Desperation

Desperation, which might stem from fear or despair or extreme anxiety, can erode someone's moral resolve if intense or sustained enough, and though it never excuses a legitimate intrinsic evil, if this kind of mental state motivated them rather than something like greed, egoism, or a default irrationalistic rejection of the truth, they could not possibly be as great of a sinner as someone who does what should not be done gleefully or without any concern for the nature of reality they would be disregarding.  Just as it is possible to do that which is good with terrible or amoral intentions, it is possible to do that which is evil with intentions of varying immorality, or perhaps with intentions that might not be problematic on their own.

A hypothetical person who murders under duress from being told by their kidnapper that their own family will be killed if they do not comply would not be as heinous as someone who murders, especially if they have thought about moral metaphysics and epistemology at least on the level of logical possibility, in order to express hatred of moral concepts or to simply steal the belongings of others.  Someone who steals reluctantly to survive could not be as immoral a thief as someone who steals for a sense of empowerment or to flagrantly express egoistic philosophy.  A man or woman who lies to protect someone else (though this is Biblically permitted under the right circumstances, as in Exodus 1 and Joshua 2) is not the same as someone who lies because they enjoy deceiving.

Not everyone who commits the same sins is necessarily of equal depravity.  For some actions, there is a whole spectrum of potential motivations that might drive a person, and it is not as if the fear or anxiety that can seize someone's heart can always simply be willed away.  If desperation, particularly when it affects someone's will to adhere to their worldview (though of course only a worldview that is both true and verifiable is valid to hold), could be willed to oblivion, perhaps very few would choose to suffer in this way.  Emotion is not always subject to control; what is still within a person's control is what they believe and how they act.  Nothing short of literal mind control would remove this volitional ability.

While evil would still be evil, certain sins committed out of personal desperation are not as severe as they could have been.  The motivation is sometimes all that differentiates a given righteous or wicked course of action, or all that distinguishes an otherwise good act from a hollow one.  It is also what can make a given immoral behavior more or less evil.  Avoidable as it still is, immorality does not have to be carried out with the exclusive, direct intention of being irrational, cruel, or selfish.  Sheer desperation, which could even overpower a rationalistic person if they allowed it to, can be a terrifyingly penetrating emotion that makes what a person would in other circumstances never do seem necessary for escape or relief, for themself or for others.