Size Is Relative: The Ontology Of Shapes And Lengths

It isn't unusual to hear something described as "big," "short," "long," or as some other adjective relating to shapes.  Despite the commonality of such language, however, these descriptions are incomplete.  Of course sizes, shapes, and lengths do exist--both on the conceptual plane grasped by the mind and in the external world as the dimensions of objects.

Size is how large or small something is, and length is how long or short something is.  Yet there is something else that must be clarified about sizes and lengths.  Clearly each material object is the size or shape that it is; to deny this is to deny something that cannot be false.  But there is no such thing as something that is big or small, only something that is larger or smaller than something else, just like nothing is old or young, only older or younger than something else.  Likewise, there is nothing that is short or long, only something that is shorter or longer than another thing.

The frog is not little, and the finger is not big.  The frog is smaller
than the finger and the finger is larger than the frog.

Of course, this does not erase the tendency for people to simply refer to something as "small" or "long," despite the incompleteness of such terms--smaller than what?  Longer than what?  Shorter than what?  Larger than what?  Comparison is the only way to make references to sizes and lengths meaningful in conversation with other people.  Without a reference point, without a comparison of two or more things, judgments or statements about size and length have little to no usefulness, for there is no such thing as "bigness" or "smallness" or "shortness" or "longness."  Something can only have these qualities by comparison to another thing.

Thus size and its qualities are relative.  This is not particularly difficult to realize, but colloquial use of language sometimes obscures this fact on a linguistic level.  Language is necessary to convey truths, yet it can be used in a manner that actually complicates a right understanding of reality--not because reality itself becomes less knowable when language is used, but because the very tool used to explain reality to others can misrepresent it just enough to confuse or distract some people.