Wednesday, August 21, 2024

The Localization Of Consciousness

It does not in any way seem as if my mind is thinking actively, as opposed to passively perceiving, where my fingers or thighs are.  I can feel physical sensations in those areas of my body, and I can focus on those anatomical locations, but it in no way seems like the perceptions of my consciousness are centralized in body parts (non-spatially, of course, as consciousness is immaterial even if created by the body's neural matter) like my shoulders or toes.  Without consciousness inhabiting those parts of my perceived body, I would not be able to experience anything at all connected with them, from the physical feeling of the body part bring present to the perception of pleasure or pain, when applicable.

The unresolvable epistemological issue of whether my body is exactly as it appears aside, is my consciousness thus bound only to my "head" area, since that is, even non-spatially speaking, where abstract thinking and visual perception occurs?  No, for any sort of perception can only occur within a consciousness, so me feeling anything at all regarding my body from my scalp down to my toes means my consciousness extends all the way through it.  It is logically possible for a consciousness to exist without a particular experience, like that of feeling a stubbed little toe or the emotion of happiness, yet it is impossible for me to experience something like the feeling of a ring on my finger without myself being conscious in a way that includes sensory perceptions and without something of my mental self permeating that part of my physical form.

My consciousness is local to my perceived head, since that is where I both generally perceive and also experience things like intentional thoughts, decisions of the will, and phenomena like the recollection of memories.  My body at large is still conscious as far as outward sensations go, though consciousness is intertwined with the body rather than a part of it; the interior of my body, on the contrary is shielded from my basic sensory experiences so that I would not feel anything inside except during circumstances like having a full stomach, feeling water descend in my throat, or experiencing a strained muscle.  As I have said before, senses require consciousness, but consciousness does not require senses.

In actuality, physical sensations, which includes these, are the only ones that logically necessitate (epistemologically) that I really do have a body (metaphysically).  Something like visual perceptions of my body utterly falls short of absolute certainty past the fact that the perceptions are being experienced in my mind.  I could also have a body without perceiving certain parts or even the whole of it, such as if when I am dreaming [1], but I cannot perceive any part of it without my mind existing and passively experiencing senses at the same time, even though some of the exact details of the sensory experiences could be totally illusory.  With physical sensations, this is not the case when it comes to the existence of my body as a physical residence for my mind, since a consciousness without a body could not experience physical sensations due to be immaterial.

My mind is nonetheless extended, though it does not occupy metaphysical space as a non-physical existent, throughout whatever parts of my body I perceive passively or otherwise.  One can reflect on the same truths as one fixates on particular parts of the body that might be far from the centralization of one's mind (which is not the brain regardless of the causal relationship).  One can will one's arm to lift, and it moves accordingly, but the arm is not thinking.  It is reacting in accordance to the will, which is experienced, as it were, in the head, though a unified consciousness is still present that has branches elsewhere.  My foot does not think, yet I can think and induce it to move.


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