.
If a spouse still has more sexual energy leftover after sex with his or her spouse, then he or she could use masturbation, erotic media (of a morally legitimate kind [2]), or a combination of both to try to appease that surplus sexual excitement. If I had a wife and she did this, this is not the same as my spouse committing mental or physical adultery--the former is wanting to commit adultery and the latter is actually carrying out the act of adultery. Consuming and enjoying erotic media in itself is neither.
As an asexual, if I was married (to someone who is not also an asexual) it would be a great relief to me if my wife would take matters of her sexual fulfillment into her own hands--literally in this case! I do not at all mean that I would be unwilling to sexually fulfill my wife; I would be entirely willing to use my body to bring her sexual pleasure. But I would certainly appreciate it if/when she chooses to release or indulge in sexual energy through masturbation, and if she wants her masturbation to be accompanied by consumption of morally legitimate erotic media, then she will not receive opposition. Whereas some people might want their spouses to include them in their use of erotic media, I would be entirely alright if my spouse uses erotic media and does not directly bring me into it or bring me into it at all.
Any claim that all spouses would be offended or hurt by their partners using erotic media, with or without them, is unfounded, fallacious, and simply untrue. I sure as hell would not be. It would actually be a relief to me if my wife, understanding the nature of my asexuality, would explore her sexuality in nonsinful ways that either do not involve me or involve me minimally.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/02/the-truth-about-erotic-media-part-3.html
[2]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/12/the-truth-about-erotic-media-part-1.html
If a spouse still has more sexual energy leftover after sex with his or her spouse, then he or she could use masturbation, erotic media (of a morally legitimate kind [2]), or a combination of both to try to appease that surplus sexual excitement. If I had a wife and she did this, this is not the same as my spouse committing mental or physical adultery--the former is wanting to commit adultery and the latter is actually carrying out the act of adultery. Consuming and enjoying erotic media in itself is neither.
As an asexual, if I was married (to someone who is not also an asexual) it would be a great relief to me if my wife would take matters of her sexual fulfillment into her own hands--literally in this case! I do not at all mean that I would be unwilling to sexually fulfill my wife; I would be entirely willing to use my body to bring her sexual pleasure. But I would certainly appreciate it if/when she chooses to release or indulge in sexual energy through masturbation, and if she wants her masturbation to be accompanied by consumption of morally legitimate erotic media, then she will not receive opposition. Whereas some people might want their spouses to include them in their use of erotic media, I would be entirely alright if my spouse uses erotic media and does not directly bring me into it or bring me into it at all.
Any claim that all spouses would be offended or hurt by their partners using erotic media, with or without them, is unfounded, fallacious, and simply untrue. I sure as hell would not be. It would actually be a relief to me if my wife, understanding the nature of my asexuality, would explore her sexuality in nonsinful ways that either do not involve me or involve me minimally.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/02/the-truth-about-erotic-media-part-3.html
[2]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/12/the-truth-about-erotic-media-part-1.html
Labels:
Asexuality,
Erotic Media,
Marriage,
Masturbation,
Sexuality
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