Human Cloning

The hypothetical cloning of humans is not a great evil, though some characterize it as such.  There is nothing inherently depraved or obligatory about such a thing.  Human cloning is, like many things, capable of being used in a legitimate and immoral manner, but is itself morally neutral.  There are ethical boundaries that govern how clones should be treated, as well as the morality of the purposes they are brought into existence for, but there is nothing wrong about human cloning on its own.

All arguments against the cloning of humans--full humans, not just isolated organs--rely on slippery slopes, appeals to emotion, and circular reasoning.  The objections are based on what might happen, not on what will happen, or are based on emotive grounds or assumptions.  As such, there is not a single sound argument against human cloning itself, as it is not evil by nature.  Christians in particular should recognize these anti-cloning arguments as untrue (Deuteronomy 4:2).

A group of hypothetical human cloners should certainly exercise caution with how it proceeds with research and actual cloning.  However, the need for caution does not indicate that the cloning itself is immoral, only that it could be used, like everything in human life, for immoral purposes.  There is nothing special about cloning that renders slippery slope fallacies valid.  Cloning facilities could be monitored, ensuring to a great extent that clones are not abused.  An example of a behavior that this surveillance could aim to prevent would be the growing of clones for organ harvesting, where clones are created simply for the extraction of organs and then discarded or killed.  This is not a guaranteed outcome; it is merely a way that cloning could be abused.

The presence of human clones in a society would force out into the open some of the same questions that a group of transhuman beings would force.  For instance, should clones be treated differently than natural humans?  Since they would be the same categorical beings as normal humans, with the difference being their origins, they should not be treated as subhuman creatures.  The personhood of human clones must be fully regarded.  A living clone of myself would be a sentient being, just as I am, possessing its own consciousness and its own body.  It follows that it would have the same human rights that I do, being the same type of metaphysical being that I am.

The concept of human cloning is not a thing that merits moral outrage.  The treatment of clones, however, could deserve vehement condemnation.  This is an issue that demonstrates the tendency of some to attack a thing based upon a potential misuse of it or because of a subjective discomfort with it.  Neither of those things has anything to do with the moral legitimacy of the thing in question.