William Lane Craig's Misunderstanding Of Divine Hatred

This is not the first time I have written about something Christian apologist William Lane Craig gets wrong about logic, general metaphysics and epistemology, or Christian theology.  In a clip posted to YouTube [1], he compares the Judeo-Christian God to Allah, the deity of Islam that is supposed to be the same God as that of Judeo-Christianity.  Craig says that there is only a small handful of, as he calls them, "poetic" verses in Psalms saying God hates people, which he then says are outweighed by the verses affirming God's love for sinners.  Moving on to Islam, he claims correctly that Allah is said to not love those who do not love him and do what is righteous.  Yet Biblical theology is severely misrepresented here.

In Leviticus 20:23, God himself insists he hates the Canaanites for sins like the ones addressed in chapters 18 and 20.  Is God engaging in poetic exaggeration, using language in a basically misleading manner to emphasize his displeasure?  It would appear not.  The words of Leviticus and any other part of the Bible never say or imply this, and there is no logical reason why God must or should not hate any person, no matter what they believe or do.  Why would a rational, righteous being not deeply hate someone who neither cares for necessary truth and morality nor repents if they do err?  Throughout Psalms (5:5-6, 11:5), Proverbs (3:31-32, 6:16-19, 11:20), and other places in the Old Testament (Deuteronomy 18:9-12, 22:5, 25:13-16, Hosea 9:15, Malachi 1:2-3), it is in fact reiterated that God hates some people.  For the sake of conciseness, I need only to show a small selection from the many examples below.  See the other verses listed in this paragraph for many more instances of this.  Craig is very, very wrong when he asserts that there are "almost no passages in which it says that God hates sinners."  He could only be assuming.

Leviticus 20:23—"'"You must not live according to the customs of the nations I am going to drive out before you.  Because they did all these things, I abhorred them."'"

Deuteronomy 25:13-16—"Do not have two differing weights in your bag—one heavy, one light.  Do not have two differing measures in your house—one large, one small.  You must have accurate and honest weights and measures, so that you may live long in the land the Lord your God is giving you.  For the Lord your God detests anyone who does these things, anyone who deals dishonestly."

Psalm 5:5-6—"The arrogant cannot stand in your presence.  You hate all who do wrong; you destroy those who tell lies.  The bloodthirsty and deceitful you, Lord, detest."

No matter how "literally" they claim to interpret the Bible, even if they really only mean this in some ultimately invalid way, a great many people in the broader American church would probably be horrified or puzzled if they stumbled upon these verses or similar ones.  Yes, the New Testament does say with express clarity that God loves even currently unsaved sinners in a handful of key verses.  However, it is likely that anyone who thinks Yahweh does not hate people almost certainly treats the New Testament as the starting point of the Bible (not the Old Testament which the New Testament must be consistent with in order to be true), hears/reads that God loves unsaved humanity, and then, if they ever encounter verses like Psalm 5:5 in the first place, ignores the logical fact that it is possible and perhaps even morally good to both hate and love someone at the same time.  So they think God used to hate people but changed in the New Testament era or, as Craig asserts, any verse about God hating someone is merely poetic and not literal in its forcefulness.  They allow discomfort with the Old Testament and their stubborn irrationality to keep them from seeing what is really very stark.

The verses which directly present God as loving Gentiles, not merely Jews, and even the wicked and those who have not committed to him are every bit as straightforward as those which say God hates certain people:

Deuteronomy 10:17-18—"For the Lord your God is God of gods and Lord of lords, the great God, mighty and awesome, who shows no partiality and accepts no bribes.  He defends the cause of the fatherless and the widow, and loves the foreigner residing among you, giving them food and clothing."

John 3:16—"For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life."

Romans 5:8—"But God shows his own love for us in this: While we were still sinners, Christ died for us."

It is plain that Yahweh both hates and loves certain people, yet the explicit references to him hating unrepentant sinners are seemingly far more numerous than the statements that actually say with any directness that he loves the general unsaved.  I have never seen this acknowledged by anyone else who did not fall into the error of either thinking that the Biblical God simply does not really hate anyone or that he hates some people without also loving them.  The Bible rather obviously says both, though many do not seem to look in the right places or are quick to dismiss the logical compatibility of some types of love and hatred.  This is not some particularly challenging issue on any level.  Personal revulsion towards the idea of divine hatred, loyalty to church traditions rather than to reason and the Bible, and a misunderstanding of basic logical possibility are what actually deter people from accepting that, yes, Yahweh does hate people.  While Craig does not necessarily deny in full that Yahweh hates at least some sinners to an extent, at best, he significantly trivializes it.

John 3:16 and Romans 5:8 do not deny that God hates at least some humans, and you could realize this while reading these verses in strict isolation from any other passage.  But then again, neither does loving someone exclude the possibility of hating them at the same time.  What the Bible says about divine hatred conflicts with neither pure reason nor with any other Biblical doctrine.  Actually, the full nature of God's hatred is not even the only thing William Lane Craig has gotten severely wrong about verses like John 3:16.  At least at one point, he affirmed the extremely illogical, heinous position that eternal torture in hell is justice, and that this is the position of the Bible (though the linked video does not address this).  He probably still holds to this to this day.  However, the verse clearly says that the alternative fate to eternal life is perishing, which is the only thing that logically could happen to someone who does not live forever: they would eventually cease to exist!  The fact that God can still love people and still hate some of them fiercely is not the only major error he would hold to concerning John 3:16.  And no matter what he might believe, say, or feel, eternal torture is by nature far worse than lacking love towards someone one way or another.

Craig has to neglect or reject almost every fact stated in this post to maintain ludicrous stances, even thinking that a wholly loving God would have anyone tortured without end!  Somehow, allegedly, not loving sinners would be automatically evil or subpar, but torturing them forever is ethically legitimate, according to his incoherent nonsense.  Verses from the Quran like Surah 3:140 do outright claim that God does not love evildoers.  But, not loving someone is different from hating them.  Furthermore, Yahweh's hatred is not some obscure triviality in Biblical theology.  To make Christianity appear better than Islam, Craig misrepresents Christianity, when this is not even necessary to demonstrate that Allah's love is far more limited than Yahweh's either way.  More than this, Craig just assumes that loving all people unconditionally is morally good in addition to some of his more grave but related beliefs that are not mentioned in the clip.  As someone who thinks subjective conscience proves the existence of good and evil, as he states elsewhere, he is already standing on fallacious ground.  Layers upon layers of errors constitute the majority of his worldview.

[1].  https://youtu.be/Xem0vdDRCps?si=aRxMxA4btlY9IA0X

Enjoying Anger

I have known two other rationalists at the time of this writing (which is long before the scheduled posting date) who have relinquished anger because it wound up being so draining or overwhelming for them that, though it never had to be allowed to overpower their alignment with reason or compel them to mistreat anyone, they had no desire to entertain it.  Inability to conjure or silence emotion in all cases is not the same as an inability to control one's beliefs and actions regardless.  No one is automatically irrational for experiencing anger, therefore.  As rationalists, a denial of any of this would likely have been far from their minds in choosing their new disposition.

Anger can be a highly empowering thing that can only render someone irrational or abusive if they decide to let it.  There is no shortage of irrationalistic people one might encounter in life and thus plenty of fuel for the fire of anger on this level alone.  For a rational person who knows all of this, the feeling of anger can be a comforting reminder of their intellectual superiority over non-rationalists and a very personal source of emotional strength.  This is not the same as wanting there to be stupid and immoral people to be angry with, as to wish for errors on someone else's part is itself irrational and to hope for someone to be immoral to be justified in anger towards them would be immoral itself.

No matter how alluring or empowering it is to experience and perhaps even enjoy anger towards irrationality and evil, still, no person is in the wrong just for preferring to not bask in anger.  They can recognize all of these necessary truths and simply not find the genuine empowerment and pleasure that is there to be found in anger for every willing person, though only empowerment and pleasure in non-irrationalistic anger is valid.  All else is emotionalistic and/or egoistic nonsense.  While enjoying and dwelling on anger in this way might seem to many people as if it is contrary to the moral framework of Christianity, this is not at all the case.

If Christianity is true as it appears to be, anger is not immoral.  In fact, any anger that is involuntary, unable to be willed away, could not be morally erroneous anyway because no one could be guilty of a thing beyond their control.  This is the case with all anger on Christianity as long as it is not baseless (see Matthew 5:22 on anger without cause), disproportionate, or used as "justification" for sinful beliefs or actions.  Anger itself is never condemned in Mosaic Law or anywhere else (Deuteronomy 4:2, 12:32), and more than once it is said in the Bible that no one has to sin in their anger (Psalm 4:4, Ephesians 4:26).

Yahweh is also said to be angry at certain people and worldviews or deeds (Exodus 22:24, Leviticus 26:27-28, Psalm 30:5, 103:9, Jeremiah 30:23, and so on).  If God himself is rightfully angry, since only the uncaused cause having a moral nature would metaphysically anchor morality to begin with, it cannot possibly be evil for humans to be angry, and in the right circumstances, to love anger for the rational and righteous intentions behind it.  If something is good or even merely permissible, moreover, it cannot be evil to enjoy it.  Only emotionalistic, selfish anger or anger that drives sinful behaviors could be immoral.  Anger can be legitimately celebrated and delighted in otherwise.

What Makes Something Abstract?

The likes of microbes, organs, asteroids, valleys, stones, and water are not metaphysically abstract.  Any such things that exist are physical objects or environments, though any logically necessary truths about them are abstract in nature since they are immaterial truths/existents grasped by the mind.  For instance, the fact that a brain or a boulder could not exist if there was something logically impossible about it is an abstract truth.  Possibility and impossibility are more foundational to reality than concrete examples of material objects because if a physical substance was truly impossible, it could never exist to begin with!  Possibility is dictated strictly by the laws of logic, starting with the axioms that cannot be false because then they would still be true.

One of these axioms is the fact that some things necessarily follow from others: if not, then it would be true in light of the nature of reality that there is nothing that logically follows from anything.  In other words, it would follow logically from the nature of reality that logical necessity is false!  This requires that logical necessity is true either way.  It would likewise follow from it being possible for contradictions to be true that it is impossible for the conflicting idea that contradictions are inherently impossible to be true.  Regardless, contradictions are impossible because their truth would still inescapably hinge on their falsity!  All genuine axioms are self-evident because they must be relied on in the process of disbelieving in them or as much as doubting them.

Something is, again, abstract if it is immaterial and grasped by the mind, such as a logical truth, a concept, or a mental state like a deep emotion, and logical axioms are the supreme foundation of these and all other things.  The mere physical existence of a mountain is not an abstract matter, or at least not apart from its relationship to issues of metaphysics and epistemology beyond its basic physical substance.  Is there an uncaused cause, and did it directly create the universe or create another being that bought the universe forth, and so on?  Is there any moral obligation to protect the natural world?  What makes the existence of mountains possible as opposed to impossible?  Can one know if a mountain exists rather than the mere mental image of it?  All of these issues are explicitly abstract.  How does a specific person subjectively feel about the sight of a mountain?  Even this is abstract, an issue of introspection and thus the mental realm of experience that is still necessarily governed by logic.

One major error is the idea that because a mind is necessary to grasp abstract "objects", they must exist because of or within minds; that is, they are not mind-independent.  Anyone is guilty of this extreme philosophical blunder who goes as far as to believe that logical axioms or mathematical truths are distinct from the material world but would not be true if there was no universe and no conscious beings.  This position neglects how logic is not only true of other things in that it necessitates certain truths about them, but it is true in itself, quite literally the entire reason anything is true at all.  Logic cannot be false and therefore necessitates itself, and consequently, it exists with or without any other existent, including God.

Logical truths are not thoughts, but a being with rational (rationalistic) thoughts does actively recognize logic for what it is: logical axioms are inherent truths that could only be false if they were still true, and other things follow necessarily from this handful of self-evident facts.  Discovering this entails making no assumptions and intentionally grasping the self-necessity and thus absolute certainty of logical axioms.  Even a person who believes in one thing that really does follow from another but does not know logical axioms, or rightly believes in logical axioms but makes assumptions regarding something else, is irrational.  As abstract as it is, for it is pure objectivity that transcends all else even while governing/underpinning the rest of reality, logic alone grounds knowledge, and it is logic alone that actually makes anything true.  Anything else can only be true if it is logically possible.

Examples Of Jewish Myths In Antiquities Of The Jews

In Antiquities of the Jews by Josephus, one can find semi-detailed information about the trappings of rabbinic Judaism at the time of the author.  He presents many ideas as part of the Torah's laws when they are not, and vice versa, completely distorting some elements of Yahweh's prescriptions while ironically summarizing others accurately in ways the Torah itself does not state so directly.  Here, we will focus on the differences.  It would already be impossible to tell from reading Antiquities what the Torah and broader Bible teaches as its moral doctrines, or its historical narratives, and if someone compares the two, numerous contradictions or deviations become apparent between the two proposed moral systems.

To start with, here is what Josephus writes about what appears to be Exodus 22:28, which in some translations says not to revile the "gods", an exaggerated term sometimes used for judges acting on behalf of God:

"(207) Let no one blaspheme those gods which other cities esteem such; nor may anyone steal what belongs to strange temples; nor take away the gifts that are dedicated to any god." (117)

Numerous errors are taught here.  To start with, though there is irrationalistic and unbiblical moral relativism taught by Josephus here (he would probably think that the sins of Deuteronomy 17:2-5 are sins only for Israelites), the verse he seems to be thinking of, Exodus 22:28, does not say what he claims.  It says in some translations not to revile "the gods."  Translations like the ESV say otherwise, although the phrase could indeed refer to human judges enforcing (Psalm 82).  Though there is etymological ambiguity in whether the Hebrew word means "the gods" (as in pagan deities), "God" (as in Yahweh), or human judges operating on Yahweh's behalf, if Exodus 22:28 literally meant that it is immoral to curse or oppose paganism, it would absolutely contradict other parts of the Torah.  Along with passages like Deuteronomy 7:24-26, 8:19-20, see the following:

Deuteronomy 12:2-3—"Destroy completely all the places on the high mountains, on the hills and under every spreading tree, where the nations you are dispossessing worship their gods.  Break down their altars, smash their sacred stones and burn their Asherah poles in the fire; cut down the idols of their gods and wipe out their names from those places."

Deuteronomy 16:21-22—"Do not set up any wooden Asherah pole beside the altar you build to the Lord your God, and do not erect a sacred stone, for these the Lord your God hates."

Exodus 22:28 is clarified by the likes of Leviticus 24:13-16 and Deuteronomy 17:8-12, which respectively condemn cursing God and Levitical priests or judges upholding the laws Yahweh reveals.  Yahweh is, after all, the God of all humankind (Genesis 1:26-27, 5:1-2, Numbers 27:16, Isaiah 19:23-25, 56:3, and so on), though he revealed himself to the Hebrews in a special way for reasons other than their righteousness or alleged superiority in any arbitrary, meaningless separate standard (Deuteronomy 7:7, 9:1-6, 10:14-15, Psalm 147:19-20).  Yahweh is also said to be the only god even ahead of the writings of Isaiah that emphasize this dramatically (see Deuteronomy 4:35, 39).  Now, if only Jews are obligated to worship Yahweh, then this contradicts his status as the only deity (the same would be true if he was the supreme deity out of many, though the Torah does not actually teach this as some think); it cannot be logically or morally valid to worship something that demonstrably does not exist, and thus since Judaism entails the nonexistence of other gods, any Jew who thinks worship of gods other than Yahweh is permissible for Gentiles would be an ideological hypocrite.  

Also, by logical necessity, if something is good or evil, it is good or evil for all people capable of practicing it, and Gentiles are certainly able to worship Yahweh.  The Hebrew Bible would be inherently false it its teachings actually contradicted this or any other necessity of reason.  However, the Torah itself directly acknowledges that its moral obligations are, except where logic requires otherwise (for instance, there cannot be Levitical sacrifices if there is no active priesthood), absolutely universal across time, geography, and nationality (Leviticus 18:24-30, 20:22-24, 24:10-16, Deuteronomy 4:5-8, and so on).  Jews having additional obligations just because they are Jews would be racist against them, and Gentiles having a lesser relationship with Yahweh just because they are Gentiles would be racist against everyone else.  Josephus is an intellectual insect both with regard to the plain teachings of the Hebrew Bible and, more importantly, with regard to knowing the necessary truths of logic, even if only concerning what follows and does not follow from the tenets of true Judaism.

"(214) Let there be seven men to judge in every city, and such as have been before most zealous in the exercise of virtue and righteousness.  Let every judge have two officers, allotted him out of the tribe of Levi." (117)

Deuteronomy 16:18-20 prescribes having judges in each town of the Promised Land, but nothing is said about the number of judges or the exact nature of those beneath them on a hierarchy.  The arrangement Josephus describes is also not at all what Moses himself claims to have established in Deuteronomy 1:15-18, where he summarizes how he set up an unspecified number of leaders who preside over groups of up to thousands and administer justice.  Josephus either mistook traditions for the Torah's teachings without reading it, and reading it without making assumptions at that, or he actually read the Torah and thought that it states what it does not.  He assumed regardless: if one is wrong, one could only have assumed, since there is no way to accept an untruth other than on the irrational grounds of belief without proof.

"(219) But let not the testimony of women be admitted, on account of the levity and boldness of their sex, nor let servants be admitted to give testimony on account of the ignobility of their soul; since it is probable that they may not speak truth, either out of hope of gain, or fear of punishment." (117)

Nowhere does the Torah say anything remotely similar to this.  It is not as if Genesis 1:26-27 and 5:1-2 from the start of the Bible are compatible with only one gender having the right to formally testify, and nothing is said about slaves not having this right.  Josephus merely appeals to stereotypes about gender and class despite their inherent falsity [1].  Now, even if the Hebrew text of Deuteronomy 17:6-7 and 19:15 used explicitly "masculine" wording when speaking about witnesses, this neither indirectly entails that the same thing does not apply to women (logic requires consistency if this moral concept is valid) nor actually says that women are excluded or in any way treated differently as witnesses.  In fact, as I love to emphasize, a more literal translation of the pronouns in the Bible shows that over and over, male wording refers to both men and women who have already been separately mentioned together.

Male language is often the historical default despite inclusive meaning even when gender equality is not explicitly stated, hence why the 2011 NIV has Deuteronomy 19:15 and other passages on witnesses translated in a clearly egalitarian (gender neutral) way.  The obligation, right, or allowance would still have to be the same for men and women by logical necessity unless it has something to do with literal anatomy (as with Leviticus 19:27); if something is evil and doable by all, it is evil for all, and vice versa.  As for examples of male language explicitly speaking of women, below is a small number of the Torah's moralistic commands that show how male language alone does not exclude women in its meaning, as if an intelligent person (an actual rationalist, unlike Josephus) could not know this from reason alone.  Only one is necessary to affirm this, yet there are many more than these three, emphasis mine:

Exodus 21:20-21 (KJV)—"And if a man smite his servant, or his maid, with a rod, and he die under his hand; he shall surely be punished.  Notwithstanding, if he continue a day or two, he shall not be punished: for he is his money."

Leviticus 13:29-30 (KJV)—"If a man or woman have a plague upon the head or the beard; then the priest shall see the plague: and, behold, if it be in sight deeper than the skin; and there be in it a yellow thin hair; then the priest shall declare him unclean: it is a dry scall, even a leprosy upon the head or beard."

Deuteronomy 15:12-13 (KJV)—"And if thy brother, an Hebrew man or an Hebrew woman, be sold unto thee, and serve thee six years; then in the seventh year thou shalt let him go free from thee.  And when thou sendest him out free from thee, thou shalt not let him go away empty:"

Josephus is wrong on many levels in this matter.  His sexism, which in this case is against women, is contrary to both reason and Biblical doctrines.  

"(253) He that desires to be divorced from his wife for any cause whatsoever (and many such causes happen among men), let him in writing give assurance that he will never use her as his wife any more . . ." (Page 120)

Deuteronomy 24:1-4 does not say that divorced spouses can never remarry each other.  The specific example in the case law clearly conveys that if a husband and wife divorce, they cannot remarry if the wife has separately married afterward and then her new husband dies or also divorces her.  There is no universal prohibition of remarriage to one's former spouse.  Also, Deuteronomy never says spouses can divorce based upon any reason, as in a personal preference for their partner to not wear clothing of a certain color, something which is permissible no matter the dislike of others.  It says that there must be some moral deficiency on the other spouse's part, or an "indecency" as the NIV puts it.  Josephus, whether because of his own asinine assumptions or yielding to the irrationality of then-contemporary religious leaders, or "better" yet to long-standing erroneous traditions, gets more than one pivotal thing wrong here.

Additionally, the ideological bent of Josephus towards aristocracy, his declaration that free men should not marry slaves, and so on exemplify his utter irrationalistic misconceptions of not only Biblical philosophy, but also reason itself.  Some of these concepts are so unrelated or contrary to the concepts actually put forth in Mosaic Law that it takes extreme levels of stupidity to remotely consider them as Biblical.  His moral system often reflects the type of social constructs and conceptual misrepresentations Jesus opposed in Pharisaical philosophy (including in Matthew 15:1-20), which is riddled with contradictions and assumptions.  No historical or present Jew believes in Jewish myths about the Torah's ethical prescriptions or any other sort of error because they are a Jew and one Jews folly does not mean another shares in it, but from rabbinic literature to Josephus to the New Testament itself, a plethora of writings record examples of sheer legalism on the part of many Jewish individuals.

Logic, people.  It is very fucking helpful, and it is true whether or not you know or like it.

The Works of Josephus: New Updated Edition (Complete and Unabridged in One Volume).  Josephus, Flavius.  Ed. Whiston, William.  Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, LLC, 1987.  Print.

[1].  https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2020/06/refuting-gender-stereotypes-unnecessary.html

Similarities Between Romantic Partners

When I was younger, before I was a rationalist, I was told that "opposites attract" in romantic relationships.  Did the person who told me this mean it in the sense that it is supposedly some ordinary phenomenon for people to be romantically drawn to someone who is different from them, such as when it comes to personality?  Did they mean that it is actually good to seek out a partner who is psychologically different from oneself?  I am not sure if they only meant the first sense or also the second, but this is entirely erroneous except in that many people, being non-rationalists, might asininely end up staying in romantic relationships with people who are not really compatible with them—much less rationalistic, morally upright people.

Marrying someone who is unlike you hinders intimacy or introduces great troubles, if not both.  This is a basic but vital logical fact about marriage.  One does not need to be told nonsense about how (supposedly) "opposites attract" to then realize why it is of great importance for the stability of a romantic relationship that both parties are compatible up front.  Marriage is no exception.  With the strict exceptions of things like complementary skills (not on the basis of gender, but individuality) or differing hobbies that can be conducted in a way that does not irritate the other party, someone has to be a special kind of idiot to think that intentionally or recklessly choosing a partner with different personality traits or behaviors is in any way rational, morally valid, or even pragmatically beneficial to the relationship.

You have no control over whether someone else changes their beliefs or personality inside a marriage, especially for the worse.  Just to clarify, of course it is only valid to change an irrational belief (either it is logically impossible or demonstrably untrue, or it was simply assumed to be true even if it demonstrably is) for a rational one; all else is objectively erroneous.  But, at least the starting point leading up to the beginning of the marriage can be carefully engineered to involve genuine compatibility.  Somehow, many people act like they are incapable of or absolutely averse to 1) being rational and self-aware and 2) selecting a partner who is both of these things and actually similar when it comes to personality.

Irrational people might pine after someone else even if they themselves have thought of how they and the recipient of their interest are not really compatible—if not on the level of worldview, the ultimate level of compatibility/incompatibility that non-rationalists often neglect, then on the level of personality.  Even if two people both hold the correct worldview (rationalism and various things which stem from it), do they have the same desires, goals, and habits where there is freedom of individuality without believing or doing anything irrational or immoral?  If there are differences of personality, are they simply pretending like they are not present or refusing to take them seriously because they feel so in love?  

Two people do not have to like the same television shows or even both like watching television or streaming shows, for instance, but if this leads to any lack of alignment in other ways, then even something like this is a blatant mark of incompatibility.  Waiting until marriage to intentionally discover and communicate such things is a surefire way to place the relationship on a weak foundation.  Some people might, for the sake of either assumptions or emotionalism, put little to no effort into thinking about significant philosophical issues—including compatibility in marriage—and their relevance to the context of their personal life.  If either partner sincerely expresses their authentic self in the marriage, disparities will probably rise to the surface very quickly.  Both partners could contribute to this idiotic negligence before marriage, certainly.  At least one of them has to in order for this to ever be a problem.

They are ideologically and relationally negligent in that they actively or passively wait for some personal experience to prompt them to ponder something major, when it is both often logically obvious what the truth already is from pure reason itself and when they to an extent damn perhaps the entire course of their life from not acknowledging tbe truth ahead of time.  And yes, remaining silent about such things before a marriage unless due to very specific reasons (such as having to focus on major life problems) because of assumptions, emotionalistic obliviousness, and unwillingness to risk discomfort is incredibly neglectful towards the truth and towards one's partner and relationship.  If the marriage collapses under the strain resulting from this, it is absolutely at least in large part the fault of the partner who charged ahead foolishly.

Servants Of Yahweh

We are to be servants of Yahweh according to 1 Corinthians 7 [1], and there is freedom in this.  Even if Paul had never said such a thing, the nature of morality is that obligation can only exist if the uncaused cause has a moral nature, and the nature of obligation is that one should do what is morally necessary no matter what.  In Luke 17:7-10, Jesus addresses how when someone has done all that they are required to do, they should accept that they have only done what they have a duty to carry out.  The servant of God is to do that which they should for its own sake without thinking that it is God who serves them or that present or future reward is what would make moral duty binding.

The clear moral rights of all servants are outlined elsewhere (Exodus 20:8-10, 21:2-11, 20-21, 26-27, Deuteronomy 5:12-15, 15:12-18, 23:15-16, and more), and they would also have the same rights as anyone else to not be murdered (Exodus 20:13, 21:12-14), kidnapped (Exodus 21:16), and so on.  Jesus is not dismissing them as humans or saying that their entire existence is about serving the whims of the human master or mistress, because they are also people with obligations and rights.

What Jesus affirms, rather, is that fulfilling one's ethical obligations is exactly what someone is already supposed to do.  There is no special incentive, such as acknowledgement, that makes righteousness worthwhile.  Both are true: righteousness could only deserve praise, for it is what should be done, and it is also what people should love and practice humbly without praise in mind (though involuntarily experiencing the desire for praise does not mean that someone yields to it on the level of foundational motivation).  What is morally mandatory should be done because it is obligatory, not for the sake of reward.  Reward and celebration is still the just reaction for righteousness all the same.

Also, Jesus himself includes the explicit praise of servants of Yahweh in his eschatological parables about a master going away and returning.  Matthew 25:19-23 all but directly teaches that those who obey God, though they are but his servants, will be commended with the renowned phrase, "Well done, good and faithful servant."  Though it is a parable, what else would praise be likely to figuratively stand in for?  Likewise, the parable of the man who returns as a king in Luke 19:15-17 features a similar statement.  Reward which goes far beyond mere verbal acknowledgement is also mentioned in these parables, and later on, Paul and John say that followers of Yahweh and Christ will rule the world, its people, and angels in 1 Corinthians 6:2-3 and Revelation 20:4-6.

Contrary to what one should do if morality exists, the pagans and hypocrites Jesus condemns might do things that are good—or that are mere social constructs and personal preferences, having no validity when enforced or expected upon others (Matthew 15:1-20, Mark 7:1-13)—for outward show (Matthew 6:5-8, 16-18, 23:5-7, 27-28).  They are not doing them with rational or sincere intentions.  Instead, they seek fame or recognition instead of being content to align with what is true and upright simply because it is true and upright.  They have already received their "reward" in full the moment they are given the attention they pursue, Jesus says.  The genuinely rational and righteous motive would be to do what is obligatory because that is its very nature.  Reward is deserved, yes.  It is also not what makes something morally good, much less an obligation.

[1].  https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2023/04/christs-slave.html

The Sin Of Gloating Over An Enemy's Misery

There is a difference between reveling in the fact that someone has committed a logical or moral error, even to the point of happiness or excitement that they have faltered so that one has a reason to pounce on them, and joyfully welcoming how, among other things, an amoral life setback makes it more difficult for them to wreak wicked havoc on others.  Obviously, the first kind of reveling is itself irrational and (if there is good and evil) immoral, since no one can ever legitimately err in such ways to in turn legitimize this reaction in another person.

What if the reveler does not stumble into the pitfall of this sort of celebration?  If someone is evil, would it be correct or at least permissible to delight in their trials and pain because of their faults, instead of in how they are/were in the wrong as if to celebrate stupidity and wickedness?  Not according to Proverbs.  What might seem like a random topic of little direct emphasis within Biblical theology comes up more than once in pivotal ways.  In spite of its reputation as a set of texts with no place for restraint from brutality or for compassion, the Old Testament is far from evasive on this point:

Proverbs 24:17-18—"Do not gloat when your enemy falls; when they stumble, do not let your heart rejoice, or the Lord will see and disapprove and turn his wrath away from them."

Listing various sins he claims to have not practiced out in the open or in secret, Job brings up the sin of gloating over an enemy's misfortune.  Along with evils like denying justice to his male and female servants (31:13-15), neglecting the poor and vulnerable (31:16-22), and worshiping or erroneously exalting wealth or the cosmos (31:23-28), expressing a belittling sort of pleasure at the downfall of an enemy is a sin that he specifically distances himself from.  

As seen from Proverbs, this is not the mere perception of Job, since rejoicing in the calamity of an enemy is clearly condemned as antithetical to God's character outside of a narrative like the book of Job.  The assumption made by some Jews and Christians is that whatever a figure like Job or Paul says about ethics in a Biblical story must be accurate, but this would only have to be the case if it aligns with God's nature.  Sometimes what an otherwise righteous Biblical figure states or does is not said to have divine approval, or it clearly contradicts what God demands elsewhere.  Still, what Job says is consistent with Proverbs 24:17-18.

Job 31:29-30—"'If I have rejoiced at my enemy's misfortune or gloated over the trouble that came to him—I have not allowed myself to sin by invoking a curse against their life . . .'"

Job insists he has not committed two independent but similar sins: rejoicing at the trouble of his enemy and cursing them.  Cursing any person is evil [1], with some instances being far worse than others (Exodus 21:17, Leviticus 20:9).  Each of these sins disregards the value of each person by harming them in some unjust manner.  In fact, the two can go hand in hand.  Cursing humans is actually singled out as depraved for the same basic reason as murder (compare James 3:9 with Genesis 9:6).

And the similar sin of gloating over misfortune is something promised significant judgment later in the Bible.  On the scale of a collective civilization, God predicts defeat and death for the Ammonites in Ezekiel 25 precisely for being joyful at the tragedy that befell Israel and Judah, which came about because God removed his protection from them after his people, as a whole, persisted in sin.  Indeed, beyond withholding further calamity from Israel, God reacts harshly to the Ammonites to the point of allowing them to be conquered.  The Bible, in saying these things, yet again gives specific examples of how Gentiles do not just have a pathetic and woefully incomplete seven moral obligations as opposed to Jews (Rabbinic Judaism's Noahide Laws are very clearly logically and Biblically false).  Both gloating and malice are utterly condemned no matter who is on either end:

Ezekiel 25:1-4, 6-7—"The word of the Lord came to me: 'Son of man, set your face against the Ammonites and prophesy against them.  Say to them, "Hear the word of the Sovereign Lord.  This is what the Sovereign Lord says: Because you said 'Aha!' over my sanctuary when it was desecrated and over the land of Israel when it was laid waste and over the people of Judah when they went into exile, therefore I am going to give you to the people of the East as a possession . . . For this is what the Sovereign Lord says: Because you have clapped your hands and stamped your feet, rejoicing with all the malice of your heart against the land of Israel, therefore I will stretch out my hand against you and give you as plunder to the nations.  I will wipe you out from the nations and exterminate you from the countries . . ."

Despite the lack of a statement like "You must never gloat over an enemy in their distress" in Mosaic Law, God is crucially not acting beyond or contrary to it in affirming the evil of such belittling attitudes or words in Ezekiel 25.  The Law does mandate that one take measures to assist one's enemy when they are in immediate need, such as when their beast of burden collapses under a load.  For the sake of both the animal and the human, who is one's enemy, one should intervene to offer assistance (Exodus 23:4-5), which excludes an apathetic or sadistic gloating from the sidelines.  However, Yahweh's laws never go so far as to condemn being an enemy to another party or having personal enemies.

Even in the midst of extreme and borderline misleading exaggeration as he addresses divorce [2] and oaths, Jesus, assumed by many to prescribe an ultimately quite unbiblical degree of aversion to conflict, does not say it is evil to have enemies.  Instead, one is to love one's enemies and not only one's friends or allies (Matthew 5:44-45), as they too are humans made in God's image with the same rights as all other people.  Nothing about loving enemies and treating them like a human goes beyond what the Law dictates, so there is no asinine, arbitrary addition or "correction" to it here as would be the case with many Pharisaical or evangelical ideas and even with some of the other ideas Jesus seems to propose.  No matter where one looks in the Bible, having enemies on the basis of their ideological or behavioral misalignment with the truth is not declared wicked.  

It could only be rational and righteous to be opposed to the wicked on the basis of their wickedness, after all.  But treating them in certain ways is always sinful.  Although it is possible to celebrate that a wicked person has lost power and thus has a lesser capacity to do evil from a distance without directly interacting with them, taunting them or in almost any way celebrating the fact that a human is suffering (not at justice being imposed as in the case of something like Deuteronomy 25:1-3, which does require some suffering) remains a despicable immorality.

God does not take pleasure at the death of those who deserve to die, as much as their life ending is a positive thing in some regards (Ezekiel 18:23, 33:11).  He likewise does not take pleasure at the suffering of humans as if them being in anguish is ever left to itself the morally positive thing.  Even in the limited instances where the likes of physical lashings and executions are obligatory within certain inflexible boundaries, it is always a travesty that there is any sin to punish in the first place.  

This should never be made the subject of delight, nor should the human whose objective value does not disappear no matter the folly of their stances or actions ever be denigrated.  Living this out can be very difficult for those with a proclivity towards anger or coldness.  Yet mockery of stupid, evil people is not even inherently the culprit, depending on how it is done (for instance, see Psalm 2:1-4).  Celebration of a person's ruin or that there is a need for the wicked to come to ruin is.

[1].  https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2025/09/cursing-humans.html

[2].  See here for elaboration, for instance:

https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2026/02/does-god-really-hate-divorce.html

"Right Now You're Feeling Helpless"

One scene in Saw VI that has nothing to do with the traps or flashbacks displays exceptional artistic competence, from the performances to the narrative tension to the layers of irony.  Antagonist Mark Hoffman, the successor to Jigsaw (John Kramer) after his death, listens to a portion of an edited voice recording from Saw V as the FBI works to uncover whose voice it really is.  It is Hoffman's.  He himself is a detective involved in Jigsaw-adjacent cases, but he was previously revealed to the viewers to have put the murderer of his sister into a copycat Jigsaw trap before being unexpectedly recruited by Jigsaw, who chastised him for making the trap inescapable.  In Saw V, Hoffman killed Special Agent Peter Strahm and later placed his fingerprints in key locations to make it seem like Strahm, not Hoffman, was acting as the new Jigsaw.

While the tape in question was for his sister's murderer, Hoffman tensely navigates the situation as his framing of Strahm is on the brink of coming to light.  After all, the blade he used to cut out a puzzle piece of flesh from his sister's killer and another victim after John's death has been noted as having the same distinctive partially serrated edge.  Again and again, his own voice replays "Right now you're feeling helpless" from the tape that helped catapault him over his head into collaboration with John Kramer.  The broader whole of Saw VI is excellent, but this scene, under four minutes long, is executed so incredibly well that it stands tall entirely on its own.  It moves vital plot points along with masterful urgency and drama while showing a far more restrained Hoffman than the one we unfortunately received in the next film.  Even in isolation, the multifaceted excellence is apparent from the acting and the suspenseful course of events.

Returning FBI characters Lindsey Perez and Dan Erickson are in the room, with Perez asking Hoffman if he is alright.  Hoffman says he is anxious about the tape, and he seemingly is.  Yet instead of being anxious about identifying some separate killer on the loose, he is anxious about his own identity as Jigsaw's accomplice coming to light as the constantly repeating voice on the tape is made to sound more and more like his own unedited voice.  Perez and Erickson start to apply pressure with great subtlety at first.  Asking questions about Strahm's alleged motives as "Right now you're feeling helpless" continues to loop, they lay a conversational trap for Hoffman.

When Perez mentions how she never saw any evidence of such inclinations in Strahm during his five years as her partner, Hoffman says, "You never really can tell what someone is thinking on the inside."  This line simultaneously touches on a major philosophical truth about the human condition (as far as other minds are concerned, not one's own) and ironically affirms how he is trying to conceal his own intentions and deeds from others in the room, some of whom are already growing suspicious of him.  Now, he is the one in an increasingly vulnerable position; he is probably feeling quite helpless himself.

We see Hoffman walking around and preparing himself to fight or kill everyone in the room.  He gets a cup of hot coffee, which he later throws into the face of Perez to temporarily distract her.  He even sets down the coffee when Erickson seems to lean towards the idea that Strahm tried to frame Hoffman rather than the other way around.  And then he picks it back up after Erickson insists there is a problem with this, declaring that evidence points to Strahm having already been dead when his fingerprints were placed at the scene.  Almost right after, Hoffman's voice becomes clear on the tape: "Right now you're feeling helpless" plays one more time before the murderous detective starts killing everyone in the room.

You do not have to watch the entirety of Saw VI to see the elements that make this scene so strong—though it is of course integrated in ways that build off of Saw V and earlier scenes in Saw VI to great effect.  It is a stellar example of how to maximize every aspect of the dialogue, performances, and setting in an individual scene to pay off almost immediately while still serving as the culmination of many prior plot developments.  For a franchise primarily associated at a cultural level with lethal traps, this segment of the sixth film rises to great heights without even featuring any trap (many traps in the movie are likewise masterfully handled on many levels) or any portrayals of Jigsaw expressing his philosophy, not even in flashback form.  A simple premise and location can be superbly capitalized on with strong dialogue, acting, and ominous buildup free of elaborate effects.

Overemphasis On Words

People who act like the mental light bulb has turned on when literally all they have been told is the contrived term for a concept they still know little to nothing about and have just heard of for the first time are, well, foolish.  They are irrational.  If you just know the word for something, you still do not know what that thing is, only what it is called!  From this alone, you could not even know which concept is being associated with the word.  Spoken language literally illuminates almost nothing on its own in this sense, and certainly nothing of importance.  Someone could be familiar with a multitude of words for an idea, even in different languages, and lack knowledge of what exactly it is.

Some people are so infatuated with words, and perhaps moreso with the illogical elitism expressed in favor of people who read or claim to read (at least certain books) than with words themselves, that they focus very disproportionately on language and articulation.  Are words important?  For the pragmatic purpose of communication, yes.  They are quite literally the only way short of direct telepathy for one being to get highly precise or abstract concepts across to another such being.  Do they have such a high status that concepts are trivial compared to the arbitrary words for them and that familiarity with words means you know concepts or reason itself?  Of course not.

If you were to look out for instances of other people reacting as if they have learned far more than is possible from simply being told of a term that is new to them, it might not be difficult to find plenty of cases.  Whether because of some personal delusion or the desire to look "intelligent" before others, this exaggerated reaction is somewhat common, at least in my experience.  One might see, among other things, a person encounter a word for something like a psychological condition or a personal finance tool and then treat the word like it has grand significance or special power.  

If they knew the nature of the thing already thanks to logic, the term is unnecessary for this altogether even on the level of prompting.  And if they did not know, the word reveals basically nothing in isolation, as already stated.  While subjective excitement or gratefulness for having a word for something has its limited place, whatever the thing it refers to, it is just a word.  Communicating is where language is truly vital, not understanding an idea.

If a concept is neither logically self-necessary (only logical axioms are) so that there is literally no excuse for a conscious person to not grasp it at some point early in their life nor in some extended way obvious in light of reason (that introspective states of mind cannot be illusions, that skin color is always objectively irrelevant to personality traits, etc.), then it might only come to mind if someone else brings up the idea using words or uses a word and then is pressed as to what it means.  Absolutely!  But, only someone who is not being rationalistic would ever conflate a term with an idea, as if the former is anything other than random invention used to communicate the latter, or would ever, even worse, elevate the former over the latter.

Job Titles

Someone can take a job for its title with the real intention of using it as a stepping stone to a job in order to manipulate fools who themselves care about meaningless things.  This, even if manipulation of intellectual insects is the explicit goal, is a legitimate approach.  It does not require false or assumed beliefs or any sort of commitment disproportionate to the actual objective nature of the workplace.  A job is just a job, and the title is not even as significant as the job itself or the money it earns, as it is a mere word or phrase and might not even accurately reflect the nature of the position.  More than just one's employer or other prospective employers might care, though.  Coworkers (especially if they gave into the cultural bullshit of certain regions of the world) might actually respect someone more as a person because of such rank, similarly to how many non-rationalists regard people highly or lowly on the basis of educational background.

Educational elitism is not valid, for it conflates intelligence (rationality, which someone can only possess by being rationalistic [1]) with education and especially with arbitrary credentials, having the added error of discriminating against those without access to formal education, for financial or other reasons, on a basis they cannot necessarily control at all.  In place of educational credentials or perhaps alongside them, job titles are despite their irrelevance treated by some as indicators of characteristics like intelligence.  Aside from how even job promotions are to some extent entirely beyond one's control—no one is guaranteed to be noticed for genuinely hard work or rewarded accordingly even if they are (you could be ignored, kept in place for productivity, or punished through lack of promotion)—positions and tenure have nothing to do with whether someone is a philosophical rationalist for the right reasons and actually understands or cares about things which are true and significant.

People who scramble to obtain jobs with particular titles, such as managerial or executive titles, so that they can as quickly as possible make more money and securely escape the "rat race" of asinine workplace obsession and American capitalism are not in error for this—if they go no further.  Anyone else who actually cares about job titles for almost any other reason is a fool, one who has either bowed down to social conditioning (and even if society was right, assuming its ideas are true is still irrational) or devoted themselves to some form of egoism or emotionalism.  Looking to job titles instead of one's alignment with the necessary truths of reason, which depends on neither personal belief or perception nor societal trends, to maintain self-esteem might be popular in some circles, but it is utterly pathetic and erroneous.

The sole way to otherwise care about job titles and yet not be irrational is to, making no assumptions and having no philosophically false priorities all while knowing reason, subjectively appreciate professional duties and effort while strictly recognizing them for what they really are: social constructs made to serve a broader social construct that itself only matters as a means to a financial end, so that workers can survive without resorting to begging or sins like theft.  Work of a professional kind is nothing more than this, and so job titles within the workplace are even lesser than the general workplace itself.  There is nothing rational or righteous about someone because of their career (except concerning certain jobs if certain worldviews are true; for instance, see Deuteronomy 23:17-18), and any thrill derived from work and its titles or prestige is purely subjective.

[1].  For just some posts where I address the truth and nature of genuine rationalism, see here:

A.  https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2023/08/it-does-not-follow.html

B.  https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2024/04/true-skepticism.html

Does God Really Hate Divorce?

Often in conjunction with an exaggerated emphasis on a total misunderstanding of Matthew 5:32 and 19:9 (which allegedly specifies the one exception for divorce and remarriage) that contradicts Matthew 5:17-19 and a host of other verses and logical facts, anti-divorce people in the church routinely appeal to Malachi 2:16.  Supposedly, this verse says God hates divorce.  Anyone who insists that Malachi 2 and Matthew 19 show that Yahweh hates divorce as an intrinsic or almost universally grievous evil is simply wrong.  Aside from probable translation errors with some versions of Malachi 2:16 (compare the NIV and ESV translations to those like the NKJV's), even if God did genuinely always hate divorce, that would not make all divorce evil.  This much is logically true on its own.  Something could be unfortunate but morally permissible or necessary in grave circumstances, so that it is valid to "hate" the thing in question without it being evil itself.  For an analogy rooted directly in Biblical theology, see what God says about the death of the wicked in the book of Ezekiel.

Ezekiel 18:23—"'Do I take any pleasure in the death of the wicked? declares the Sovereign Lord.  Rather, am I not pleased when they turn from their ways and live?'"

Ezekiel 33:11—"'Say to them, "As surely as I live, declares the Sovereign Lord, I take no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but rather that they turn from their ways and live . . ."'"

God clearly says he is not delighted by the death of the wicked and actively prefers for them to turn to righteousness rather than perish.  All the same, as much as God takes no pleasure in their death and longs for their repentance (see also verses like 1 Timothy 2:3-4 and 2 Peter 3:8-9), he inflexibly commands the just death of people who sin in certain ways elsewhere.  However tragic any human death is because it is linked to sin one way or another, it is still justice to kill some people because of their own actions.  I have listed two passages that address capital sins below.

Leviticus 20:9—"'Anyone who curses their father or mother is to be put to death.  Because they have cursed their father or mother, their blood will be on their own head.'"

Deuteronomy 17:2-5—"If a man or woman living among you in one of the town the Lord gives you is found doing evil in the eyes of the Lord your God in violation of his covenant, and contrary to my command has worshiped other gods, bowing down to them or to the sun or the moon or the stars in the sky, and this has been brought to your attention, then you must investigate it thoroughly.  If it is true and it has been proved that this detestable thing has been done in Israel, take the man or woman who has done this evil deed to your city gate and stone that person to death."

In various places, the Bible calls an assortment of other sins detestable besides worshipping other gods or the natural world as in Deuteronomy 17.  What follows is a mere sampling.  All sin is detestable because it is evil, of course, albeit not always equally detestable.  When Proverbs 6 says seven things are detestable, it does not even mention the detestable sins called such in Deuteronomy 18 and Luke 16, for instance.  But it does say that feet which rush into evil are detestable, without specifying any particular kind of evil.  All sin is encompassed.  The Bible, like reason, affirms that anything immoral would be detestable:

Deuteronomy 18:9-12—"When you enter the land the Lord your God is giving you, do not learn to imitate the detestable ways of the nations there.  Let no one be found among you who sacrifices their son or daughter in the fire, who practices divination or sorcery, interprets omens, engages in witchcraft, or casts spells, or who is a medium or spiritist or who consults the dead.  Anyone who does these things is detestable to the Lord; because of these same detestable practices the Lord your God will drive out those nations before you."

Proverbs 6:16-19—"There are six things the Lord hates, seven that are detestable to him: haughty eyes, a lying tongue, hands that shed innocent blood, a heart that devises wicked schemes, feet that are quick to rush into evil, a false witness who pours out lies and a person who stirs up conflict in the community."

Luke 16:13-15—"'No one can serve two masters.  Either you will hate the one and love the other, or you will be devoted to the one and despise the other.  You cannot serve both God and money.'  The Pharisees, who loved money, heard all this and were sneering at Jesus.  He said to them, 'You are the ones who justify yourselves in the eyes of others, but God knows your hearts.  What people value highly is detestable in God's sight.'"

If God hates the evil act, then he would also hate the evildoer, apart from whom there is no evil.  Indeed, Deuteronomy 18 communicates as much about those who practice divination or necromancy.  God hates them and other evildoers because of their evil acts or thoughts, without which they would not be wicked.  But he does not actually hate divorce or divorcees, at least not in the sense that evangelicals might think.  He would hate that divorce is warranted or necessary in the way he might hate that the unrepentantly wicked must die.  Their death under proper conditions (i.e., not through murder or unjust tortures, but the likes of legitimate capital punishment or divinely appointed death from sickness) is a thing that in a very particular way merits celebration for the elimination of evil by removal of the evildoer.  But the evil that made the sinner deserve to perish is a tragedy, along with the fact that the dead evildoer did not repent beforehand and thus potentially save their life.

There is a very easy way to demonstrate that divorce is not an abomination on Judeo-Christianity, at least not automatically: find at least one verse expressly permitting divorce.  A lack of condemnation also accomplishes this, but one would have to read more of the Bible to notice an absence of such prohibition.  Yet the Law, where God restates almost all of or clarifies more about the moral obligations sporadically touched on throughout Genesis in a very incomplete way, does both.  The Law never condemns divorce as a whole, instead revealing that there must be some genuine error on the other spouse's part (Deuteronomy 24:1) and that divorce in certain very specific circumstances is wrong (Deuteronomy 22) unless there is something like abuse, such as unjust physical force (not for self-defense), aimed inside the marriage.  For instance, Exodus 21:10-11, 26-27, Deuteronomy 23:15-16, and 1 Corinthians 7:15 all independently affirm one way or another that no man or woman loses all rights to divorce, no matter the scenario, based on their own misdeeds before or during the marriage.

Sometimes, as with Numbers 30:9, general divorce is brought up in the divine Law using a variation of the word without any condemnation.  In other cases, like in Exodus 21:26-27, the context is not about marriage, though there are logical ramifications for marriage and divorce in the Bible's position on the issue at hand.  Here, that is the abuse of male and female slaves.  Passages like Deuteronomy 21:13-14 clearly speak of a marriage ending without actually using terms like "divorce", but it is very obvious from what is said that divorce is in view and ethically permissible in, at a minimum, the context addressed.  The verses below are but a sample of the relevant passages from the Torah, arranged in sequential order:

Exodus 21:26-27—"'An owner who hits a male or female slave in the eye and destroys it must let the slave go free to compensate for the eye.  And an owner who knocks out the tooth of a male or female slave must let the slave go free to compensate for the tooth.'"

Numbers 30:9—"'Any vow or obligation taken by a widow or divorced woman will be binding on her.'"

Deuteronomy 21:13-14—". . . After she has lived in your house and mourned her father and mother for a full month, then you may go to her and be her husband and she shall be your wife.  If you are not pleased with her, let her go wherever she wishes.  You must not sell her or treat her as a slave, since you have dishonored her."

None of these or other passages call divorce some universal or near-universal act of wickedness.  Instead, they clearly allow it and prescribe allowing one's partner to go free for abuse.  If divorce was a sin, then God did the exact opposite of forbidding it by both explicitly and more subtly giving laws that permit divorce in a wide variety of situations.  In fact, even lack of contentment with the marriage is a factor according to Deuteronomy 21:13-14 (and 24:1)—personal, amoral dissatisfaction is not the sole factor, but it is treated as relevant twice.  As I love to point out, the only possibilities if all of the verses I have mentioned or alluded to are in the Bible are that 1) the Jesus of the gospels is an overtly insane, hypocritical heretic who forsakes reason and his own supposed religious philosophy, or 2) he does not mean exactly what he says.  There is direct indication of the latter in the gospel accounts themselves [1].

Malachi 2 similarly does not present Yahweh as hating divorce.  And if it did, either it would mean God hates divorce but it is still permissible in many circumstances, similar to how God takes no pleasure in the death of the wicked but still kills/will kill them as they deserve, or it would mean that God is himself an irrationalistic hypocrite, and therefore he is in the wrong.  Guess which of these is not Biblical either way?  God is said to not change (Malachi 3:6), so if the Bible is true, he absolutely did not arbitrarily "decide" that marriage is more important than the people in a marriage or anything else of more foundational philosophical significance, then arbitrarily decide that divorce is permissible, and then arbitrarily decide to hate divorce before his Son announces that divorce is suddenly always evil with at most one exception.  Further disproving this incoherent stance on divorce is the fact that Jesus never even condemns divorce in his strictest wording: at best, he only condemns remarriage to a new partner following divorce.

And this is massive hyperbole that would otherwise outright contradict Mosaic Law (Deuteronomy 24:1-4, 12:32).  Deuteronomy 24 even makes the emphatic point that the party whose wrong spurred the other to end the marriage, in this example the wife, does not sin in remarrying.  That is, remarriage is not a sin unless they/she marries a separate partner afterward and then, after the new partner dies or divorces them, remarries the original spouse.  Neither does Paul condemn remarriage, all but saying it is of course allowed when he declares an abandoned or otherwise abused spouse as no longer bound or enslaved.  See 1 Corinthians 7:15, which clearly uses the phrase "such cases" or "such circumstances" to reference scenarios far beyond the scope of literal physical abandonment.  Also, see how the analogous passages in the Law about slaves going free for abuse, even if they had freely promised lifelong service with some of its own parallels to marriage (Exodus 21:5-6, Deuteronomy 15:16-17) and with no discrimination based on gender, never forbid the liberated servant from seeking a new master or mistress.  Perhaps Paul recognized the equivalence of such servants to abused spouses when he wrote that the abandoned husband or wife is no longer enslaved/bound.

I myself was quite surprised even after years of being a rationalist at how utterly exaggerated the statement of Jesus is in Matthew 19:9.  Almost as soon as I became a rationalist in early 2015, I saw that Biblical ethics explicitly allows for divorce far outside of what Jesus hyperbolically says is the one basis (Exodus 21:10-11 and 1 Corinthians 7:15 alone) and that God's moral nature requires that abuse of various kinds frees the victim of either gender to leave their relationship or situation (Exodus 21:26-27, Deuteronomy 23:15-16).  But obviously, to the exact extent specified earlier, God is entirely fine with people divorcing because they lack personal interest in continuing the marriage according to Deuteronomy 21 and 24.  Heretical anti-divorce and anti-remarriage theology I had already been exposed to before coming to rationalism did contribute to a level of initial wariness towards the issue that, even though I had already started making no assumptions, is entirely unnecessary.

God does not hate divorce as an intrinsic evil, nor does he automatically hate people who initiate divorce or have their marriages end by the wishes of the other party.  He does hate the sins of husbands and wives that make divorce legitimate or even necessary for the safety or mental/physical wellbeing of a victimized partner.  Divorce really is the best and divinely authorized solution to a wide variety of marital issues as soon as they appear.  Sure, reconciliation is a valid solution, but it is absolutely never a moral requirement, and abusive partners need to acknowledg their stupidity and wrongs as much as they recall them whether or not a couple stays together.  If more people were as ruthless in dismissing dating partners as romantic options for any rationalistic reason (not for their own emotional issues they force onto their partners, for instance), fewer people would even have to bother with the potentially harrowing process of divorce that is monetized and drawn out in an unbiblical society like that of America.

[1].  https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2025/08/misunderstanding-luke-1616-18.html

Above And Beyond

The very concept of going above and beyond  as a moral necessity is something promoted by a certain kind of parent, employer, or other party, usually with the promise or implied hope that some significant reward will follow, even if it is only self-satisfaction.  With the workplace, the possible benefit is an eventual raise or promotion, though people could hold to this notion of going above and beyond in other contexts as well.  But having pragmatic benefits does not mean something must be done in a moral sense, only that it might result in a given objectively or subjectively favorable outcome.

Some employers act as if they basically think that an employee who does not go "above and beyond" the literal base requirements of their job is a poor worker, or at least one that somehow still merits condemnation or suspicion even if they have done nothing irrational or immoral, although they would very likely not get immediately paid more and perhaps not get noticed in a proportionate way for complying with these asinine overexpectations.  Likewise, some people think that it is really a moral duty to go above and beyond the actual obligations to other people and treat them with greater kindness, affection, or consideration than what is required by their moral system, such as Judeo-Christian ethics.

By nature, going above and beyond is utterly unnecessary to being a rational or righteous person precisely because it is above and beyond.  It can be a good thing, but it can never be mandatory, and thus it is erroneous to think that anyone who passively or actively (and therefore intentionally) shirks from going past what is truly required of them by reason and morality is in the wrong.  If kindness is morally good, for instance, one can be kind without spontaneously reaching out to all of one's friends or neighbors to check on them, putting on a "kind" facial expression in the presence of others, or doing anything else that is not in itself necessary in order to be kind.

Doing the "bare minimum" to uphold this or any other obligation—not that Biblical ethics is really about kindness at its core as opposed to truth and justice—or to carry out a job is really all that is necessary.  If something was not the bare minimum, some other criteria would be, and if there is a minimum threshold, then anything above that is by default above and beyond.  Above and beyond is inherently unnecessary.  This is such a simple truth that many parents and employers overlook to their own stupidity.  Everyone needs only to align with reason and morality to be in the right, at which point they can see the folly of anyone who would pressure others to do more than this.

The Sun Will Turn To Darkness And The Moon To Blood

The brief book of Joel, containing only three chapters, covers several topics of great importance, though chapter two will be the focus here.  Portions of this very chapter are quoted by the book of Acts (2:16-21) to hold up events concerning the early church as the fulfillment of particular Old Testament prophecies, with an emphasis in the quoted verses on Yahweh's egalitarian approach to Jews and Gentiles, men and women, and the old and the young, as well as the divine being pouring out his Spirit on people from all of these categories (Joel 2:28-29).  The immediate context confirms this outpouring is supposed to occur before the "great and dreadful" day of the Lord because it is described before Joel mentions the the sun turning to darkness and the moon to blood (2:31), which is itself said to occur before the day of the Lord.

In fact, like God pouring out his Spirit on a diverse set of people, the prophecy about the sun and moon does not go unreferenced in the New Testament.  Revelation 6 does describe celestial abnormalities that perfectly align with the words of Joel 2:31.  While Acts cites Joel 2 by more directly paraphrasing the wording and attributing it to the prophet Joel, Revelation simply declares that the sun will turn or at least appear to be black and the moon will look as red as blood after the opening of the sixth seal.  The parallels between Joel and Revelation are still stark without any sort of explicit paraphrasing or citation:

Joel 2:30-31—"I will show wonders in the heavens and on earth, blood and fire and billows of smoke.  The sun will be turned to darkness and the moon to blood before the coming of the great and dreadful day of the Lord."

Revelation 6:12-13—"I watched as he opened the sixth seal.  There was a great earthquake.  The sun turned black like sackcloth made of goat hair, the whole moon turned blood red, and the stars in the sky fell to earth, as figs drop from a fig tree when shaken by a strong wind."

Joel certainly provides little clarification about what precisely is meant by the sun turning to darkness and the moon to blood, without specifying anything about the timing of these phenomena other than that they will occur at some future point before the "great and dreadful day of the Lord."  Revelation brings up the sun and moon appearing to have a different color as connected with a specific seal judgment in the context of a particular sequence.  However, the way Revelation describes the sun and moon alludes to the exact eschatological things mentioned in Joel 2:31.  Peter says in Acts 2 that at least part of the prophecies in Joel 2 were fulfilled on Pentecost during the time of the early church, and though he mentions the part about the sun and moon in Acts 2:20, he does not claim these things have transpired yet.

Revelation clarifies more about how these specific portions of the prophecy are to be brought about.  And alongside the unusual appearance of the sun and moon, there is said to be a terrible earthquake once the sixth seal opens, one that Revelation 6:14-17 seems to equate with that of Isaiah 2:10-21, another eschatological passage.  But I am focusing on a very specific connection between Joel and Revelation about the sun and moon; Revelation alludes to a multitude of Old Testament segments, far more than would fall into the scope of this post!

Since Joel says that the sun and moon change color (or appear to have their color changed) before the day of the Lord, it is pertinent that Revelation uses language about people experiencing the earthquake referring to the "day" (Revelation 6:16-17) of the wrath of God and the Lamb only after the sun appears black and the moon red.  Even aside from strict chronology, the day of the Lord spoken of throughout the Bible is not necessarily a single day, and Revelation definitively presents the content of Joel's prophecy about the sun and moon as eschatological.  Far from irrelevant to the New Testament, Joel 2 is a pivotal chapter from the minor prophets for multiple reasons, eschatology included.

Can Abusive People Change?

It is easy to find online assertions of some sort of asinine fatalism holding that if someone naturally gravitates towards abusive inclinations on a mental level or if they act abusively once, they are doomed to commit abusive actions for the rest of their life.  But if someone was truly rational, they would never think such a thing.  Change is not necessarily positive, so even if someone changed, they might only become worse.  Sometimes people do claim abuse is bound to increase in severity or frequency.  However, a rational—that is, rationalistic—person does not conflate claims or consensus with logical truth and proof.

Even if someone who thinks abusers never/cannot chance has personally received abuse from a person who never changed or has seen it inflicted on others from similarly consistent abusers, they are wrong because they would have to be assuming, misunderstanding subjective experience instead of looking to reason itself.  One abuser is not another abuser; that one remains steadfast in their harmful practices or becomes even more abusive does not mean another one will do either.  And comparison between hypothetical or real people is unnecessary to know that abusers can change, since it is logically untrue that a given person will stay as they are or have been.  Ultimately, of course, the fact that an abuser changing in a positive manner does not contradict logical axioms is what all of this hinges on.  It clearly is logically possible for them to change for this reason alone.

Possibility alone does not mean something is true or will occur, however.  An abusive person having the capacity to change for the better unfortunately does not necessitate that they will choose to.  Still, they could.  There is nothing about being an abuser that logically requires otherwise.  Anyone who holds a contrary belief is an illogical thinker planted in emotionalism or assumptions.  For abusive people who do not change, though, why would this be the case?  Their staunchness is certainly not an inevitable outcome.

In some cases, the status quo of the relationship serves the abusive party's own irrational or evil intentions—perhaps they just want someone to exercise power over arbitrarily, or perhaps they like hurting people for the sake of hurting people.  For romantic relationships, perhaps the abuser is afraid that their partner will end the relationship and seek another partner.  Lashing out verbally or physically is intended to deter them from this course of action, whether or not they were even considering it beforehand, and whether or not they already had valid reasons to.  The former's behavior is self-sabotaging, of course, because they are only giving their partner a genuine reason to leave.

Perhaps they think they are so worthy of attention and submission that they deserve literally unconditional loyalty, so they intentionally or unintentionally toy with their partner to feel empowered or important.  If the partner stands up to them, even on a purely rationalistic basis without engaging in mistreatment in the other direction, they might think they are the one being abused.  Some form of emotionalistic arrogance or egoism is almost an intrinsic part of this, if not on the level of philosophical belief, than on the level of mental indulgence and behavioral practice.  Or, the abuser assumes that pain from past relationships (romantic or nonromantic) justifies him or her in their mistreatment because they are driven by the desire to overcome or redirect their own anguish.

No, abuse will not necessarily continue or get worse.  All the same, if someone is already a non-rationalist, there is little hope for them to ever become rational and righteous anyway.  When irrational people do change—particularly with people who are truly irrationalistic as opposed to merely rationalists who avoidably fall short of perfection—it is probably going to be for the worse.  They are not rational, and it takes effort to initially let go of assumptions or identify logical truths without confusing them with any irrelevant thing like personal intuition or preference.  That effort is unlikely to be given by people who are just in the grip of assumptions.  This is not true strictly or especially about abusive people/non-rationalists, however.  Could they change?  Absolutely.  Will they?  That depends on their rationality, willingness, and other factors, all of which have to do with their individual standing, not that of another abuser.

The Dear Lady Of 2 John

It might not receive a great deal of attention in general American church circles, but the book of 2 John is outright addressed to a woman.  "To the lady chosen by God and to her children," John writes in verse 1, identifying the primary addressee as a woman.  He also calls them "dear lady" in verse 5.  Near the end of the book, John goes on to express his eagerness to see and converse with her face to face in one of multiple affirmations of platonic interaction between men and women in the New Testament, which receives absolutely no censure in either Testament to the discomfort of some. 

So it is plain that a New Testament book is written primarily to a female contemporary of John the apostle, which simply would not be part of the Bible if women are supposed to be kept to the sidelines of Christian community by men.  With this sort of thing, absence would not mean that John believes the opposite or that Judeo-Christianity contradicts gender egalitarianism in any way.  That is, if this and every other New Testament book was addressed to men, this alone would not logically entail a denial of women's equality with men with all of its ramifications.

The significance is still immense, and not only for how it contradicts cultural norms of the time, but also for how it defies things like the gender segregation that infests plenty of modern churches outside of primary services—at least churches in my country.  Men and women are treated as if they are different species of unrelatable beings, rather than as individuals with somewhat biologically different bodies.  So much for not yielding to culture as evangelicals clamor to avoid with other issues!  This of course by logical necessity invalidly burdens men in gender-specific ways as well, but if men and women are separated and men are placed in positions of hierarchical authority, women are kept from those positions.

All of this is in part why 2 John might shock some people who call themselves Christians as they hold to an illogical philosophy of gender at odds with pure reason and Biblical doctrines alike.  John treats the "dear lady" as an equal and an intimate friend who shares the same (probably correct) theological worldview.  Again, while there would be nothing inherently anti-egalitarian about the mere absence of women being the direct addressees of any book of the Bible, that even one is written to a woman, and in a celebratory way, is of great importance.  On its own, this contradicts some tenets of evangelical complementarianism altogether.

But, 2 John is not even the only book of the New Testament specifically written to a woman.  Paul includes his spiritual sister Apphia in the people addressed at the beginning of Philemon.  After mentioning Philemon, the man whose name is that of the epistle, he brings up Apphia.  Paul frequently mentions women by name in his New Testament writings (throughout Romans 16 and in Philippians 4:2-3, Colossians 4:15, etc.), and in the case of Philemon, he writes one of his letters to a woman.  All the New Testament is written for women as well for men, of course.  The Old Testament before it is likewise for women as well.  However, for multiple reasons (the linguistic flexibility of male nouns and pronouns, the logically necessary applicability of doctrines to both genders, and so on), New Testament epistles are written to and/or for women.  And all are for men, including 2 John.

Becoming A Vampire

Between various entities like vampires, ghouls, and eventually a certain core character, consuming blood comes up rather frequently in Supernatural for such a specific act in a show that is not exclusively about vampiric or vampire-adjacent creatures.  However, it is vampire antagonists that introduce the act into the central plot in the first season.  These beings are shown abducting people to intake their blood.  The second season introduces Gordon, a "hunter" of monsters like protagonists Sam and Dean Winchester, along with vampires who refuse to drink human blood to survive, instead relying on the blood of animals.  Gordon assumes that all vampires must actually rely on human fluid and does not relent when he is told that the ones he is hunting are not the same as others he has killed.

As is the case with any non-rationalist who believes they know literally anything rather than just perceiving or assuming it, Gordon thinking he is justified for making assumptions is already hypocritical.  Now, hypocrisy is a recurring focus of the show.  One character after another says or does asinine things that contradict certain beliefs they have previously espoused—or, in the case of beliefs, that contradict the objective truths of logic.  The Winchester brothers themselves are chief examples within the early seasons alone, but the hunter Gordon's delusional reason for pursuing even vampires who do not harm humans is among the first overt examples.  Believing he is treating vampires as they deserve does not make his reason for doing so valid.  It would actually be the other way around, if his exact reason was correct.

Gordon displays a much more insidious form of hypocrisy in the third season, however, once he is involuntarily turned into a vampire himself.  Becoming a vampire or some other non-human creature against one's will is already terrible enough.  That Gordon hated and feared vampires to the point of stereotyping them as aggressive towards humans would certainly add layers to the existential terror that overcomes him as his metaphysical transformation leaves him yearning for blood with the full intensity of a craving he has yet to master.  Rather than abruptly change his belief about vampires deserving to die because it is no longer as personally convenient, he tells a fellow hunter that he, the hunter, must kill him, Gordon—once he kills Sam Winchester for ostensible affiliation with demons.  

Gordon remains consistent with his anti-vampire worldview in this regard, although some of his beliefs about vampires beforehand were still inconsistent with reason itself, in part because he only believed them on the basis of assumptions.  Where he lapses into sheer hypocrisy regarding even his own somewhat irrationalistic philosophy is in turning a woman into a vampire so that Dean Winchester will be distracted by an attacker as Gordon attempts to eliminate Sam.  Typifying how extreme circumstances often bring people, and people who are already fools all the more, to the point of inconsistency between one belief and another or between belief and action, his decision parallels things far more relatable than making another vampire.

If being a vampire is so evil—and it would be certain actions a conventional vampire must take to survive that are evil, not simply being a vampire against one's wishes—then it would of course be immoral to make someone else a vampire to distract an enemy.  Gordon betrays his own philosophy here.  He remains consistent enough to not pretend like he would be an exception if all vampires deserve to die, but he seems to think turning a human into a vampire against their will for utilitarian purposes is permissible in his situation, despite creating another monster he regards as abominable and harming one of the non-hunter humans he supposedly strives to protect.

And yes, Biblically, a true human-turned-vampire or equivalent being would morally have to be put to death even if they never killed anyone but only drank the blood of any creature to live [1] (if they could somehow survive without resorting to the sin, then this does not apply).  Not even the blood of a subhuman animal can be legitimately consumed except by other such animals.  So, Gordon is ironically in alignment with Biblical theology on this (Genesis 9:4, Leviticus 17:10-14, etc.), even though Biblical theology is wildly different from what mouthpiece characters in Supernatural say about it (hell, justice, demons, eschatological seals, etc.), and even though he is by no means a rational person who makes no assumptions and holds no beliefs for personal reasons as opposed to strict logical necessity.  He simply dislikes vampires, attributing malicious actions and intentions to every single one them irrationally and unjustly, when the sin of eating any blood is already enough to deserve capital punishment even if it is not from humans.  And then he as a vampire does to an extent exactly what he hated them for and ascribed to all of them in the first place.

Through Gordon, viewers see an example in fiction of a person who is comfortable with arbitrarily deviating from either what is true or what they merely but sincerely believe is true because of emotion or convenience.  How very much like the typical person!  Put them in the right circumstances, and their perhaps already irrational beliefs will fail to constrain their behaviors, even as they might still profess or hold to those beliefs.  The central allure of utilitarianism is precisely that one can supposedly be absolved of guilt by bringing about a certain goal because the situation or the outcome would somehow override moral duties to act or not act in certain ways.  Whether he is driven primarily by emotionalism or utilitarianism when he transforms the woman, it would not matter.  He is in the wrong just by being a hypocrite separate from the irrationality he had already clung to before becoming a vampire.

[1].  https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2025/12/the-vampires-moral-dilemma.html