The Uncertain Security Of Money: Skepticism Of Object Permanence

Object permanence is assumed to be true without justification by the average person, for many people react as if object permanence is an absolutely certain, immutable aspect of reality while never even hinting at any sort of skepticism about the matter.  While the ultimate unverifiability of object permanence has broader philosophical ramifications than the following points, the relationship between object permanence and the perceived security of something like money are scarcely ever touched upon.

Money, whether it is physically stored in a safe or deposited in a bank and represented by digital numbers, is often looked to for a sense of stability.  There is nothing inherently irrational about this: money allows people to obtain things they desire, even if they care little for money on its own.  It permits financial safety and therefore emotional relief for many people.  Nonetheless, this sense of security is often overestimated to a significant extent due to epistemological assumptions about the nature of matter.

Anyone who can understand the unprovable nature of object permanence in general is capable of understanding how it would undermine the epistemological security offered by money.  Who can prove that their money will not metaphysically evaporate into nonexistence simply because it is logically possible for the laws of physics to change?  Who can prove that physical currency they place in a safe will be there when they check inside?  Philosophically speaking, there is no such thing as absolute certainty about whether one's money will even be there when one looks for it!

Even if money provides practical security, there is no genuinely absolute certainty about whether one's money will continue to exist--and yet there is a plethora of more practical reasons (as opposed to the more abstract and metaphysical reasons) for which money might be lost or rendered less useful.  There are degrees of security offered by money, none of which are absolute.  One can only prove that one is in a position of better financial security than some other set of circumstances would allow for.  Of this one can be absolutely certain, but this is not the same as having infallible future security.

In other words, it is impossible for money to provide absolute security about the future for both practical and more explicitly philosophical reasons (practicality is not outside of philosophy, for philosophy contains all things, yet it is the lowest and most trivial aspect of philosophy).  Money can be reassuring, but thinking that money can deliver one from all uncertainty is a display of intellectual ineptitude.  Only when one regards money as its nature deserves can one learn how to best use it.