Wednesday, October 27, 2021

Rationalistic Sensory Skepticism: There Is No Need For Specific Examples Like The Matrix

Almost every mainstream discussion or reflection on the fact that perceiving something with the senses alone does not automatically make that perception accurate is presented with specific examples of ways sensory perceptions might not reflect the physical world.  After all, there is a reason The Matrix remains a prominent part of popular culture despite the dominance of irrationalistic epistemology and priorities.  The situation depicted in The Matrix is one that can neither be proven nor disproven (although it can be proven that there is no evidence whatsoever that it is anything more than a mere logical possibility) and has actually helped make the epistemological disconnect between looking at something and proving to oneself that it is really there outside one's mind.


The truth is that no one needs to specifically think of or share hypothetical examples like a technology-based scenario like that of The Matrix or a theological entity like a deceiving deity in order to understand that there is no logical connection between having a visual or auditory perception and that perception corresponding to the actual external world.  While the examples are especially useful for conversations with people who have little to no philosophical initiative and are too unintelligent or apathetic to reflect on or at least try to seek out fundamental logical facts themselves, the logical truth that perception does not always prove something is as it is perceived is not often talked about in a broader sense without these examples.

None of this means examples should be actively avoided or that they are not helpful even for personal contemplation.  There are indeed multiple distinct reasons why a being with inaccurate sensory perceptions might experience such a thing.  For starters, the two examples already mentioned are possibilities.  I cannot prove that there is not an external technological or supernatural force actively keeping me from visually perceiving the external world as it is--not that I could know that I was seeing the external world as it is even if this hypothetical barrier was lifted.  Even the possibility of visual and auditory hallucinations is another example of how the epistemological divide between general sensory perceptions and the exact nature of the external world could reflect a hypothetical metaphysical reality.

Sometimes examples do lead a person to core logical truths and sometimes the core logical truths, knowable in the absence of all specific examples of their applications, lead a person to particular examples.  Some people might continue to focus back and forth as they dwell on things.  There is nothing irrational about happening to use examples as a springboard, to be clear.  What is irrational is thinking that it is examples like a technological matrix or a god who actively distorts the senses that are necessary to either come to realize that sensory perceptions are not necessarily accurate or to truly understand the ramifications thoroughly after having discovered this epistemological issue.

Examples have their place of usefulness.  They can help clarify various truths or concepts and can provide specific possibilities to analyze or offer to others.  When examples are falsely elevated beyond this, they are distortions of concepts or are focused on more than the truth or possibility they illustrate.  If more people truly cannot understand that examples are largely just a means to an end rather than the heart of concepts, perhaps we would see more conversations use examples without having entire positions reduce down to mere examples instead of the logical truths behind those examples.  In a society comprised of people who understand this, there would be more rationalistic awareness and likely more communication without red herring emphases.

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