Suppose that a hypothetical person was to be cloned. The duplicate would be a perfect physical copy of the original, and yet no changes to the cloning process could ever eliminate the distinction between the two. The reason the two cannot be the same goes beyond the fact that two physically separate beings cannot be the same single entity, however, as a crucial part of the distinction pertains to the phenomenological dimension of individual persons. Even if a full physical clone of a human was created, the clone would immediately develop its own cauldron of memories.
Without memory, there could be no constant, unified sense of self, as there would be nothing to bind together one's experiences. It is precisely because of memory that even complete physical clones could never be identical to the subject of the cloning on a personal level. As soon as a clone is brought to a state of consciousness, the clone and the original being would be different persons--and not only in the sense that their bodies are distinct.
From the moment that the memories of the two diverged, their personal identies would diverge as well. The metaphysical identities of a person and his or her clone are already separate by default, as the two are not the same being simply by virtue of not having the same body. This does not distinguish them on a phenomenological level, though. Memory is the only thing that distinguishes the personal nature of one from the other.
It is memory that captures the experiences of one individual and connects those experiences in a way that makes them unique. Despite being taken for granted by many, memory holds together the core of personal identity (not logical/metaphysical identity, as aforementioned) on a continual basis. The significance of memory formation for one's identity is only affirmed by the fact that not even complete physical cloning could guarantee identical memories.
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