Saturday, September 18, 2021

Forsaking Intuition

There are many different ways that intuitions, the spontaneous, personal perceptions strong enough that a non-rationalist is likely to immediately yield to them, can manifest themselves.  One kind of intuition is moral intuition: this is observed inwardly whenever a person who has not rationalistically analyzed their moral emotions feels their conscience flaring up all of the sudden in reaction to certain thoughts or events.  Of course, conscience is epistemologically invalid no matter what, but this is still a crucial example of intuition.  Another type is present when someone has a strong tendency to believe in a sensory phenomena like object permanence without critically assessing the idea.  There are different categories that all share the same fundamental flaws.

The reason why so many people rely on intuition, knowingly or unknowingly, likely reduces down to the ease of doing so.  Instead of reasoning by not making assumptions, starting with what cannot be false (logical axioms), and then seeing what does and does not follow from these truths, a person who looks to intuition as a source of genuine knowledge about things other than their own perceptions has to only experience thoughts and perceptions as they surface and act on them.  With this approach to epistemology, there is no effort beyond perhaps occasionally analyzing how one form of intuition relates to other.  Now, there are plenty of ways to make assumptions, even ones of noteworthy stupidity, without defaulting to intuition, but the less thoughtful someone is, the more likely they are to never go beyond intuition.

Belief in anything based on intuition other than the fact that intuition exists (for experiencing an intuition does prove this much) is a glaring, avoidable folly that everyone is capable of seeing on their own if they only tried.  The absolute certainty of reason obliterates the assumption-based epistemology that honors intuition and regards it as something more than an irrelevant distraction from knowable truths about concepts and experiences beyond one's own sense of intuition.  If someone is concerned with true knowledge instead of the illusion of knowledge, they would either forsake intuition on their own or at least stop looking to it for knowledge, that which it cannot provide, once others rightfully mention how irrational it is to believe in moral, scientific, or other metaphysical stances based on intuition.

However, not only is it logically possible for a person who heavily relied on intuition to recognize their fallacious beliefs and actively stop believing in metaphysical or epistemological ideas based on intuition, but it is also possible to do so without a lasting or prolonged struggle to simply be rational.  Intuition and general assumptions of any kind are an epistemological prison that keeps someone from truth, yet they are a prison that anyone can walk out of by merely choosing to, embracing reason as they cease fallacious beliefs.  The collective assumptions non-rationalists make just happen to be an inviting prison that is easy for someone who does not sincerely care about truth to accept.

Intuition is the refuge of irrationalistic thinkers who are comfortable with making assumptions that appease their arbitrary desires and seem superficially consistent with their experiences.  It is incredibly easy (for a non-rationalist) and almost thoughtless to just believe whatever seems to be true at the moment, especially when something seems to be true because it is what unexamined experience and personal preference jointly point someone to.  A consistent rationalist rises above the petty, worthless pitfall of believing in even a single thing based on intuition.  In forsaking intuition, a rationalist is free to wholly align with reason.

No comments:

Post a Comment