Is Skepticism Of Other Minds Demeaning?

One of the most basic, clear facts about phenomenology is that humans can only gaze into their own minds, a limitation that not only leaves one incapable of seeing the thoughts of others, but also leaves one incapable of even demonstrating the existence of a single other mind in the first place.  The fact that there is great evidence for other minds, that it seems as if they exist, falls short of proving anything more than that it seems like there are other consciousnesses.  This is one of the most foundational truths about the intersection between epistemology and phenomenology.

Some have contended that skepticism about the very existence of other minds is an arrogant stance that demeans others.  Intellectual humility, ironically, is only achieved when one admits to oneself that one does not know what one cannot know; it is actually arrogant to mistakenly believe that one knows what one does not or cannot, since this entails thinking more highly of oneself than one's epistemological status permits.  To believe in an unverified or unverifiable thing is intellectual arrogance, since one presumes to know what is at least currently unknown.

A person who does not think of himself or herself more highly than he or she should cannot be guilty of arrogance.  Many things that are considered arrogant have nothing to do with pride, and it is easy to demonize a position by merely accusing its holders of being arrogant.  Instead of retreating behind the suspicion that controversial or original ideas are borne of arrogance, a rational person accepts that even actual arrogance does not disqualify a claim from being true (the opposite belief commits the genetic fallacy).

As for the charge that skepticism about other minds is demeaning to others, there is nothing impossible about loving a person even if one cannot know that he or she exists as an independent being.  There is nothing exclusive about caring or having affection for someone and not knowing if there are any minds other than one's own consciousness.  That neither opposes the other is a simple matter, one that can be quickly and easily realized.  Thus, there is nothing about withholding belief in other minds that necessarily entails a belittling attitude towards any other minds that might exist.

If denying that other minds can be known to exist was arrogant, then it would follow that it would be rational to be arrogant.  Similarly, if it was degrading to accept that the only mind one sees into is one's own, then this would necessarily mean that it would be rational to harbor degrading attitudes towards others--but these things are not the case.  Even if they were, they would do nothing to discredit or refute skepticism about other minds, but the fact of the matter is that there is no connection between this skepticism and a lack of humility.