The Greek philosopher Plato proposed that beyond our sensory inputs exist objects he called the "forms," with forms of beauty, goodness, and other concepts existing. These forms, existing outside of temporal human experience, would remain immutable and thus the concepts they reflect would not change. Moral Platonism is the belief that moral truths simply exist abstractly. I will contrast this view with theonomy, the belief that God's moral laws alone have moral validity. On this view there is no other moral authority besides God and no ultimate way to know morality apart from his (or her in non-Christian theonomy) revelation.
With moral Platonism defined, its severe epistemological flaw becomes apparent. On this worldview, nothing exists to reveal moral truths to humans. Humans can be born with a sense of morality or develop one by various means; whether or not this moral sense conforms to reality is unverifiable and unfalsifiable. The greatest epistemic problem with Platonism of this type is the fact that humans would have absolutely no way to view the forms--since they exist abstractly outside of our sensory perceptions--and no therefore no way to correctly judge if a particular view (say, of justice or virtue) matches the forms or even if the forms exist. Someone consistently living as a moral Platonist to the logical end of such a worldview will arrive at despair, moral skepticism, and uncertainty.
But with theonomy, God actively reveals moral truths to humans, negating the epistemological problem of moral Platonism. If God is good, then good can only be one of three things: 1) something randomly decided by God at his possibly fluctuating whims, 2) a standard external to God which God can deviate from, or 3) God IS good. According to 1) there is not necessarily such thing as something inherently or unchangingly good, as all moral obligations could change as God's whims do. With 2), God only possesses the attribute of goodness inasmuch as he complies with an outside standard of morality. This would best describe the relationship between God and morality in a universe governed by moral Platonism.
In other words, we would obey God not because he is good, but only because he happens to instruct us in a way consistent with this standard that exists independent of him. But with 3), God does not do good by looking to an outside standard or by redefining good as his decision and commands change; he acts according to his nature and thus his commands are objectively good because his nature is objectively good. Christian doctrine from the Bible can merge this idea with the explicit Scriptural position that God's nature never changes (Malachi 3:6, James 1:17, etc), the two forming the Christian idea that moral truths never change.
Because God is the metaphysical anchor for morality, he must reveal moral truths to humans for them to have moral knowledge. The common idea that conscience serves as moral revelation to humans cannot provide an adequate basis for moral knowledge, however, as conscience is inescapably subjective, malleable, and subject to deadening and fluctuation. I have written more extensively elsewhere on why conscience can do nothing more than restrain the acts of individuals who honor it [1]. Because of the limitations and unreliability of conscience, God, who IS good, must reveal to us details about right and wrong, or we would otherwise never know them except by accident. Even this represents a major epistemological advantage over moral Platonism, though!
We do not need to aimlessly and blindly align our actions with arbitrary moral beliefs and just hope that the "forms" of morality happen to coincide with our moral beliefs. Clearly, access to and understanding of special divine revelation [2] will vary depending on variables like geography and other sociocultural, political, and educational forces. Theonomist morality does remain unknown to people who only have their subjective or socially-conditioned moral ideas to base their ethical beliefs on. Yet it is the only logically verifiable ontological source of moral knowledge. Even if true, however, moral Platonism fails to provide any means for us to access true moral knowledge, always leading to hopeless moral skepticism in the end.
Summary of observations:
1. Moral Platonism holds that moral truths exist abstractly.
2. If moral Platonism is true, we have no way to know moral truths.
3. Christianity proposes that God is the standard of morality instead of saying God is either good or evil depending on his actions.
4. God must reveal moral truths to humans for them to have moral knowledge.
[1]. See here:
A. http://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-illusionary-guidance-of-natural-law.html
B. http://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/03/the-nature-of-conscience.html
[2]. By special divine revelation I mean information from God not accessible simply by reason or human experiences without divine assistance.
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