The Epistemology Of Absurdism

In his Myth of Sisyphus, absurdist philosopher Albert Camus offered a rather excellent description of the epistemology of an absurdist.  Absurdism as a philosophy is not the product of mere emotional confusion, but the conclusion of a purely rational examination of the human limitations we find ourselves confined by.

Camus explains how the absurdist stands firm amidst the irrational calls of others:


"I don't know whether this world has a meaning that transcends it.  But I know that I do not know that meaning and it is impossible for me just now to know it . . .

At a certain point on his path the absurd man is tempted.  History is not lacking in either religions or prophets, even without gods.  He is asked to leap.  All he can reply is that he doesn't fully understand, that it is not obvious.  Indeed, he does not want to do anything but what he fully understands.  He is assured that this is the sin of pride . . . Hence, what he demands of himself is to live solely with what he knows, to accommodate himself to what is, and to bring in nothing that is not certain.  He is told that nothing is.  But this at least is certain." (17-18)


Camus here summarizes the goal of an absurdist.  An absurdist realizes that meaning cannot be proven to exist, yet many people cry out that it does in the name of numerous conflicting religions and ideologies.  In turn, the religious often accuse the absurdist of wallowing in pride that comes from wanting rational proof, as if they are not arbitrarily begging the question.  The absurdist rejects their unverified claims of meaning and resigns himself or herself to what can be known, for he or she is after truth, not preference or a desired belief.

Now I want to draw attention to the last two sentences of the quote.  Some religious apologists or apologists of arbitrary secular meaning reply with the self-defeating response that nothing is certain and therefore the absurdist should just accept something as meaningful.  But he or she sees that if nothing is certain, then the fact that nothing is certain is certain, and thus the objections of a non-absurdist fail, for certainty does exist in some places.  Truth exists, some knowledge is possible, and it is impossible for a conscious, rational being to escape these brute facts; to deny them is to rely on and prove them.  But meaning is not among the brute obvious facts of reality.  Camus explains elsewhere that the illogical pleadings of others are "not likely to stop the absurd man.  Seeking what is true is not seeking what is desirable" (14).

In short, the absurdist of Camus's description here is a thorough rationalist, who admits that certainty does exist in some areas but refuses to embrace what lies beyond the video of what can be objectively, absolutely known, whereas his or her critics may deny that certainty is possible (a self-defeating move) and tell the absurdist to believe in an unverified claim about meaning.  When people say we can know nothing, they could not possibly know nothing without knowing that they know nothing.  They defy and contradict a necessary truth grasped at the core of my conscious experience and existence.  When they say that the impossible claim that we know nothing somehow justifies belief in an unverified proposition, they have committed a double error, both denying something that cannot be false and then pretending that their absurdity justifies whatever beliefs they desperately want to be true.  It is they who have an absurd philosophy, not the absurdist.

I myself am a theistic absurdist in that I admit the necessary existence of an uncaused cause and realize that an inability to prove either nihilism or objective meaning results in a void of certainty about issues of meaning.  I am a Christian in the sense of having committed myself to live for Christianity on probabilistic evidentialist grounds, for Christianity has threefold support: 1) it agrees with necessary truths that cannot be false and can be known with absolute certainty, 2) it is internally consistent with its own claims, and 3) it is consistent with evidence from external disciplines which do not deal with necessary truths (like science and history).  Yet the entirety of Christianity cannot be proven and thus cannot be known to be true (including its value claims).  No, it does not follow from the existence of the uncaused cause that objective meaning exists.  That is why theism does not disprove either absurdism or nihilism.

Absurdism is not easy.  "It is always easy to be logical.  It is almost impossible to be logical to the bitter end" (3), Camus writes.  That is the problem I have faced as a theistic absurdist: I find myself embracing the discoveries of reason which cannot be false as I share a world with those who tell me that reason is unreliable (an impossible thing) and that nothing is certain and so I should just accept unproven value claims.  Yet it is indeed not an easy thing for me to look within my heart and mind and recognize that my desires for meaning and objective fulfillment might be desires for things that do not exist.  That is why my commitment to Christianity, a commitment far more nuanced and intellectually-fortified than that of many Christians I know of, actually displays a far more impressive allegiance to Christianity than anything that those who pursue blind faith or an irrational justification for Christianity can possibly exert.


The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays.  Camus, Albert.  Trans. O'Brien, Justin.  New York: Vintage Books, 1991.