Equally Invalid Moral Ideas

Either morality exists, meaning it is objective in that human awareness and feelings do not ground it, or it does not exist at all.  Only a fool even entertains the impossibility of moral relativism.  Feelings about moral ideas are subjective, but, again, only a fool thinks that subjectivity of emotion and general perception makes reality itself subjective.  This could not be true any more than it could be true that the inherent subjectivity behind sensory perceptions makes the nature of the external world subjective.  In both cases, someone must mistake their perceptions, emotions, and preferences with all aspects of reality relevant to an issue.

Although it is logically impossible for moral relativism or any other kind of relativism to be true (not that this means moral obligations exist; it only means whether they exist or not has nothing to do with perceptions and preferences), even if relativism was true, it would not mean what it is often taken to suggest.  The world's many affirmative moral stances would not all become equally valid ways of approaching ethics.  No, none of them could deserve any sort of admiration or allegiance.  The opposite would be true.  Every moral stance would be equally invalid in the sense that none of them correspond to any aspect of reality beyond mere perceptions.  What is perceived as empowering by imbecilic pseudo-thinkers is actually what entails the worthlessness of all moral ideas.

Moral relativism can therefore never be used as a logical way to escape criticism.  If anything, it only means there would not be any basis for so much as objecting to the criticism unless a misunderstanding of motives or logical facts was involved, but there would not be an obligation to be consistent, rational, or respectful of other people's true actions or intentions.  Moral relativism, like moral objectivism, is completely incompatible with the idea that others deserve to be regarded kindly no matter what they believe, say, or do.  It means there are no moral obligations, just personal feelings about how one wishes morality would be.  This leaves no room for obligatory or rational cooperation as if everyone is suddenly of great value.

All types of relativism, alongside total skepticism due to its self-refuting nature, reduce down to the ultimate form of irrationality: a denial of the necessary nature of logical truths.  Pointing out an ultimate inability to prove the existence of morality trivializes subjective preferences just as much as any kind of moral realism does.  Either way, there is no grand value in moral "convictions," as if people are special just for feeling a certain way about something that has nothing to do with their feelings.  This is never the case.  Relativism of all kinds, moral or not, reduces to pure irrationalism that misunderstands subjective perceptions by conflating them with all of reality.