The senses are capable of perceiving a vast amount of information, but a being must possess both an intellect (which grasps the laws of logic) and a working memory in order for its sensory perceptions to be useful. The former is required to even comprehend that one is experiencing sensory perceptions, while the latter is what enables future expectations about phenomena in the external world to be constructed.
Suppose that a hypothetical person named Amanda observes for the first time that water can extinguish fire if a proper amount of it is used (whether that water comes from artificial or natural sources). As she notices this, she does not need to recall any past precedent to make sense of her findings, as this is the first time she has seen this occurrence; memory is not needed to perceive something in the present moment.
Does Amanda truly know that water will be capable of putting out fires in the future? Certainly not, since the laws of nature, unlike the laws of logic, are not necessarily fixed. However, she now has a basis for believing that it seems likely that this phenomenon is repeatable. She does know that there is at least some evidence that this is the case.
Her memories of watching water and fire interact are themselves evidence that water will probably be able to quench fire in the future. This example highlights a crucial point about memory: apart from recollections of past experiences with the external world, information gained by the senses is practically useless. The senses cannot independently provide any basis for future expectations.
Memory is vital to the basic epistemological aspects of everyday interaction with the external world, for without it there can be no awareness of any sensory perceptions except those which are experienced in the present. It is unfortunate that the subject of memory does not appear to be addressed very thoroughly or frequently by many philosophers, as our interactions with external objects hinge on it almost entirely.
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