The objective fact that many of the senses one uses in daily life prove nothing but that one has senses and that specific sensory perceptions are being experienced is in no way trivial. Although the epistemological disconnect between having sensory perceptions and knowing all of those perceptions are accurate is directly knowable apart from familiarity with particular hypothetical scenarios like the the brain in a vat possibility, these examples of various ways that one's senses might be inaccurately perceiving the material world range from a supernatural entity distorting one's perceptions to a technological cause. Of course, I could not possibly know that any of these situations are or are not true, but the brain in a vat possibility, the logically possible idea that my true body is a brain stimulated by technological means into producing the conscious perception that I am a person with two arms and legs, is sometimes dismissed as irrelevant to practicality and life.
Other than the psychological and ideological ramifications of the realization that this is possible--which are already deeper and more personal than any amount of practicality could ever be, for metaphysics and epistemology are more foundational to both reality and living in reality than the whole of practicality--there is no difference in how one lives if one is either inside a simulation of some kind or perceiving the true external world. However, absolute certainty, rationality, truth, and basic philosophical consistency are all involved in actually understanding that one's sensory perceptions are not necessarily accurate and, for the most part, prove nothing except that one is perceiving seeming external objects and environments of matter (the sense of touch can be recognized to logically necessitate that a world of matter exists [1], but no other sense that is not related to this one proves anything more than that sensory perceptions exist without regard to whether they correspond to matter outside of nonphysical consciousness).
Perhaps the sound of someone else's voice really is coming from another person, or perhaps the other person one is looking at does not exist except as a mental construct that amounts to a sensory illusion. In either case, yes, the basic experience of perceiving that another person is speaking to you is the same, but anyone who believes that which contradicts any of the aforementioned epistemological truths has an objectively asinine, false worldview. Only a fool believes that external objects exist just because they seem to, and only a fool believes that any sensory perception alone truly proves that the world exists and exists as it is perceived. The fact that people who have and have not thought about sensory skepticism must live somewhat similarly as far as outward actions goes does not in any way conflict with these logical truths or make sensory skepticism trivial.
The real reasons why anyone would push back against or not embrace sensory skepticism are always irrationality and fear. Since sensory perceptions alone do not prove anything except that one is perceiving things that might or might not be more than purely private mental experiences, it is irrational to believe otherwise no matter what anyone prefers. Since so many of our experiences pertain to the external world despite this, realizing how epistemologically unhelpful most of the senses are in an ultimate sense could just be overwhelming and terrifying for some people, enough to make them wish to ignore inconvenient truths. Indeed, many people talk and act as if it is truly difficult for them to avoid assumptions and merely be consistent with the truth or even with what they mistakenly believe to be true.
People who do not care about truth really care about the truth that they are too stupid or self-absorbed to look past themselves, or they are trying desperately to not let go of unexamined or false ideas. That some people emphasize sensory skepticism over more fundamental or all-encompassing parts of philosophy or mistake it for total skepticism about all of reality (when logic and introspection, at a minimum, are still absolutely certain) does not change the enormity and gravity of understanding what does not logically follow from everyday experiences with the senses. It is true that sensory skepticism, the nuances of it, and the knowable logical truths that underpin it are not the most foundational part of philosophy. It is not all-encompassing like logical axioms and their many inflexible ramifications. However, the truths about sensory skepticism and human sensory experiences are still vital and somewhat central in understanding what can be known of reality.
No comments:
Post a Comment