The Clarity And Accuracy Of Memory

The clarity of a memory sometimes depends greatly on the amount of time that has elapsed since the event it recalls actually happened.  Because of this, some might think that a new memory without blurry details makes knowledge that specific past events happened or specific aspects of past events absolutely certain.  At the very least, memories of events can be far more coherent and easy to dissect when not much time has passed.  Memories can have degrees of clarity based on such mental factors, yes--epistemological limitations still do not disappear simply because a memory seems more accurate or precise.

The details of the memory might be clearer and the speed of recall faster, but other epistemological hindrances remain.  The largest is that memories still prove nothing more than that one has memories.  The facts that memories can and do exist are absolutely certain; anyone who understands the absolute certainty of logical deductions and immediate introspective states can realize this.  There is a vast gulf between perceptions and knowledge of the full reality beyond the perceptions when it comes to memory, a gulf that logic can expose without providing an epistemological bridge across.

The inability for one to find such a bridge is not due to reason itself.  On the contrary, reason is itself the only reason a bridge between total ignorance and absolute certainty about anything at all is present in the first place.  The limitation lies within the nature of human perception, and without the ability to grasp reason, no mind could ever understand even the contents of its memories or that it is non sequitur folly to conflate memories and events, as the two are very distinct.  Human memories simply function with the limitation of having no knowledge if what the memories suggest happened.

This epistemological disconnect remains even when a memory of a past occurrence is at its strongest and most personally impactful.  The amount of time that has passed since the recalled event (whether or not it actually occurred) has no inherent bearing on how clearly one remembers it, but it also provides no special epistemological advantage in that the non sequitur disconnect between having memories and those memories being accurate still remains, no matter how strong the memories are or how recently they formed.

Having just seen or heard something therefore does not provide more assurance than having seen or heard it long ago in an ultimate sense.  No matter how distant or recent the recalled event was, the same absolute certainties and the same unknowable aspects remain for both: the memories infallibly exist without providing any knowledge of actual events, only knowledge of one's recalled experiences.  That memories do not constantly, totally conflict with each other and sensory perceptions proves that one's memory is consistent with one's general experiences.  That it does not logically follow from having a memory that a specific event actually happened proves that this fact only illuminates something about the contents of one's mind.