Though scientists may insist otherwise, neuroscience itself is ultimately irrelevant to the entire subject of free will. Even if free will was completely unverifiable or unfalsifiable, neuroscience would have no bearing on the epistemology of the issue [1], in part because of the inability of science to establish metaphysical facts (other than facts about our perceptions) and in part due to the distinction between consciousness and matter. Denial of this fact is one of the greatest mistakes made by modern neuroscientists and biologists at large.
Phenomenology transcends mere biology, as consciousness--the animating force possessed by all sentient life--is nonphysical, even if human consciousness would not exist without matter. Consciousness, which is a prerequisite for having a will, is an immaterial existent. Thus, the determinism that defines how the external world affects the body does not automatically mean that the will is dictated by physical events. Furthermore, the latter type of determinism can be completely falsified!
As I have emphasized multiple times before, no one has to assume that they have free will, and to propose that an assumption is epistemologically valid is asinine (an assumption might be true, but one cannot assume and know at the same time). Not only does it not follow from any biological fact about the human body that free will does not exist, but the very existence of knowledge--something that cannot exist without a mind--proves the presence of free will [2]. Unless one can freely choose one's worldview, one cannot know if an idea is true, as external forces control one's worldview formation. To deny that one can know at least some things, though, is inherently self-refuting, and thus free will's existence can be proven and not merely assumed.
Our bodies may have many processes that are wholly unaffected by our wills, but our wills inescapably govern our actions, and we can voluntarily direct the thoughts that precede those actions as we please. If I wish to raise my leg, I can; if I wish to speak or refrain from speaking, I can likewise do so. In any of these cases, it is I myself who both wills to perform these activities and subsequently carries them out, the possibility of a choice to avert each action present at all times. I am certainly a biological creature--but I am not merely a deterministic biological machine, and neither is any other being which is metaphysically equivalent to me.
[1]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2019/07/neuroscience-is-irrelevant-to-free-will.html
[2]. https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2018/09/refuting-assumption-about-free-will.html
Would this refute compatibilism as well, or only the strictest versions of determinsm? Because if two opposing views can't be rationally held at the same time, then it seems to me that compatibilism tries to have it's cake and eat it too?
ReplyDeleteAnother question I had is how is cause and effect in general or deciding to choose one thing over another reconciled with free will? I recently watched Crash Course Philosophy on youtube and at one point Hank Green addresses a counter argument to free will and I quote:
"Where would free decisions--the ones that launch entirely new causal chains--come from? Are they simply random? What would compel an agent to make one decision, and not another? And if you could answer those questions--if you can explain what would cause an agent to act--then well, you've just reinforced the position that actions are caused rather than free."
The video kinda moves on after that, but I wanted to know what the response to this would be! The free will/determinism is pretty complex to me so forgive me if you have to repeat yourself haha!
https://youtu.be/vCGtkDzELAI (here's the link, if you wanted to check out the full video!)
Establishing any form of free will or determinism, no matter how limited, disproves compatibalism, as compatibalism is indeed fatally flawed for the very reason you pointed out! Instead of distinguishing certain mental events (decisions and at least some thoughts) from strictly physical events and recognizing that the former is immaterial and the latter is deterministic, compatibalists try to treat some of the same events as being both "necessary"/preordained and freely chosen at the same time. Whether they argue that the predetermined aspects of mental events are preordained by God, the laws of physics, or some other force or thing, they are arguing for an impossibility. If I choose something, I am by definition the thing making the decision, and thus the same role cannot also be played by God, physical matter, or anything else.
DeleteAs for the video, I'll start with a refutation of what the opening part about Oedipus implies. The concept of fate doesn't automatically contradict free will in the sense that Oedipus makes his own free decisions to come to a prophesied set of events. Prophecies (true prophecies, that is) about the behaviors of individuals have no causal connection whatsoever to the actions of the individuals they refer to, just as divine foreknowledge doesn't negate free will. Knowing that something will happen does not mean that the people involved in that event or series of events are not genuinely making their own free decisions. When it comes to the subject of where decisions come from, the issue of how a free decision is caused is only a matter of describing how free will works, not whether or not it actually exists.
A free decision certainly is caused, as a decision is still an "event," but it is caused only by the agent who makes the decision. Free will is self-guided, so the thing that causes an agent to act is the agent itself. That a being has free will means that no external spiritual/theological or physical factor keeps it from making a choice, even if that choice is only on a mental plane--for instance, a person could be physically bound and thus be unable to walk around with or without the desire to do so, but he or she can still choose to focus on certain thoughts, deliberate about the situation, and plan possible escape tactics. There is still a causal relationship between the will and certain thoughts/actions even though the will is free! The man in the video describes causality as if every event or effect having a cause entails determinism, but my will causing my actions or thoughts (some thoughts might occur against one's will, but not all of them do) doesn't mean that there is no possibility for me to choose any option other than what I choose at a given time. It means that I chose one of several possibilities available at that time.
Ultimately, the fact that knowledge (not the existence of logical facts, but awareness of them) requires free will--and the fact that some things can be known with absolute certainty (many things, in fact, as I've written about before!)--means that the ability to reflect on and understand anything at all proves the existence of at least a limited free will. To deny knowledge is to affirm at least basic self-verifying axioms in an attempt to escape them, and thus the very notions that free will is unprovable or illusory cannot be anything other than wholly, demonstrably false. This is why proving that you yourself have free will is very simple, no matter how many questions there might still be about how free will and other aspects of reality intersect.
Sorry for the long answer! Does that clarify anything for you?
I think so! At the very least, the thing I most understand is that rationality would be impossible without any freedom of will. If humans are just "biological machines" in a naturalistic sense, the chemicals in our brains or some other cause are solely responsible for all our thought patterns, like falling dominos. You would have virtually zero control over what conclusions you arrive to, whether correct or incorrect. You can't blame someone for being irrational or committing an evil act, biology is to blame! He or she was wired to do that.
DeleteI've also found it puzzling whenever I hear Christians who criticize the naturalist stance like I did last paragraph about how nature would be responsible for our actions and thoughts, but then affirming theistic determinism and seeing nothing wrong. It's the same flawed argument you argue against, the only difference is just substituting "Nature" with God. But I'm sure you'd get accused of blasphemy for pointing that out!
Exactly! I hate that many Christian apologists say that rationality is impossible without free will, but then turn around and act like free will isn't proven by rationality at the same time (yet another example of their epistemological hypocrisy where they claim nothing is absolutely certain and claim that they can know certain things all at once). Even if consciousnesses wasn't purely immaterial, a fact that isn't brought up enough when free will is discussed, it follows necessarily from one knowing even the most fundamental axioms that free will exists simply because there can be no knowledge at all without it.
DeleteThe Christians who believe in theological determinism probably think that their denial of free will is somehow "safer" than one rooted in materialism because it involves God. If so, they feel more comfortable imagining that God controls their behaviors than imagining that the natural world does. It's a blatant inconsistency, and yet many of them don't seem to realize that they are holding to an idea they would criticize in another context. It's also very ironic that many Christians have to affirm that the Bible teaches human moral responsibility in order to at least superficially seem to have Biblical theology, even if they deny human free will!
Oh one more question!
Delete"No one can come to Me unless the Father who sent Me draws him..." -John 6:44
Is free will still consistent with this verse? Do humans still have the capacity to reject the drawing of God?
The Greek word for "draw" in John 6:44 can mean "persuade," which would not contradict the verses in the Bible that clearly describe free will in any way. The Bible does affirm that humans can resist or reject God of their own volition elsewhere, though, as in the case of Acts 7. In Acts 7:51, Stephen says that the people who are about to stone him are like their ancestors in that they "always resist the Holy Spirit." Anyone who claims that the Bible says no one can resist God's desire for their redemption has not read it very thoroughly!
DeleteIf no one could reject salvation even though God wants them to be saved (and he wants everyone to be saved according to 2 Peter 2:9 and 1 Timothy 2:3-4), then God is responsible for the fate of the unsaved, as they would be restored to him if he only wanted it. This would mean that he intentionally makes them remain in a state of sin whether or not they would choose it on their own, which in turn would mean that God is not morally perfect according to the very moral framework described in the Bible--but this is a contradiction within the Christian worldview and a sheer logical impossibility even outside of a Biblical context (the uncaused cause might not have a moral nature, but there can be no such thing as an immoral deity)!
Instead of accepting that the majority of the Bible obviously teaches that humans have free will and that the only handful of verses that might initially seem to deny free will actually do no such thing, Calvinists like to isolate verses like John 6:44 from the rest of the Bible and only interpret them in light of their mere assumptions about the nature of God and humanity. Since many of them are presuppositionalists, they are certainly not going to admit that at least parts of the Bible would be false if they did teach Calvinism, as logic proves 1) that knowledge requires free will and 2) that knowledge of logical axioms and one's own existence, at a minimum, is constantly before the mind of every conscious person. Instead of following reason wherever it leads, they prefer to hide in the shadows of erroneous, heretical traditions that distort God's moral and relational nature.