Philosophical Pragmatism

Utilitarianism is one of the most popular forms of philosophical pragmatism, a moral framework that prioritizes the consequences of behaviors over whatever methods must be used to reach or avoid those consequences.  As long as a certain course of action leads to "ideal" results (what is ideal here is always an arbitrarily designated thing) for the individual or some collective group, perhaps even the human species as a whole, a utilitarian would deem it morally permissible, if not explicitly obligatory.  This is one of the most culturally popular ideologies that centers on the practicality of achieving specific ends, but a consistent utilitarianism has ramifications for epistemology as well.

Moral utilitarianism is only a smaller part of what could be a broader framework of philosophical pragmatism in which the practicality of an idea for a certain end goal is given precedence over its truth and ultimate verifiability.  Consistent philosophical pragmatism is therefore the epistemological, moral, and general emphasis on the mere practicality of concepts in light of everyday life and goals.  This worldview centers on whether or not something is helpful and advantageous; truth is set aside as irrelevant wherever it might not be easy, useful, or preferable to do such a thing.  Whether a goal is personal or shared by a group, practicality comes first.

Thus, this form of pragmatism insists that it is true that truth itself is secondary to whether something is convenient or even seems to be so.  After all, what would be the point in adhering to philosophical pragmatism and even trying to distinguish between what is practical and what only seems to be convenient whenever making the distinction is not itself pragmatic?  If it is convenient while pursuing a given goal to even pretend or perceive that something is useful, that itself would justify a belief or action on a wholly pragmatist worldview!  Nothing at all would be higher than practicality according this ideology.

Science often receives more attention from pragmatists than the abstract laws of logic for this reason.  Apart from the necessity of at least someone making empirical sensory observations that others may not seek out, it takes far less effort to be a scientific pragmatist than it does to be a consistent rationalist.  For someone turning to reason and rationalism after years of apathy towards matters of absolute certainty and genuine consistency, not to mention years of experiencing enormous amounts of social conditioning from people of different worldviews, it can be very difficult to look to reason instead of assumptions or convenience.

Of course, without reason, whether it is acknowledged or unacknowledged, even the most practical of ideas or experiences could not be understood.  Every worldview borrows from rationalism even when they explicitly deny or deviate from reason, just as every sentient being knowingly or unknowingly relies on their grasp of reason to be aware that they are even having an experience in the first place.  Rationalism has the benefit of actually being true: it is the one worldview and epistemological framework that contains all other true ideas, including truths about practicality itself.  Ignoring or warring against reason is by nature irrational even when it means giving up convenience.