The So-Called Problem Of Evil

If evil exists, why would it necessarily reflect an individual's whims?  Evil, if it does indeed exist, would not be a product of one's feelings, or else it would be nothing but a perception with no correspondence to actual obligation or injustice.  It is entirely possible for good and evil to be downright terrifying to people with consciences or preferences that conflict with them.  These are the facts that anyone truly emotionalistic enough to appeal to the "problem of evil" must deny or be too dull to even begin to see.  In order to appeal to this so-called problem, someone must assume that some personal or societal idea of evil is true and then use this mere perception as a basis to philosophically attack the only possible moral authority that could exist: a deity with a moral nature.

Raging against theism because of the alleged problem of evil is the ideological equivalent of a young child throwing a tantrum because they did not get the toy they wanted at the exact moment they wanted it.  Indeed, mocking their intellectual childishness is just as valid a response to those who do this as recounting the reasons their beliefs are irrational.  The concepts this objection inescapably stands on, even if someone embracing this asinine stance does not realize it, are nothing but cultural appeals to popularity (which has nothing to do with any conceptual fact about logic, science, or values) or the elevation of personal feelings.  What else could a person look to in order to argue against the notion of a deity?

A somewhat more intelligent person might pose the problem of evil as an internal criticism of theism, but even this is erroneous.  Theism can be amoral, for starters.  Just because God exists as an uncaused cause does not mean that it has a moral nature.  It would follow that not all theism entails a set of moral obligations for humans to follow.  A God with a moral nature would also not have to have a nature that any other being at all feels is morally good.  Moreover, the only kind of "evil" a deity could be charged with is hypocrisy if it is directly responsible for the immoral acts and intentions its own nature condemns (as is the case on a Calvinism).  Not all types of religious theism or broader philosophical theism would have this internal contradiction.

There is no "problem" of evil.  There is either evil to object to or no evil to object to; neither possibility involves conscience having epistemological validity beyond introspective purposes, and neither possibility makes the uncaused cause a moral monster.  The only person who thinks the problem of evil has any weight whatsoever are fallacious thinkers who make obvious assumptions or base their worldview on their emotions.  In other words, people who object to a specific kind of theism or to the very idea of a deity on the basis of "evil" are emotionalistic to the core, relying on subjective preferences that have no bearing on ultimate reality.

A fool thinks that their personal reaction to something dictates whether it is morally right or wrong, and a fool thinks that any kind of theism deserves condemnation because of their petty conscience.  Nothing about reality other than their own perceptions and longings reflects their own subjectivity.  To argue against theism, whether a particular type or all of them, because of the so-called problem of evil is to argue from nothing but personal frustration--an objectively meaningless thing in this context.  It does not matter how "wounded" someone might be by events in their life.  It does not matter how scared they are of how it is logically possible that deeds they dislike are actually good or even obligatory.  As a rationalist, I have nothing but mockery and contempt for such a fool.

Logic, people.  It is very fucking helpful.