Reductionism And Phenomenology

An engine may generate power for a car, but power is distinct from an engine in the same way that comfort is not a bed despite beds being capable of providing comfort.  That which is contingent on another thing is by necessity distinct from whatever brings it into existence.  This particular example is one that perhaps only several people have ever thought of in this context precisely because the fact it is meant to illustrate can seem so obvious.  After all, an engine is only a source of power instead of power itself, and it is very unlikely that one would ever hear someone staunchly insist that the opposite is true.

Even though the correlation between the nervous system and consciousness is identical in nature, it is not difficult to find someone who claims that consciousness is the same thing as the brain.  The exact causal relationship between the two is ultimately known, as is the case with the vast majority of causal relationships, but this in no way means that one cannot use reason to analyze the nature of consciousness and matter--which reveals that the former is immaterial despite the physicality of matter.  Even emergent naturalism (not that it is even possible for all immaterial things, like logic and space, to emerge from matter, as they are prerequisites) is still a form of substance dualism.

Anyone who would scoff at the thought of an ideology that conflates engines with a vehicle's power or a bed with comfort, rather than regarding the latter in each pair as a possible consequence of the former, should not have great trouble in comprehending why consciousness is not reducible to the brain or extended nervous system.  The body and mind are connected, but they are not synonymous.  The intangible seat of experiences summarized by the word consciousness does not and cannot be reduced to particles of any kind, whether or not consciousness is sustained by matter.

There are, of course, other logical facts about the issue that demand consideration, such as the ones addressed here [1], but they are not all requirements to understanding that substance dualism is both objectively true and provable.  Both one's consciousness and one's body can be demonstrated to exist, the first being self-evident and the second being demonstrable by a more elaborate deduction [2].  The existence of one could hinge on the other's existence, but the two are metaphysically distinct.  Consciousness is nonphysical.  To deny this is to contradict a fact about consciousness that is hardly difficult to establish with reason alone.


[1].  https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2019/03/reality-is-not-construct-of-nervous.html

[2].  https://thechristianrationalist.blogspot.com/2017/07/dreams-and-consciousness.html