Someone who complains of pain from a wound on their leg might exclaim something like "My leg hurts" when articulating their experience. When they say this, they truly do seem to mean, regardless of whether they have explored the issue directly, much less done so rationalistically, that they, their conscious self, are experiencing pain in a body that belongs to their mind. In the moment, they might not mean to say anything more about the nature of reality than that they are experiencing a particular form of pain. They still talk as if they believe that the mind and body are distinct. Inability to know if other minds exists, even if someone cries out in pain, does not nullify that one's own mind can be truly known to exist, that is, with absolute certainty thanks to logical necessity.
I have on many occasions written about why consciousness cannot be part of the body even if it only comes into existence because of it, and why consciousness cannot be physical. These things are not strictly the focus here. Instead, the focus rests on how many go about their lives talking as if they believe in this distinction of consciousness and body even if they are very philosophically apathetic or against mind-body dualism. For some, it seems like the tendency to act/speak as if they believe this is almost automatic.
Suppose someone says, "I have a headache". Only within a consciousness can there be pain. In a truly inanimate object or a corpse, there would be nothing to do the experiencing, and thus no pain could be felt. There would be no consciousness, no self, to perceive. When someone says that they have a headache, they are communicating that they think on some level that their head and by extension the rest of their body is outside of or separate from their mind, which is experiencing the pain. By speaking like this, they betray a commitment at some level—perhaps they are just assuming, but their words express some sort of worldview nonetheless—to substance dualism.
Naturally gravitating towards a philosophical idea does not make it true or knowable, and one can only know something due through logical proof, but it is still the case that many people do passively lean towards some form of mind-body dualism even if they have not explicitly thought about the subject. The mind is not the body, and their natures are different enough that even philosophically negligent people tend to naturally gravitate towards this because it truly does seem by default like mental experiences in a sense lurk behind or above the the body. It is likely that they would, however, scrutinize these ideas only when someone else more blatantly brings them up.
Even then, a person cannot engage in everyday conversation without at least brushing up against indirect verbal acknowledgement of things like logical axioms, their own consciousness, or some sort of philosophy of the material world, which in the broadest sense includes the body. As for their own conscious mind, yes, it is almost inevitable that even the most passive, assumption-enslaved non-rationalist who talks about basic human experiences like a painful burning sensation on the skin is affecting their body. Implicitly or explicitly, their wording does point to some inner embrace of metaphysical mind-body dualism (and no one needs to know the formal terms for this philosophical idea to intentionally come to the idea).
Of course, many who mention how "their" ("my" in their own statements) arm, leg, head, or some other body part is in pain would probably just be non-rationalists adopting the standard language of their day rather thoughtlessly—without any more consideration than it takes to accept a belief based upon personal intuition or cultural pressures. And, I will reiterate that the truth or falsity of mind-body dualism crucially would never be because of linguistic habits anyway. It remains so that speaking as if they believe in mind-body dualism, even if they directly insist they believe in the nonexistence of anything but physical substance, is a very ordinary occurrence for many people. For logical reasons, it turns out to be the case that the mind really is separate from the body ontologically even if the former ultimately does not exist apart from the latter, but direct recognition of this is not the only reason why someone would talk as if this distinction is true.
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