The right circumstances could force almost anyone to reevaluate their will to live in either an ideological or a personal sense. Some people at least talk as if they believe that it is epistemologically "obvious" that one should persevere in spite of trials, and they might even look down on those who grapple with the existential issues of absurdism (as an epistemological stance, absurdism is true) or with mental illnesses that could impede their eagerness to keep living. There are many assumptions in the idea that self-preservation is clearly worth pursuing. Some, furthermore, who believe these assumptions could very well have never suffered as severely as some who do not prize self-preservation. Of course, I am only pointing out the asinine errors and assumptions in this belief. I am not encouraging a lack of self-preservation!
What if it turned out to be immoral to preserve one's life? Many people have assumed the opposite to be true on the basis of moral feelings, social pressures, and personal preferences, which is ironically highly irrational. It is not that it is logically provable that one should not prolong or improve one's life, of course. It is just not rational to assume anything at all and the belief that someone should automatically strive for self-preservation is an assumption. Moreover, personal crises can make people who once loved life wonder if they even want to continue living with or without an objective moral reason to do so. Many are persuaded to endure for the sake of people who would mourn their absence without ever actually going beyond assumptions or preferences.
Assuming that one should want to live because of some practical consequence like pleasing family members or because one feels happy or morally stirred by the thought of self-preservation is contrary to reason. This is also true of assuming that there is anything about preserving one's existence that justifies casually harming others or treating them abusively in order to benefit oneself. All assumptions are epistemologically invalid, but these are false assumptions because practicality and personal interest are irrelevant to truth, proofs, and obligation. However, it is asinine to deny that it is possible for there to be a reason one should live regardless of feelings or consequences. These are just things a person could believe about self-preservation that are irrational no matter how appealing or commonly believed they are.
It is irrational to assume anything at all, including that one's life automatically has value greater than that of strangers--which can certainly drive people to seek self-preservation at the expense of others--or that doing something immoral is fine as long as it benefits oneself. Self-preservation or self-gain motivated by any kind of assumptions about logic, morality, one's own self, and other things is inherently irrational, in fact. The idea that benefitting oneself or even wanting to continue existing is self-evidently what one should do is outright false. So too is the idea that it is rational to believe in any set of values, including egoism, short of absolute logical proof, which is unattainable given human limitations. Value systems can only be disproven if they are inconsistent (self-contradictory) or supported by evidence, such as how the evidence for Christianity is evidence for its values being true (this is the only value system that has any evidence since all others epistemologically reduce down to having no evidence or just being preferences).
The idiotic belief that it is rational to always seek self-preservation is based in nothing but assumptions, and false ones at that, meant to motivate a person to arbitrarily desire to continue life without ever actually thinking rationally about the matter, in an irony that is not at all surprising to an established rationalist. Living is only easy if one already wants to live, and many people have likely never thought about self-preservation beyond personal desire. The idea that self-preservation is obviously good, especially in all circumstances, ignores the fact that preference does not prove obligation (meaning those who prefer to live are not morally or intellectually valid simply for having a natural preference), the fact that a person who lacks the will to live and does not intentionally preserve their life is not being fully irrational in the way some might think, and the fact that if certain moral obligations exist, it is actually irrational and unjust to preserve one's life at the expense of fulfilling those obligations.
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