Two Mistaken Ideologies About Conscience

There are two majority stances on the nature of conscience.  The first, and most popular, holds that conscience is direct confirmation of the existence of objective moral obligations that are revealed to most or all people.  This fallacious position is unfortunately the most common one throughout human history.  Even in the contemporary world, it maintains a stronghold in the minds of many.  The second stance, contrarily, holds that the subjective nature of conscience proves that morality has no objective existence.

Due to the prevalence of the first stance in the church and secular world, I have addressed and refuted it many times.  The second is less common, although it is just as asinine.  Those who endorse the latter often conflate moral relativism with moral nihilism, although relativism involves numerous subjective moral frameworks simultaneously being true and nihilism means no values exist.  Confusion about the genuinely distinct ideas is commonplace, even though relativism is logically impossible and moral nihilism is entirely possible (despite there being evidence for moral realism).

This particular confusion aside, the idea that the subjectivity of moral feelings entails a metaphysical moral relativity, whether or not relativism and nihilism are being conflated, is no less mistaken than the prevailing evangelical and secular framework of moral epistemology.  There is no connection whatsoever between the nature of conscience and the metaphysical existence or nonexistence of morality.  No degree of consensus or intensity behind a given moral emotion can verify that some set of moral obligations exists, but no degree of subjectivity in a person's moral feelings reflects anything about ethical metaphysics.

Thus, the epistemological uselessness of conscience does not mean that morality does not exist.  The utter subjectivity and arbitrary nature of conscience makes it impossible for moral feelings to prove anything about the existence or nature of objective morality, and anyone who objects to this can ironically only do so on subjective grounds, but it is also true that the subjectivity of conscience cannot prove that morality does not exist.  Both conclusions are mere non sequiturs; neither conclusion follows in any way.

In both cases, conscience is of no epistemological value beyond recognizing one's own personal moral feelings, preferences, and perceptions.  It is emotionalism that has persuaded people that anything else is true about the matter.  Those who believe that their moral feelings establish the existence of moral obligations are delusional, but those who believe that the sheer subjectivity of conscience establishes that there are no objective moral obligations are just as inept.